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The historical position of the Tractatus. 
In my opinion the Tractatus is a working out of the 
correspondence theory of meaning which occupied Russell 
in the first decade of this century. It is the brilliant 
mausoleum of a theory whose dominance will be traced in 
such work of Russell's as The Principles of Mathematics 
(1903), ' On denoting ' (Mind, 1905), Philosophical 
Essays (1910) and The Problems of Philosophy (1912). 
At the same time it is the herald of a revolution; its 
dogmatic ruling on language gives way to investigation. 
' Red granite and black diorite, with 
the blue 
Of the labradorite crystals gleaming 
like precious stones 
In the light reflected from the snow; 
and behind them 
The eternal lightning of Lenin's bones.' 
' The skeleton of the future: At Lenin's tomb ', 
by Hugh Macdiarmid. 
The historical position of the Tractatus may be put, 
simply, as follows: Wittgenstein rigorously developes 
Russellian assumptions about language and judgment to 
the point at which they become quite unacceptable; in 
realising their unacceptability he developes his later 
philosophy. This is, admittedly, an over- simplification 
since it leaves out of account Moore, Frege and Hertz 
and suggests also that Wittgenstein added nothing of 
2. 
his own. I would still claim that the principal assumption 
of the Tractatus is that meaning demands correspondence 
and that Russell's work, as given above, is the most 
important immediate ancestor of the Tractatus. A more 
exact description of the relation between these two 
philosophers will be attempted in this thesis, together 
with remarks on such other predecessors as Moore and Frege. 
The earlier and the later Wittgenstein. 
It is generally agreed that Wittgenstein is one of the 
leading philosophers of the past half-century. 
' There can be no serious doubt that the most 
powerful and pervasive influence upon the 
practice of philosophy in this country today 
has been that of Ludwig Wittgenstein.' 
English Philosophy since 1900, p.62; G. J. Warnock. 
' The influence of Wittgenstein on modern 
philosophy, particularly in the English - 
speaking countries, has been very great... 
Wittgenstein stands out as a great and 
original philosophical genius.' 
The Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy 
and Philosophers, p.411; edited by J. C. Urmson. 
His work falls into two periods, the ' earlier 
Wittgenstein and the ' later '. Two works, of the 
considerable corpus published, are taken to be 
characteristic of these periods, the Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus (first published in English in 1922) and 
the Philosophical Investigations (published posthumously 
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in 1953). 
' Wittgenstein's work as a philosopher 
divides clearly into two periods. The 
definitive account of his earlier views 
is contained in the Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus, written in 1914 -18; he 
himself published no account of his later 
views, but we have an earlier version of 
them in the Blue and Brown Books which 
date from 1933 -35, and a later version 
in the Philosophical Investigations, 
which contain his thoughts, from the 
mid -thirties until his death.' 
The Concise Encyclopaedia, p.408. 
However, the contrast between these two works, and 
therefore between the periods they typify, should not be 
allowed to obliterate the continuity of Wittgenstein's 
thought.Indeed, it is the continuity which gives richness 
and meaning to the contrast and helps us to understand 
Wittgenstein's antipathy to philosophy as a type of theory. 
' 40031: All philosophy is a 
of language "...' 
Tractatus. 
critique 
' Philosophy may in no way interfere with 
the actual use of language; it can in the 
end only describe it.' 
Investigations, p.49e. 
As these quotations reveal, Wittgenstein's preoccupation 
was with the nature of language. It is this, fundamentally, 
which endows his work with a continuous theme. A more 
striking feature of his philosophic identity is his 
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conception of the role of the philosopher: it is not the 
philosopher's aim to produce a theory; he ought, rather, 
to see that certain ' practical ' problems in the use 
of language are resolved. His task is, in some sense, 
seeing that people can speak, not in telling them what to 
say. 
' 653: The correct method in philosophy 
would really be the following: to say 
nothing except what can be said, i.e. 
propositions of natural science - i.e. 
something that has nothing to do with 
philosophy - and then, whenever someone 
else wanted to say something metaphysical, 
to demonstrate to him that he had failed 
to give a meaning to certain signs in 
his propositions. Although it would not 
be satisfying to the other person - he 
would not have the feeling that we were 
teaching him philosophy - this method 
would be the only strictly correct one. 
4112: Philosophy aims at the logical 
clarification of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of 
doctrine but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists 
essentially of elucidations. 
Philosophy does not result in 
' philosophical propositions ', but 
rather in the clarification of propos- 
itions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, 
as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its 
task is to make them clear and to give 
them sharp boundaries.' 
Tractatus. 
' 126: Philosophy simply puts everything 
before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything.- Since everything lies 
open to view there is nothing to explain. 
For what is hidden, for example, is of 
no interest to us. 
5. 
One might also give the name 
" philosophy " to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and 
inventions.' 
Investigations, p.50e. 
Philosophic activity is pre- theoretical. If it takes 
place at all, it does so before theorising can begin. The 
solution to a pp.ilosophical problem is not a theory, since 
the problem is, characteristically, an inability to make 
the proper use of language. This type of inability is 
removed by understanding how language really works. 
So much for the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought. 
The discontinuity emerges most powerfully in the change in 
his conception of how language in fact does work. According 
to the early theory, linguistic meaning is a function of 
simple relationships operating at a level which stands to 
ordinary language in somewhat the same relation as the 
fundamental relationships described in physics stand to 
the everyday world. Accordingly, meaning in ordinary 
language depends on its reduction, through analysis, to 
a level of unanalysables out of which the complexes of 
language are variously constructed. 
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein rejects the 
atomic model. He also rejects the other half of the early 
theory, that meaning requires exact correspondence. The 
reductive and correspondence criteria are replaced by that 
6. 
of ' use '; not that the use -criterion has no place in the 
Tractatus - ' 3328: If a sign is useless, it is meaningless.' 
The difference comes with the, recognition that there are many 
things done with language, many uses for expressions, many 
different types and standard of performance. 
On reductionism he has this to say : - 
' When I say: " My broom is in the corner ",- 
is this really a statement about the broomstick 
and the brush? Well, it could at any rate be 
replaced by a statement giving the position 
of the stick and the position of the brush. 
And this statement is surely a further analysed 
form of the first one.- But why do I call it 
" further analysed "? - Well, if the broom is 
there, that surely means that the stick and 
brush must be there, and in a particular 
relation to one another; and this was as it 
were hidden in the sense of the first sentence, 
and is expressed in the analysed sentence. 
Then does someone who says that the broom 
is in the corner really mean: the broomstick 
is there, and so is the brush, and the 
broomstick is fixed in the brush? - If we 
were to ask anyone if he meant this he 
would probably say that he had not thought 
specially of the broomstick or specially of 
the brush at all. And that would be the 
right answer, for he meant to speak neither 
of the stick nor of the brush in particular. 
Suppose that, instead of saying " Bring 
me the broom ", you said " Bring me the 
broomstick and the brush which is fitted 
on to it. "! - Isn't the answer: " Do you 
want the broom? Why do you put it so 
oddly ?" Is he going to understand the 
further analysed sentence better? - This 
sentence, one might say, achieves the same 




The implication is that ' Bring me the broom ' is just 
as useful as ' Bring me the broomstick and the brush which 
is fitted on to it ' and therefore just as meaningful, even 
if one is an ' analysed ' version of the other. Analysis 
does not necessarily increase understanding. 
Wittgenstein does not have much to say explicitly against 
the correspondence theory of meaning, partly because in 
abandoning reductionism he repudiates the path from ordinary 
language to that level of meaning at which exact corres- 
pondence was thought to occur. Here is one of his comments 
on the inefficacy of correspondence theory:- 
' I see a picture; it represents an old 
man walking up a steep path leaning on a 
stick.- How? Might it not have looked 
just the same if he had been sliding 
downhill in that position? 
What is essential is to see that the 
same thing can come before our minds 
when we hear the word and the application 
still be different. Has it the same 
meaning both times? I think we Mil l
say not. 
141. Suppose, however, that not merely 
the picture of the cube, but also the 
method of projection comes before our 
mind? - How am I to imagine this? - Perhaps 
I see before me a schema spewing the method 
of projection: say a picture of two cubes 
connected by lines of projection. - But 
does this really get me any further? 
Can't I now imagine different applications 
of this schema too ?' 
Investigations, pps.54e & 55e. 
In short, mere correspondence is insufficient to explain 
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the meaning of a picture, since the application of the 
picture can alter. 
His main criticism of the correspondence theory of 
meaning is not brought to bear on the doctrine of logical 
form and picturing but on the theory of names and the 
correlative metaphysical theory of simples. According to 
the theory of names, meaning depends ultimately, though 
not wholly, on a set of expressions each of which is the 
name of some changeless and perfectly simple atom; and, 
further, every real name belongs to this set. 
' We said that the sentence " Excalibur 
has a sharp blade " made sense even when 
Excalibur was broken in pieces. Now this 
is so because in this language -game a name 
is also used in the absence of its bearer.' 
Investigations, p.21e. 
° But,' says the Atomist,' that is precisely why 
" Excalibur " is not a real name.' 
' ...if " Excalibur " is the name of an 
object, this object no longer exists when 
Excalibur is broken in pieces; and as no 
object would then correspond to the name 
it would have no meaning. But then the 
sentence " Excalibur has a sharp blade " 
would contain a word that had no meaning, 
and hence the sentence would be nonsense. 
But it does make sense; so there must 
always be something corresponding to the 
words of which it consists. So the word 
" Excalibur " must disappear when the 
sense is analysed and its place be taken 
by words which name simples. It will be 
9. 
reasonable to call these words the real 
names.' 
Op.cit., pps.19e & 20e. 
Wittgenstein's reply is that ' Excalibur ' is a name 
even if its bearer is physically complex, even if Excalibur 
actually disappears. That ' Excalibur ' has meaning in 
being a name does not imply that its meaning is what it 
names or that its having meaning is its corresponding with 
its bearer. 
And, in any case, 
' ...what are the simple constituent parts 
of which reality is composed? - What are 
the simple constituent parts of a chair? 
The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the 
molecules, or the atoms? - " simple " 
means: not composite. And here the point 
is: in what sense " composite "? It 
makes no sense at all to speak absolutely 
of the " simple parts of a chair ".' 
Op.cit., p.21e. 
Wittgenstein rejects this form of the correspondence 
theory of meaning because certain expressions, names, do 
not fulfill the conditions of the theory; they do not 
correspond to simple, immutable atoms and if they do 
correspond to such things as swords and men, their having 
meaning is not explained by this correspondence. 
The philosopher's persistence in trying to see all 
descriptive expressions in terms of names is just as 
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silly, Wittgenstein 
to see all names in 
a name? Is ' game 
thinks, as his persistence in trying 
terms of ' real ' names. Is ' man ' 
a name? 
' Consider for example the proceedings 
that we call " games ". I mean board - 
games, card -games, ball -games, Olympic 
games and so on. What is common to 
them all? - Don't say: " There must 
be something common, or they would not 
be called " games "" - but look and 
see whether there is anything common 
to all.- For if you look at them you 
will not see something that is common 
to all, but similarities, relationships, 
and a whole series of them at that. 
...the result of this examination 
is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss- 
crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail. 
67. I can think of no better expression 
to characterise these similarities than 
" family resemblances "; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: 
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and 
criss -cross in the same way.- And I 
shall say: " games " form a family.' 
Investigations, pps.31e & 32e. 
' You think of " game " as the name of something that 
runs through games, as it were making them games? If you 
look at games you won't find any such thing.' 
Wittgenstein relies again on the ' use ' criterion 
when he considers the claim that language can only have 
meaning if it has exact meaning. 
' If I tell someone " Stand roughly 
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here " - may not this explanation work 
perfectly? And cannot every other one 
fail too? 
But isn't it an inexact explanation? 
Yes; why shouldn't we call it " in- 
exact "? Only let us understand what 
" inexact " means. For it does not 
mean " unusable ". And let us consider 
what we call an " exact " explanation 
in contrast with this one. Perhaps some- 
thing like drawing a chalk line round 
an area? Here it strikes us at once 
that the line has breadth. So a colour - 
edge would be more exact. But has this 
exactness still got a function here: 
isn't the engine idling? And remember 
too that we have not yet defined what is 
to count as overstepping this exact boundary; 
how, with what instruments, it is to be 
established. And so on. 
...No sin le ideal of exactness has 
been laid down; we do not know what we 
should be supposed to imagine under this 
head - unless you yourself lay down what 
is to be so called. But you will find it 
difficult to hit upon such a convention; 
at least any that satisfies you.' 
Op.cit., pps.4le & 42e. 
An important feature of these critical considerations of 
his early philosophy is Wittgenstein's reliance on observation. 
Our observation of how language actually works tells us that 
the Atomist theory of meaning is false. 
Perhaps the first self- criticism of this sort is to be 
found in an address which he gave to the Aristotelian Society 
in 1929. He had said, in the Tractatus, 
' 555: We now have to answer a priori 
the question about all the possible 
forms of elementary propositions... 
5551: Our fundamental principle is 
that whenever a question can be decided 
by logic at all it must be possible to 
decide it without more ado. 
( And if we get into a 
position where we have to look at the 
world for an answer to such a problem, 
that shows that we are on a completely 
wrong track.) 
Tractatus. 
Then, in his paper to the Aristotelian Society he 
says, 
' That is to say, we can only arrive at 
a correct analysis by, what might be 
called, the logical investigation of the 
phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain 
sense a posteriori and not by conjecturing 
about a priori possibilities. One is often 
tempted to ask from an a priori standpoint: 
What, after all, can be the only forms of 
atomic propositions, and to answer, e.g., 
subject- predicate and relational propositions 
with two or more terms further, perhaps, 
propositions relating predicates and 
relations to one another, and so on. 
But this, I believe, is mere playing 
with words. An atomic form cannot be 
foreseen.' 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume 9, p.163. 
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He still holds a correspondence theory of meaning in terms 
of which language must mirror the logical structure of reality. 
What he has given up is the a priori determination of what 
that logical structure is. It can only be known through the 
' investigation of the phenomena themselves '. 
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This seems to be one of Wittgenstein's first moves away 
from the a priori ' explanation ' of language to its 
understanding through investigation. Instead of making 
mere assumptions about language and its relation to reality, 
instead of working out the implications of what was, from the 
very start, an idealisation, one should observe language in 
action. 
...we can avoid ineptness or emptiness 
in our assertions only by presenting the 
model as what it is, as an object of 
comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring - 
rod; not as a preconceived idea to which 
reality must correspond. ( The dogmatism 
into which we fall so easily in doing 
philosophy.)' 
Investigations, p.51e. 
' The more narrowly we examine actual 
language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. ( For the 
crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation; it was a 
requirement.) The conflict becomes intol- 
erable: the requirement is now in danger 
of becoming empty. We have got onto 
slippery ice where there is no friction 
and so in a certain sense the conditions 
are ideal, but also, just because of that, 
we are unable to walk. We want to walk: 
so we need friction. Back to rough ground.' 
Op.cit., p.4-6e. 
The philosophy of language and its relation to science. 
No theory has the right to make requirements of its 
subject- matter. If a theory is out of keeping with what 
it claims to explain, the fault lies with it, not with 
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its data. An ideal theory is one which does not need to 
be adjusted to fit the facts, since it already fits them. 
So a theory which requires the facts to fit it is in a 
sense ' ideal ', or seems to be; it need not be adjusted. 
But, for that very reason, it is not a theory at all. The 
futility of making requirements of language is not 
ameliorated by applying them to some hypothetical system 
on which ordinary language is thought to rest. For then 
it is still required that language does depend on the 
hypothetical system. Is there any good in advancing P 
as the explanation of Q if, in the event of P's not doing 
this, the blame is put on Q? Obviously not; it is 
therefore wrong of the philosopher or logician to try to 
force language into the pattern of an ideal or to talk 
of idealised systems which he claims, without explanation, 
are somehow presupposed by language. When the philosopher 
speaks of propositions, names and sentences, he ought, in 
the first instance anyway, to mean the propositions, names 
and sentences of ordinary language. 
' The philosophy of logic speaks of 
sentences and words in exactly the sense in 
which we speak of them in ordinary life 
when we say e.g. " Here is a Chinese 
sentence " or " No, that only looks 
like writing; it is actually just an orna- 
ment " and so on. We are talking about 
the spatial and temporal. phenomenon of 
language, not about some non -spatial, 
non -temporal phantasm.' 
Op.cit., pps.46e & 47e. 
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This does not mean that the ideal does not have its 
place in the explanation of meaning. Preconceptions are 
useful as models, as means of exploration. A model which 
is at odds with fact may nevertheless be valieble, for in 
trying to fit it to the facts we discover what the facts 
are. Furthermore, a preconception qua model may be a 
focal -point of similarity and difference; it can be a 
means of comparison and can thus not only reveal the 
variety of data but suggest more appropriate models. 
The preconceptions and their workings -out which 
constitute the Tractatus are valuable in this way. The 
system is an ' object of comparison ' which increases 
our understanding of language by its difference from 
language. It is the first of Wittgenstein's language 
games. 
' Our clear and simple language -games 
are not preparatory studies for a 
future regularisation of language - 
as it were first approximations, ignoring 
friction and air -resistance. The language - 
games are rather set up as objects of 
comparison which are meant to throw 
lig zt on the facts of our language 
by way not only of similarities, but 
also of dissimilarities.' 
Op.cit., p.50e. 
The language -game is an ' object of comparison '. 
By it we discover similarities and differences. It is 
therefore a tool for description and classification. 
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Wittgenstein's later philosophy thus presents us with 
language as a datum and with a means for analysing and 
classifying our datum. Can the suggestion be that the 
philosophy of language is, in reality, the science of 
language? Are we being told to classify and then to 
generalise, with the explanation of meaning as our goal? 
No! On the contrary, Wittgenstein rejects even the first 
step of the process. While describing the language -game 
as an object of comparison he simultaneously denies that 
the philosopher's business is theorising or even class- 
ifying. For one thing, the desire to systematise conflicts 
with the ' family resemblance '. Can you systematise 
number? Just think how many types of number there are. 
Can you systematise games? Just think how many types of 
game there are. 
He seems to be saying that language is impossibly 
complicated; you couldn't classify it, if you wanted to. 
He seems to be saying that even if we have objects of 
comparison, none will adequate for the task; some 
nuance will go unobserved, some difference be blurred. 
Systematising implies a clarity and uniformity which do 
not exist in language. Wittgenstein had already said this 
in The Blue Book when he attributed the true origin of 
metaphysics to philosophy's foolish imitation of science. 
' Our craving for generality has another 
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main source: our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of 
reducing the explanation of natural 
phenomeha to the smallest possible 
number of primitive natural laws; and, 
in mathematics, of unifying the treat- 
ment of different topics by using a 
generalisation. Philosophers constantly 
see the method of science before their 
eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to 
ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. This tendency is the real 
source of metaphysics, and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness. I 
want to say here that it can never be 
our job to reduce anything to anything, 
or to explain anything. Philosophy 
really is " purely descriptive ". 
...Instead of " craving for generality " 
I could also have said " the contempt- 
uous attitude towards the particular 
case ".' 
The Blue and Brown Books, p.18. 
Wittgenstein seems to have three reasons for rejecting the 
possibility of philosophy being the science of language or 
even a science at all. One is that philosophy, imitating 
science, has tried to explain the everyday world in terms 
of hypothetical entities like sense -data, ' objects ' and 
universals which have no real basis in fact and which 
consequently explain nothing; thus, the most a philosopher 
can do is to present the facts and leave their explanation 
to the scientist. Another reason is that philosophy's 
concern with language is the practical one of relieving 
tension or linguistic ' cramp ', of getting language on 
the move again, whereas a science of language would assume 
that it was already in good order. The third is that 
language, in any case, is too subtle and diverse to be 
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described systematically i.e. there cannot be any such science 
as ' the science of language ' 
Perhaps Wittgenstein is right; philosophy cannot be the 
science of language. This is certainly not because there is 
no such science, since there manifestly is, as the work of 
modern linguistics shows. The second reason was that phil- 
osophy straightens out what may then become the subject - 
matter of some theory. 
' The philosopher's treatment of a 
question is like the treatment of an 
illness.' 
Investigations, p.91e. 
' The results of philosophy are the 
uncovering of one or another piece 
of plain nonsense and of bumps that 
the understanding has got by running 
its head up against the limits of 
language.' 
Op.cit., p.48e. 
' There is not a philosophical method, 
though there are indeed methods, like 
different therapies.' 
Op.cit., p.51e. 
But if the philosopher is a kind of doctor, if philosophy 
is the treating of linguistic ailments, why not admit that 
philosophy, like medicine, includes both theory and practice? 
That the doctor's concern is primarily practical did not 
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prevent the rise of medical science; and just as illness, 
abnormality and breakdown form part of the subject- matter 
of the science used by doctors, so must nonsense and its 
varieties act as data for the science of language, a science 
on which the philosopher can, and ought to, rely. 
As to the first reason, that philosophy ought not to 
imitate science, on pain of producing pseudo- theories, 
may we not, very often, construe philosophic ' theor- 
ising ' as an initial step towards science? 
' If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, 
a historian, or any other man of learning, 
what definite body of truths has been 
ascertained by his science, his answer 
will last as long as you are willing to 
listen. But if you put the same question 
to a philosopher, he will, if he is 
candid, have to confess that his study 
has not achieved positive results such 
as have been achieved by other sciences. 
It is true that this is partly accounted 
for by the fact that, as soon as definite 
knowledge concerning any subject becomes 
possible, this subject ceases to be 
called philosophy, and becomes a separate 
science. The whole study of the heavens, 
which now belongs to astronomy, was once 
included in philosophy; Newton's great 
work was called " the mathematical 
principles of natural philosophy ". 
Similarly, the study of the human mind, 
which was, until very lately, a part of 
philosophy, has now been separated from 
philosophy and has become the science of 
psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the 
uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent 
than real: those questions which are already 
capable of definite answers are placed in 
the sciences, while those only to which, 
at present, no definite answer can be 
given, remain to form the residue which 
is called philosophy.' 
The Problems of Philosophy, pps.239 -40: B. Russell. 
20. 
' In the history of human inquiry, 
philosophy has the place of the initial 
central sun, seminal and tumultuous: from 
time to time it throws off some portion of 
itself to take station as a science, a 
planet, cool and well regulated, progressing 
steadily towards a distant final state. This 
happened long ago at the birth of physics: 
only in the last century we have witnessed 
the same process once again, slow and at 
the time almost imperceptible, in the 
birth of the science of mathematical logic, 
through the joint labours of philosophers 
and mathematicians. Is it not possible that 
the next century may see the birth, through 
the joint labours of philosophers, grammar- 
ians, and numerous other students of 
language, of a true and comprehensive 
science of language ?' 
Philosophical Papers, p.180: J. L. Austin. 
Though the philosopher's theories may be bad and may 
have led him ' into complete darkness ' this does not 
mean that he ought not to theorise; if he theorises, he 
must take care that his theory fits the facts. If his 
theory is about meaning, he must deal with meaning as he 
finds it. 
In fact, Wittgenstein's disclaiming any role as a 
theorist is inconsistent with his practice both in his 
early and in his late philosophy. He may say that the 
philosopher cannot theorise, but the Tractatus is a 
theory of meaning; its last remark but one is justly 
notorious. 
1 My propositions serve as elucidations 
21. 
in the following way: anyone who understands 
me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, 
when he has used them - as steps - to climb 
up beyond them. ( He must, so to speak, 
throw away the ladder after he has climbed 
up it.)' 
Tractatus, p.151. 
In recognising why Wittgenstein had to say this, we are 
under no obligation to accept it; we must merely deny that 
all of the theory is true. There can be no real doubt that 
the Tractatus is to be judged as a theory of meaning and 
that in Wittgenstein's later work there are theoretical 
assumptions and beliefs about language together with a 
means for its study. Is Wittgenstein's blindness to the 
virtues of his later work, qua theory of language, caused 
by his acute awareness of the vices of his early writings? 
This is perhaps part of the explanation, to which, possibly, 
a companion is the continuation in his thought of the 
distinction between showing and saying, with the 
correlative doctrine that what is shown cannot be said; 
the logical is ineffable. 
The Tractatus is, for the most part, a philosophical 
theory about language. It seems best to understand it 
as part of the process of setting up a science of 
language, and this means an empirical science which 
seeks to explain the structure of language and how it 
works. The fact that Wittgenstein did not intend the 
theory to be seen in this way is irrelevant, unless we 
are content to leave it as a meaningless, if beautiful, 
22. 
piece of work. We can make good sense of it by fitting it 
into a pattern of change remarked by Russell and Austin, 
the change from a priori speculation to empirical explanation. 
The general task of the Tractatus and the part to which this 
thesis is devoted. 
' Thus the aim of the book is to set a 
limit to thought, or rather - not to 
thought, but to the expression of 
thought; for in order to be able to 
set a limit to thought, we should 
have to find both sides of the limit 
thinkable ( i.e. we should have to 
be able to think what cannot be 
thought.). 
It will therefore only be in language 
that the limit can be set, and what 
lies on the other side of the limit 
will simply be nonsense.' 
Preface to the Tractatus. 
The general aim of the Tractatus may be specified by 
two questions:- 
1. What can be said? 
2. How is it said? 
In other words, it seeks to explain sense and nonsense. 
It does this at three levels, the level of act ( what are 
the necessary and characteristic acts in using language ?), 
syntax ( what are the fundamental structural features of 
language ?) and semantics ( how do we assign or determine 
the meaning of particular expressions ?). 
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According to the theory, the characteristic and principal 
linguistic act is that of asserting; but this depends on the 
act of picturing or representing, and this, in turn, depends 
on the act of referring. A fourth type of act is that of 
operating on pictures. The three main act -categories are:- 
1. Asserting /denying. 
2. Picturing and operating with or on pictures. 
3. Referring. 
The syntax of language is divided into the syntax of el- 
ementary propositions and sentences and the syntax of non- 
elementary or derivative propositions and sentences. Accord- 
ing to the syntax of an elementary sentence there is only 
one syntactic type, the noun; there are no verbs, prepos- 
itions, articles, adverbs or modifiers of any sort. Each 
syntactic form at this most elementary level has at least 
two places for nouns. It would seem that there are different 
forms of elementary sentences which not only have numerical 
implications but also restrict the sort of relation the 
nouns may have to one another; syntactic forms thus make 
abstract relational restrictions on the nouns which fill 
them. 
These syntactic forms are pre -linguistic in the sense 
that, although they are used in language, they would exist 
whether there was any language or not; they not only 
structure language but the whole of reality as well. These 
forms, in their linguistic or syntactic aspect, are ways 
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of putting nouns together; in their metaphysical, pre - 
linguistic aspect, they are ways of putting ' objects ' 
the fundamental elements of reality, together. 
The syntax of the derivative sentence has nothing to do 
with that of the elementary one, though it must presuppose 
that the elementary sentence has a syntax. Syntactic forms 
at this non -elementary level have places for sentences and 
operators, but not for nouns. There are two fundamental 
forms, each having a place for at least one sentence and 
one operator; the difference is that although both have 
a place for only one operator, one has only one sentence - 
place and the other has two. These forms may be symbolised 
as follows:- 
1. Operator space ( )/ Sentence space ( ). 
2. Sentence space ( )/ Operator space ( )/ 
Sentence space. 
Any sentence may fill a sentence space. There are 
various operators, however, which can only be used with 
the second form e.g. the disjunctive and the conjunctive. 
Given some sentence S and the negation operator, and using 
the first syntactic form, one gets the sentence Not S; one 
may use the same form again, with the negation operator 
and the sentence Not S, to derive the sentence Not not S. 
We come now to the semantic values of expressions. It is 
here that the correspondence theory of meaning comes into 
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play, for, given the three syntactic types - noun, elementary 
sentence and derivative sentence - the sort of meaning correl- 
ated with each is a function of some kind of correspondence. 
The nouns which fill the forms of elementary sentences have 
meaning through corresponding to fundamental elements in 
reality, the simples or ' objects '. The elementary sentences 
have meaning through corresponding to possible arrangements 
of objects, no such arrangement ' containing ' some other 
arrangement. The derivative sentences have meaning through 
corresponding to the ' truth -possibilities ' of elementary 
sentences. 
No noun has meaning unless some object does in fact 
correspond to it. A sentence, however, may have ruling even 
if no complex of objects is actually correlated with it. 
This is one of the most important points to the whole 
theory. Perhaps the second most important is that the 
meaning of an elementary sentence presupposes its syntax 
which is, in a curious sense, inviolable, because meta- 
physical; a certain sort of nonsense, possible in ordinary 
language, is impossible at this fundamental level, for 
no word can actually be placed with any other. This is 
not a matter of convention or choice, as it is in ordinary 
language, but a total impossibility in every sense. You 
may therefore have meaninglessness at this level, but not 
the sort of nonsense of which the following is an example, 
' The baby was played on the violin ', precisely because 
the metaphysical properties of babies and violins do not 
permit one of the former to be played on one of the latter. 
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A full analysis of the theory just stated so summarily 
is not attempted within this thesis,which is principally 
concerned with the so- called ' Picture Theory '. Exactly 
how much of the theory as a whole is taken up by the 
Picture Theory is a matter for discussion. In my view, 
the only parts of language seen as pictures are the 
elementary sentences, not the derivative ones which 
correspond in a different way to reality. Should one, in 
that case, say nothing about derivation? That would be a 
great mistake, for without understanding how the elementary 
sentence is incorporated into language one would find the 
theory meaningless. A study of negation,which is important 
both because of its role in denial and because of its 
truth -functional character, together with analysis of the 
elementary sentence, is, perhaps, enough to present the 
Picture Theory of the Tractatus. 
Comments on some previous uses of the ' picture ' concept 
in philosophy. 
The explanation of knowledge or belief through images or 
likenesses is not uncommon. Plato's Eleatic, in the Sophist, 
understands judgment in this way. Aristotle says, in the 
De Interpretatione, that words are signs of likenesses in 
the soul, whose objects are real things. In the Treatise, 
Hume identifies at least some beliefs with images of 
things and circumstances. Judgment, according to Kant 
( Critique of Pure Reason, B93.), is ' the representation 
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of a representation.' It is unfair, perhaps, to credit Kant 
with some kind of picture -theory, particularly in view of 
his ' rule ' analysis of understanding; at the same time, 
he does talk a good deal about ' representations '. 
This is only a selection from a class which must include 
many other philosophers. Somehow it seems a natural way of 
explaining judgment or belief or knowledge, possibly because 
the philosopher has first looked inside himself in search 
of an answer, and finding mental images, has seen these as 
the obvious candidates for pieces of knowledge or belief. 
It is taken, at least by Hume, to be so obvious as not to 
require any real discussion. What is more interesting, however, 
than the easy acceptance of likeness as the medium of knowledge, 
is the complete lack of concern about its actual role. Having 
drawn our attention to the fact that this - say a belief, or 
judgment - is an image or likeness, the matter is left there; 
no attempt is made to say why its being an image should 
explain its role. Some effort may be made to explain how 
the particularity of the image squares with being a 
' general ' idea or to explain how a red image can be an 
idea both of redness and of colour; these leave quite 
untouched the very important question:- Why should being 
a likeness or image of X make Y important in explaining 
knowledge of X? 
The assumption seems to be that having an image of X is 
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self-evidently equivalent to thinking about X. In fact, 
having or seeing an image of X is neither a sufficient nor 
a necessary condition for thinking about X or for holding 
some belief about X. 
If the assumption is that, presented with the image, one 
automatically sees it as an image then, first of all, this 
is not true, since a dream -image is not necessarily seen, 
at the time, as an image; and, secondly, it is characteristic 
of the ability to see something as a picture or image or 
likeness, that one can say what it is a picture /image/ 
likeness of, and that makes the explanation beg the 
question. 
There are other well -known difficulties to image or 
picture theories, such as the explanation of probability 
beliefs, knowing that something is not the case, that 
something is coloured an unknown colour; difficulties 
with what cannot seen, about the past and so on. 
These brief remarks will do no more perhaps than suggest 
comparisons with the past and points on which one's 
critical awareness should be heightened. 
Aims of this thesis. 
There are three main aims to this thesis; one is historical, 
one exegetical and one critical. 
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It would seem that the historical theme has not already 
been stated by any of the following: Anscombe, Black, 
Favrholdt, Griffin, Maslow or Stenius. They would all agree 
on Wittgenstein's owing something to Russell, but hardly as 
much as is claimed in this thesis. My main historical 
conclusion has been developed from the suggestion made by 
Urmson in his book Philosophical Analysis, that Moore's 
article of 1899, ' The nature of judgment ' ( Mind ), is 
a starting point of the Logical Atomist philosophy. 
This article is placed by me in relation to some of the 
work done by Russell between 1903 and 1911 so as to 
account not only for the emergence but for the treatment 
of one of those topics which is a nucleus of the Tractatus; 
I mean the problem of falsehood, and in particular its 
handling by a correspondence theory of judgment. It 
would seem that. Wittgenstein's Picture Theory is very 
largely the solution, in Moore /Russell terms, of a 
problem arising from the philosophy of these two men. 
Wittgenstein's ' objects ' are essentially the ' con- 
cepts ' of Moore's article. His Picture Theory is 
essentially Russell's theory of judgment, and this would 
seem to include at least one version of his theory of form 
as found in the elementary sentence. 
The special concern of the second aim, the exegetical, 
is the concept of logical form as this operates at the 
lowest level of language. Seeing the Tractatus against 
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the background of Russell's work is most helpful here, since 
iittgenstein's concept of form, though more developed and 
intricate than Russell's, is essentially the same. The work 
of various commentators who discuss form and structure is 
examined, notably Black, Griffin and McGuinness. 
Very little is said about the ' objects ', because of 
the work already done on this subject by Anscombe, Black, 
Copi and Keyt. 
As to the last, the critical, aim, the main objections 
put to the Picture Theory are:- 
1. Ordinary language is not as extremely 
simple at any of the levels of act, syntax 
or semantics as is the ' ideal ' of the 
Tractatus and therefore cannot be reduced 
to or explained by that ' ideal '. 
2. No adequate interpretation in empirical 
terms is given of such key concepts as 
name and elementary proposition and there 
is no adequate or detailed account given 
of the pioce dure for moving from the 
level of ordinary language to that of 
the ' ideal ' or elementary language. 
3. The explanation of the meaningfulness of the 
elementary sentence is inadequate. Assuming 
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that some elementary sentence consists of 
the names ' A ' and ' B ' which stand 
for A and B respectively, this is not 
enough to explain how ' A "s being 
related to ' B ' says that A is related 
to B. 
4. Wittgenstein says that the propositions 
' P ' and ' Not -P ' existentially 
presuppose one another. At the same time, 
his explanation of ' P "s having sense 
permits the non -existence of ' Not -P ' 
since ' P "s having sense depends 
simply on its having a pictorial relation 
to reality. Having explained how ' P ' 
gets its sense, Wittgenstein then 
explains the sense of ' Not -P ' in 
terms of ' P '. 
These are the main criticisms. Others are stated along- 
side these main ones. 
The general aim of this work may be summed up as 
the more accurate placing of the Tractatus in relation 
to its predecessors and successors with emphasis on its 
role in philosophical linguistics and theory of meaning. 
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Chapter One 
In Philosophical Analysis ( p.2 ), Urmson mentions an 
article by Moore which appeared in Mind, 1899. Called 
' The nature of judgment ', it shows the move to realism 
which ,was Moore's reaction to the philosophy of Bradley. 
There is more to be mined from it, however, than just a 
reaction to monistic idealism, for it contains not only 
the theory that the objects of judgment are real, discrete 
entities but also the statement of the type of analysis 
which Moore and Russell are to claim for some time as the 
method of philosophy. These two themes, reductionism and 
the belief that the final level of analysis is that of 
eternal, immutable ' concepts ' which combine with one 
another, would seem to be clear forerunners of the 
Tractatus. 
The immediate purpose of the article is to show what 
is wrong with Bradley's theory of judgment as that is 
expressed in the first volume of his Principles of Logic 
and to put something more acceptable in its place. The 
feature of Bradley's theory to which Moore takes par- 
ticular exception is its undue psychologising of judg- 
ment, of ideas, of meaning. 
Moore makes play with an ambiguity in Bradley's sense 
of ' idea ', an ambiguity which Bradley ' slurs over 
with the phrase: " But it is better to say the idea is 
the meaning. "' ( Mind, p.177.) Moore comments, somewhat 
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severely, that ' The question is surely not of which is 
" better to say " ( sic ), but which is true.' ( Loc.cit.) 
The sense of ' idea ' which Moore prefers is idea qua 
universal meaning, rather than idea qua mental fact, a 
sign of some other thing. His objections will be better 
understood if Bradley's position is made clearer. 
' Judgment, in the strict sense, does not 
exist where there exists no knowledge of 
truth and falsehood; and, since truth 
and falsehood depend on the relation of 
our ideas to reality, you can not have 
judgment proper without ideas.' 
Principles of Logic, p.2: F. H. Bradley. 
' Not only are we unable to judge before 
we use ideas, but, strictly speaking, we 
cannot judge till we use them as ideas. 
We must have become aware that they are 
not realities, that they are mere ideas, 
signs of an existence other than them- 
selves. Ideas are not ideas until they 
are symbols, and, before we use symbols, 
we can not judge.' 
Loc.cit. 
After complaining that in England ' we have lived 
too long in the psychological attitude ' Bradley explains 
that logic treats of ideas not as mere phenomena or 
psychical facts but in terms of signification. To 
represent truth of falsehood, the idea ' must be 
referred away from itself '. Its meaningfulness constitutes 
a third side of an existent, presupposing existence and 
content. But not all existents have meaning since some 
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signify nothing. 
What is this ' meaning '? It is ' a part of the 
content ( original or acquired ), cut off, fixed by 
the mind, and considered apart from the existence of 
the sign.' ( Op.cit., p.4.) 
' I have the " idea " of a horse, and 
that is a fact in my mind, existing in 
relation with the congeries of sensations 
and emotions and feelings, which make 
my momentary state. It has again 
particular traits of its own, which may 
be difficult to seize, but which, we 
are bound to suppose, are present. It 
is doubtless unique, the same with no 
other, nor yet with itself, but alone 
in the world of its fleeting moment. 
But, for logic, and in a matter of 
truth and falsehood, the case is quite 
changed. The " idea " has here become 
an universal, since everthing else is 
subordinate to the meaning. That connect- 
ion of attributes we recognise as horse, 
is one part of the content of the 
unique horse -image, and this fragmentary 
part of the psychical event is all that 
in logic we know of or care for. Using 
this we treat the rest as husk and 
dross, which matters nothing to us, 
and makes no difference to the rest. 
The " idea ", if that is the psychical 
state, is in logic a symbol. But it is 
better to say, the idea is the mewing, 
for existence and unesseaial content 
are wholly discarded. The idea, in the 
sense of mental image, is a sign of 
the idea in the sense of meaning. 
7. These two senses of idea, as the 
symbol and the symbolised:., the image 
and its meaning, are of course known 
to all of us. But the reason why I 
dwell on this obvious distinction, is 
that in much of our thinking it is 
systematically disregarded. " How can 
any one," we are asked, " be so foolish 
as to think that ideas are universal, 
when every single idea can be seen to 
be particular, or talk of an idea which 
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remains the same, when the actual idea 
at each moment, varies, and we have in 
fact not one identical but many similais ?" 
But how can any one, we feel tempted to 
reply, suppose that these obvious objections 
are unknown to us? When I talk of an idea 
which is the same amid change, I do not 
speak of that psychical event which is 
in ceaseless flux, but of one portion of 
the content which the mind has fixed, and 
which is not in any sense an event in 
time. I am talking of meaning, not the 
series of symbols, the gold, so to speak, 
not the fleeting series of transitory 
notes. The belief in universal ideas 
does not involve the conviction that 
abstractions exist, even as facts in 
my head.. The mental event is unique 
and particular, but the meaning in 
its use is cut off from the existence, 
and from the rest of the fluctuating 
content. It loses its relation to the 
particular symbol; it stands as an 
adjective, to be referred to some 
subject, but indifferent in itself 
to every special subject. 
The ambiguity of " idea " may be 
exhibited thus. Thesis, On the one 
hand no possible idea can be that 
which it means. Antithesis, On the 
other hand no idea is anything but 
just what it means. In the thesis the 
idea is the psychical image; in the 
antithesis the idea is the logical 
signification. In the first it is the 
whole sign, but in the second it is 
nothing but the symbolised. In the sequel 
I intend to use idea mainly in the sense 
of meaning.' 
Op.cit., pps.5-7. 
Bradley makes it quite clear that he is against 
' psychologising ' judgment. He brands it as one of the 
English philosopher's vices. Nevertheless, he admits that 
judgment has its psychological side and, consequently, is 
at some pains to distinguish its logical from its psy- 
chological nature. He is perfectly well aware of the 
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ambiguity of ' idea ' as being ' something in someone's 
head ' or ' what we mean by some symbol '. He describes 
idea qua meaning as a ' connection of attributes ', such 
as what ' we recognise as horse '. Idea qua symbol is 
' a fact in my head ', an ' image '. 
The image has meaning, because it has ' content ', some 
of which is inessential to it. The content of this sort of 
idea is made up from attributes. This content seems to be 
the ' meaning ' of the idea, for which the idea is a 
sign. One sees two relations at work here, a ' picturing ' 
relation which correlates images, or psychical states, with 
attributes, and a sign relation which makes the image a 
symbol of at least some of the attributes represented in it. 
It would seem that the content comes simply from the imaging, 
and that the sign -value depends both on the imaging and on 
some sort of selection by which part of the content, the 
' essential ' part, is ' cut off '. 
All is not clear; in particular, if we accept the image 
and sign values of the mental event, thus implying the 
independent existence of its meaning, in what sense can it 
be ' cut off ' from the image? But let us turn now to 
Moore's comments and criticisms. 
Moore quite rightly points out an inconsistency in what 
Bradley says on our use of symbols. Bradley had said 
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( p.2, end of paragraph 2.) that we use symbols,which he 
later identifies as ideas qua mental events or states; but 
later still ( p.8.) he says ' that in predication we do 
not use the mental fact, but only the meaning.' In other 
words, he both claims that we do and that we do not use 
the mental events or states in making judgments. Moore 
puts it as follows, 
' It would seem plain, then, that 
there his doctrine was that we do,. 
in predication, use the mental fact, 
though only as a sign; whereas here 
his doctrine is that we do not use 
the mental fact, even as a sign, but 
only that which it signifies.' 
Mind, p.177. 
This, however, is by no means Moore's main complaint 
against Bradley, which is the very one brought by Bradley 
against English philosophy's psychologising. Moore attacks 
Bradley's account of the relation between meaning and the 
mind, and in particular Bradley's abstractionism. He is 
quite content to accept that judgment depends on meanings 
which, as Bradley said, are ' not in any sense...in time ' 
What Moore cannot accept is that such meaning could be 
' part ' of an idea qua mental state or event. 
' Now to Mr. Bradley's argument that 
" the idea in judgment is the universal 
meaning " I have nothing to add. It 
appears to me conclusive, as against 
those, of whom there have been too many, 
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who have treated the idea as a mental 
state. But he seems to me to be infected 
by the same error as theirs, alike in his 
preliminary failure to distinguish clearly 
whether it is the symbol or the symbolised 
of which he is speaking, and in his final 
description of the " idea, as meaning ", 
when he has definitely decided in its 
favour. " A meaning," he says, as we 
saw above," consists of a part of the 
content (.original or acquired ) cut 
off, fixed by the mind, and considered 
apart from the existence,, of the sign." 
And again, " an idea, (4,)we use idea of 
the meaning, is neither given nor pre- 
sented, but is taken " ( p.8.). If 
indeed " the universal meaning " were 
thus simply a part of the content of 
our own minds, it would be intelligible 
that " truth and falsehood " should 
still be said to " depend on the 
relation of our ideas to reality ". 
It will be our endeavour to show, on 
the contrary, that the " idea used 
in judgment " is not a part of our minds, 
and that hence truth and falsehood are not 
dependent on the relation of our ideas 
to reality.' 
Mind, p.177. 
' The content of an idea is, Mr. Bradley 
tells us, what the idea is; it is " a 
character which is different or disting- 
uishable from that of other ideas ", 
treated as mental facts. Now, before I 
can judge at all on Mr. Bradley's theory, 
a part of this character must have been 
" cut off and fixed by the mind ". But 
my question is, whether we can thus cut 
off a part of the character of our ideas, 
and attribute that part to something else, 
unless we already know, in part at least, 
what is the character of the idea from 
which we are to cut off the part in 
question. If not, then we have already 
made a judgment with regard to the 
character of our idea. But this judgment, 
again, requires on Mr. Bradley's theory, 
that I should have had an idea of my 
idea, and should have already cut off 
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a part of the content of that secondary 
idea, in order that I may make a judgment 
with regard to the character of the 
primary idea that is in question. And 
similarly it is quite impossible that 
I should know what the content of my 
secondary idea is, until I have made 
it in its turn the object of a third 
idea, by taking part of this tirtiary 
content. And so on ad infinitum. The 
theory would therefore seem to demand 
the completion of an infinite number 
of psychological judgments before any 
judgment can be made at all. But such 
a completion is impossible; and there- 
fore all judgment is likewise impossible. 
It follows, therefore, if we are to 
avoid this absurdity, that the " idea 
used in judgment " must be something 
other than a part of the content of 
any idea of mine . ' 
Op.cit., pps.l77-8. 
This is Moore's main argument against Bradley. Its upshot 
is not to show that ideas as such cannot exist, but to 
prove that a certain sort of genesis is impossible. If 
ideas are made, and their making entails using ideas, no 
idea can be made; this is the core of the argument. Its 
other assumption is that the cutting -off process mentioned 
by Bradley as responsible for fixing the meaning of our 
ideas, does entail knowing what to ' cut off ' i.e. it 
presupposes some other idea, which, in turn, presupposes 
some third idea, and so on. 
It would be fair to say, first, that Moore is correct in 
saying that a certain sort of abstraction is impossible and 
is a fortiori incapable of explaining the existence of any 
idea; and, second, that even if Bradley's abstractionism is 
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of this sort, though one cannot, strictly speaking, say that 
this is so, Moore's argument does not establish that judgment 
is in no sense mental, which is what he wanted to show. It 
merely demonstrates that nothing can both be mental and be 
created in a certain manner. 
The remaining five- sixths of Moore's article is devoted 
to Moore's own theory of meaning, with a fair amount of 
comment on its comparison with Kant's; it would be truer 
to say ' theory of judgment ' because, although Bradley 
did introduce the question of symbolism and meaning, Moore 
ignores it, convinced that the real object of discussion 
is only incidentally related to the mind, real judgments 
being timeless and objective. 
Moore does not, in my opinion, reveal any major defect 
in Bradley's treatment; at most he shows up a minor 
inconsistency and a certain doubt about what Bradley 
could have meant by ' cutting off and fixing ' meaning. 
Our concern is not so much the criticism or defence of 
Bradley however, as the philosophical climate in 
which Moore's own ideas developed. At the same time, it 
is interesting to note that Moore's rejection of Bradley, 
in over -compensating for the ' sin.' of psychologising, 
includes blindness to an aspect of judgment, its symbolic 
aspect, of which Bradley was at least aware. 
On Moore's account, judgment and its elements are quite 
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independent of mind. What Bradley calls ' meaning ' Moore 
calls ' cornept '. The class of concepts is a genus per se 
and is at the same time the broadest possible class, to 
which everything belongs. A concept is a timeless, immutable 
object of thought, although it is in no sense intrinsically 
mental. 
' The concept is not a mental fact, 
nor any part of a mental fact.' 
' A proposition is composed not of 
words, nor yet of thoughts, but of 
concepts. Concepts are possible 
objects of thought; but that is no 
definition of them. It merely states 
that they may come into relation 
with a thinker; and in order that 
they may do anything, they must 
already be something. It is in- 
different to their nature whether 
anybody thinks them or not. They 
are incapable of change; and the 
relation into which they enter with 
the knowing subject implies no action 
or reaction. It is a unique relation 
which can begin or cease with a 
change in the subject; but the concept 
is neither cause nor effect of such a 
change. The occurrence of the relation 
has, no doubt, its causes and effects, 
but these are to be found only in the 
subject.' 
Mind, p.179. 
Bradley's difficulty, in his own eyes, lay in reconciling 
the objectivity of meaning and judgment with their supposedly 
obvious dependence on mind, a dependence which, at the 
beginning of the chapter, he passes over almost apologet- 
ically. Moore sees no need for such compatibility; he 
simply does away with the mental connotations of the word 
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' concept '. ' Judgment ' and ' proposition ' are con- 
strued in a similar non -mentalist fashion. Does this mean 
that judgments or propositions ( which Moore equates; 
' judgment or proposition ', p.179.) form a type of their 
own which is contrasted or compared with the world in terms 
of truth and falsity? No; concepts do not reflect the world; 
they compose it. Everything is composed of concepts, or, 
if not, is just one concept. 
' All that exists is thus composed of 
concepts necessarily related to one 
another in specific manners, and 
likewise to the concept of existence.' 
Op.cit., p.181. 
' It seems necessary, then, to regard 
the world as formed of concepts. These 
are the only objects of knowledge.' 
Op.cit., p.182. 
It is difficult to see what Moore is driving at, given 
that the problem was, in the first place, the explanation 
of states of knowledge or judgment, not simply of the 
objects of knowledge or judgment. He started off by 
identifying the elements of judgments as concepts, an 
acceptable, because traditional, move. He then made these 
things non- mental, but, we would suppose, still standing, 
in some sense, over and against, if not the whole world, 
or reality, at least part of it. On the contrary, he does 
something which he is ' fully aware ' must seem ' paradoxical ', 
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even ' contemptible '; he identifies judgments with com- 
plexes of concepts, so that anything you care to name is 
either a complex or else is part of one. 
' When, therefore, I say " This 
rose is red ", I am not attributing 
part of the content of my idea to 
the rose, nor yet attributing parts 
of the content of my ideas of rose 
and red together to some third 
subject. What I am asserting is a 
specific connexion of certain 
concepts forming the total concept 
rose " with the concepts " this " 
and " now " and " red "; and the 
judgment is true if such a connexion 
is existent.' 
Op.cit., p.179. 
' Even the description of an existent as 
a proposition ( a true existential 
proposition ) seems to lose its 
strangeness, when it is remembered 
that a proposition is here to be 
understood, not as anything subjective 
- an assertion or affirmation of 
something - but as the combination 
of concepts which is affirmed.' 
Op.cit., p.183. 
' Perception is to be regarded 
philosophically as the cognition 
of an existential proposition.' 
Loc.cit. 
' It would seem, in fact, from this 
example, that a proposition is 
nothing other than a complex concept.' 
Op.cit., p.180. 
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So anything is a judgment or proposition, except single 
concepts. To our question ' How do we make judgments ?' 
Moore gives the answer ' We do not make them!' 
' From our description of a judgment, 
there must, then, disappear all 
reference either to our mind or to 
the world.' 
Op.cit., p.193. 
It would appear that Moore's theory is not so much an 
explanation of judgment as a metaphysical analysis of 
' reality ' which is baldly stated to consist of timeless 
simples from which everything transient, including the 
world, emerges. 
The simples are, of course, the concepts, which go 
together to make relationships. Understanding takes the 
form of knowing the structure of such relationships, 
through their analysis. 
' A thing becomes intelligible first 
when it is analysed into its constituent 
concepts.' 
Op.cit., p.182. 
What sorts of thing are concepts? Well, existence is a 
concept ( p.181.) and so is ' this ', ' now ', ' red ' 
and 'rose '. Is ' true ' a concept? There is no clear 
answer in the article to this. 
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At one point Moore seems to say that something can make 
a judgment true, other than the mere presence in it of 
the concept ' true '. 
' What I am asserting is a specific 
connexion of certain concepts forming 
the total concept " rose " with the 
concepts " this " and "_now " and 
" red "; and the judgment is true if 
such a connexion is existent.' 
Op.cit., p.179. 
The suggestion is that the existence of some relationship 
between the concepts quoted makes the judgment true. A 
little later, he says, 
' What kind of relation makes a 
proposition true, what false, cannot 
be further defined, but must be 
immediately recognised.' 
Op.cit., p.180. 
' When I say " This paper exists ", 
I must require that this proposition 
be true. If it is not true, it is 
unimportant, and I can have no 
interest in it. But if it is true, 
it means only that the concepts, 
which are combined in specific 
relations in the concept of this 
paper, are also combined in a 
specific manner with the concept 
of existence. That specific manner 
is something immediately known, 
like red or two. It is highly 
important, because we set such 




It seems, from the last quotation, that mere combination 
with the concept of existence is not enough to make a 
judgment true since the ' specific manner ' of combination 
is itself important. This type of combination is known 
immediately, like ' red or two '. But it is actually a 
further concept, and this puts us at something of a loss 
in understanding how it can both be a way in which coz pts 
go together and yet be a possible element of such a 
relationship. Is this ' manner of combination ' the 
actual concept of truth, that which binds other concepts 
together, the cement presupposed by the complexes, the 
propositions? 
' Our conclusion is that truth 
is itself a simple concept; that 
it is logically prior to any 
proposition.' 
Op.cit., p.182. 
Nothing that Moore says goes much further in answering 
that question. Given any judgment ' its truth or falsehood 
cannot depend on its relation to an ̂ything else whatever, 
reality, for instance, or the world in space and time.' 
( Op.cit., p.192.) The truth -value of a judgment is in 
some curious sense given with the judgment, and is immed- 
iately apprehended, like redness, through ' seeing ' 
how the constituent concepts are related. There is no 
suggestion of correspondence, nor of coherence; truth is 
inexplicable. 
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The relation between Moore's article and the Tractatus is 
in one case direct and in another indirect, via Russell. The 
metaphysics of ' The nature of judgment ' is strikingly 
like that of Wittgenstein. Moore says that reality consists 
of complexes, which he calls ' propositions ' or ' judg- 
ments ', and, ultimately, of simples or ' concepts ' 
which can combine, to make complex concepts or judgments. 
These simples neither exist nor do not exist, since 
' existence ' is itself a concept; the simples are timeless 
objects of knowledge. This is almost exactly the picture 
of reality given by Wittgenstein, although the actual 
instances of concepts given by Moore e.g. ' existence ', 
' red ' and ' rose ' , do not fit in to Wittgenstein's 
scheme. Two last similarities may be noted, holding 
directly between Wittgenstein and Moore, to the exclusion 
of Russell. 
' A concept is not in any intelligible 
sense an " adjective ", as if there 
were something substantive, more 
ultimate than it. For we must, if 
we are to be consistent, describe 
what appears to be most substantive 
as no more than a collection of such 
supposed adjectives: and thus, in the 
end, the concept turns out to be the 
only substantive or subject, and no 
one concept either more or less an 
adjective than any other.' 
Op.cit., pps.192-3. 
Moore's concepts and Wittgenstein's objects are all 
equally substantives or subjects, whereas Russell is 
careful to distinguish between pure subjects and universals. 
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The metaphysics of Russell's atomism introduces an in- 
equality not found in either Moore or `Wittgenstein. 
The final similarity is that, whereas Russell insists on 
making the judging mind part of the judgment, which would 
consequently not exist if the mind did not, both Moore and 
Wittgenstein keep the mind right outside the proposition 
or judgment. 
' From our description of a judgment, 
there must, then, disappear all 
reference either to our mind or to 
the world.' 
Op.cit., p.193. 
This similarity does not mean that Wittgenstein's under- 
standing of the relation between the mind and judgment is 
Moore's. For one thing, Wittgenstein would not agree with 
the complete independence from mind of judgment. Although 
neither gives a proper, explicit account of the relation, 
we can at least say that, even if Wittgenstein does make 
judgment in some sense mental, and Moore makes it quite 
non -mental, neither makes mind part of judgment; Russell's 
theory does. 
The indirect relation between Moore and Wittgenstein 
operates via Russell and is caused by Moore's inadequate 
treatment of the psychological and linguistic nature of 
the proposition. Most of the time in which Moore is 
talking about judgment, he is really doing metaphysics. 
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This is perfectly permissible in stating a theory of 
judgment; but it is quite clear, even early in his paper, 
that what Moore means by ' judgment ' and what Bradley, 
are two different things, and that the discussion is not 
about how we think about or judge reality, but on the 
fundamental structure of possible objects of knowledge. 
Moore's identification of judgment with its object not 
only leaves unsolved important questions about judging 
and meaning, but creates the considerable problem of 
distinguishing between fact and judgment, more particularly 
of distinguishing between actual facts and false judgments. 
This is a topic which, as we shall see, gives Russell, 
following in Moore's footsteps, a difficulty which is 
insoluble so long as the elements of the judgment are 
numerically identical with those of the fact. It is this 
difficulty, clearly emergent in Russell and already 
created in ' The nature of judgment ', which connects 
the Picture Theory with these early writings of Moore; 
aside, that is, from the more direct metaphysical 
similarity already noticed. 
' The nature of judgment ' is not so much an essay on 
judgment as a displacement of Bradley's metaphysics. The 
overt subject of discussion may be knowledge of meanings, 
but the real one is the existence of meanings qua universals. 
Although Moore's principal argument is about the former, his 
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real disagreement with Bradley is about the latter. Indeed, 
it would seem possible to disagree with an abstractionist 
account of the existence of universals, and other objects 
of knowledge, while accepting an abstractionist account of 
knowledge. 
Both Moore and Bradley think that if we mean something, 
there is something welmean; if we think of ' horse ', we 
mean those attributes or properties which make up being a 
horse. Moose's point ( p.179.), which he does not really 
advance as an argument, is that if something is to become 
a meaning, it must already be something in its own right; 
he cannot accept Bradley's idealising of reality. These 
things which we can mean are the ' concepts ', ranging 
from redness to existence. 
' Existence is itself a concept; it is 
something which we mean;...' 
Op.cit., p.180. 
Thus, the understanding of what is meant, comes, in a 
curious way, to be the understanding, through analysis, of 
the things which are the meanings. This is what Moore 
says in 1903, 
' Definitions of the kind that I was 
asking for, definitions which describe 
the real nature of the object or notion 
denoted by a word, and which do not 
merely tell us what the word is used 
to mean, are only possible when the 
object or notion in question is something 
complex. You can give a definition of a 
horse, because a horse has many different 
properties and qualities, all of which 
you can enumerate. But when you have 
enumerated them all, when you have 
reduced a horse to his simplest terms, 
then you can no longer define those 
terms. They are simply something which 
you think of or perceive, and to any one 
who cannot think of or perceive them, 
you can never, by any definition, make 
their nature known...And so it is with 
all objects, not previously known, 
which we are able to define: they 
are all complex; all composed of parts, 
which may themselves, in the first 
instance, be capable of similar 
definition, but which must in the 
end bereducible to simplest parts, 
which can no longer be defined.' 
Principia Ethica, pps.7 -8. 
Thus, a real understanding of goodness is what you must 
attempt, if you want to know the meaning of ' good '. In 
fact, goodness is like being true. 
' My point is that " good " is a 
simple notion, just as. " yellow " 
is a simple notion; that, just as 
you cannot, by any manner of means, 
explain to any one who does not 
already know it, what yellow is, 
so you cannot explain what good is.' 
Op.cit., R7 
' But yellow and good, we say, are 
not complex; they are notions of 
that simri ind, out of which 
definitions are somposed and with 





Just as being true is like being red, so being good is 
like being yellow. Russell fully accepts Moore's description 
of this sort of property, when he writes, in 1904, 
' It may be said - and this is, I 
believe, the correct view - that 
there is no problem at all in truth 
and falsehood; that some propositions 
are true and some false, just as some 
roses are red and some white.' 
Mind (1904), p.523. 
' Thus the analogy with red and white 
roses seems, in the end, to express 
the matter as nearly as possible. 
What is truth, and what falsehood, 
we must merely apprehend, for both 
seem incapable of analysis.' 
Op.cit., p.524. 
This imitativeness, of course, extends to Russell's 
methodology. The tool of philosophy is analysis. According 
to Moore, the essential analysanda are the objects of 
knowledge. Although these are what Russell's analysis 
ends with, one begins with words or propositions or 
beliefs. Russell's is an amplified form of Moore's 
analysis, since it adds, to the analysis of complex 
objects of knowledge, the analysis of beliefs etc. about 
these objects. 
In 1910, Russell explains the course of knowledge 
for the philosopher as, 
' The process to be gone through 
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is essentially one of analysis: we have 
various complex and more or less confused 
beliefs about the true and the false, and 
we have to reduce these to forms which are 
simple and clear, without causing any 
avoidable conflict between our initial 
complex and confused beliefs and our 
final simple and clear assertions. 
Philosophical Essays, p.171. 
In 1918, he tells an audience in London that, 
' The process of sound philosophising, 
to my mind, consists mainly in passing 
from those obvious, vague, ambiguous 
things, that we feel quite sure of, 
to something precise, clear, definite, 
which by reflection and analysis we 
find is involved in the vague thing 
that we start from, and is, so to 
speak, the real truth of which that 
vague thing is a sort of shadow.' 
Logic and Knowledge, p.179. 
'...( the ) last residue in analysis 
are logical atoms and not physical 
atoms. Some of them will be what I 
call ' particulars " - such things 
as little patches of colour or 
sounds, momentary things - and some 
of them will be predicates or relations 
and so on.' 
Loc.cit. 
These remarks show the return of the discussion to 
the relation between states of mind and the things ' meant ' 
by them, the subject originally taken up by Bradley in the 
first chapter of his Principles of Logic, and turned by 
Moore into a debate merely about the objects themselves. 
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Even when it comes to the discussion of particulars, Moore 
insists that his concern is not with the object qua meaning, 
but simply with the nature of the object itself. 
' My business is solely with that object 
or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, 
that the word is generally used to stand 
for. What I want to discover is the 
nature of that object or idea, and about 
this I am extremely anxious to arrive at 
an agreement.' 
Principia Ethica, p.6. 
Admittedly there is an assumption about what meaning is, 
in this short quotation; that words ' stand for ' their 
meanings. But notice the curious way in which Moore 
indicates his lack of concern about the actual word /thing 
relation; his business is solely with that object which 
he holds, ' rightly or wrongly ', is signified by the 
word. Moore is still adamant in his rejection of psy- 
chologism. It now becomes Russell's task to explain the 
facts about meaning, accepting Moore's view of reality as 
a congomerate of discrete and non -mental entities, and 
at the same time wanting to develope the correspondence 
assumption of meaning just noticed in Moore and also 
present in Bradley. For, let us not forget that Bradley 
described ideas qua mental phenomena, as signs and 
symbols whose meanings are such things as the attributes 
of a horse. His theory of meaning is not all that different 
from what follows, even if his ultimate position, meta- 
physically speaking, is. 
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The re- establishment of the identity of the proposition 
or judgment is to become Russell's particular problem, 
following its disappearance during Moore's attack on 
psychologising. Unfortunately, although Russell's theory 
of judgment campaigns as a ' correspondence ' theory, 
thus implying that judgments are to be compared with 
fact or reality, no successful formula for correspondence 
is stated until the time of the Tractatus, precisely 
because Russell cannot get away from Moore's orignal 
contention that the judgment consists of the things or 
objects judged about. We shall find him trying with one 
device or another to construct two complexes out of the 
same elements, one being the judgment and the other the 
fact which makes the judgment true. It requires Wittgen- 
stein's suggestion that the elements of the complexes 
are not numerically identical, but only identical in 
kind, to blend the correspondence theory of meaning with 
Moore's timeless simples. Perhaps Russell's particular 
contribution comes through his analysis of language in 
terms of names and logical forms, the reductive process 
in language being parallelled by the metaphysical break- 
down stated by Moore to be the pattern of investigation. 
Summary. 
1. Bradley analyses meaning into mental ideas, as 
symbols, and attributes as their meanings. 
2. Moore criticises Bradley for ' psychologising ' 
meaning. Moore's main argument in effect discredits a 
certain genetic account of knowledge of meaning but does 
not attain its intended target, that judgment is in no 
sense mental. 
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3. Moore says that what becomes a meaning must already 
exist in its own right. He calls it a ' concept '. Complex 
concepts, or judgments, consist of simple ones. Simple 
concepts are timeless and immutable; they do not really 
' exist ' at all, since existence is itself a concept. 
According to this theory, intelligibility is a function 
of analysability. The result of Moore's metaphysics is 
the identification of judgment with its object. 
4. Russell accepts Moore's emphasis on analysability; 
he also accepts Moore's a count of truth, at least to 
begin with. We are to see him trying to reconcile the 
theory that the objects of a judgment are its elements, 
with a correspondence theory of meaning. 
5. The ' objects ' of the Tractatus are strikingly 
like those of ' The nature of judgment '. We shall find 
that the Picture Theory re- establishes the identity of 
the judgment or proposition and does so by combining 
Moore's metaphysics with Russell's theory of names. 
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Chapter Two. 
The Principles of Mathematics of 1903 in some ways 
represents Russell's best work. The scope and depth and 
vigour of the book are wonderful. The parts to which we 
shall give special attention are about the relations 
between language, propositions and the objects of know- 
ledge. The propositional analysis in The Principles of 
Mathematics is the prelude to Russell's most famous 
essay, ' On denoting ', of 1905. 
The purpose of The Principles is to show that mathematics 
is one with logic. It is one of the few occasions on which 
Russell seems almost to be an unwilling metaphysician, and, 
what is more remarkable, an unwilling logician, for he 
remarks of the problem of truth that he will ' therefore 
leave this question to the logicians with the above brief 
indication of a difficulty ' ( p.49.). ( The difficulty is 
being able to talk about propositions without asserting 
them.) 
In reality, of course, he does as much metaphysics as 
anyone, and as much logic too. What may seem more out of 
keeping with the subject of meta -mathematics is Russell's 
concern with grammar; he is a far from unwilling gram- 
marian. 
' The study of grammar, in my opinion, 
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is capable of throwing far more light 
on philosophical questions than is 
commonly supposed by philosophers... 
On the whole, grammar seems to me to 
bring us much nearer to a correct 
logic than the current opinions of 
philosophers; and in what follows, 
grammar, though not our master, will 
yet be taken as our guide.' 
The Principles of Mathematics, p.42. 
Russell's use of grammar is, perhaps, not quite so 
revolutionary as might appear. At least a decade earlier, 
Frege suggested the same thing. In fact it was not uncommon 
to link grammar with logic: a text -book of the 1870's, by 
W. S. Jevons, Elementary lessons in logic, contains a 
chapter on the grammatical analysis of sentences, actually 
Lesson X1, the main thesis being that ' the proper 
logical construction ' of a proposition is the ' con- 
junction of a subject, copula and predicate ' ( p.88.). 
But long before them, Aristotle considered the relation 
between logical and grammatical facts, particularly in 
De Interpretatione. 
Russell uses grammar to determine (a) what the real 
objects of discourse are, and (b) what the relation is 
between symbolism and what is said or spoken about. Two 
fundamental distinctions are made in each area of dis- 
cussion. In the first, the distinction is between those 
things which can only be logical subjects and those which 
can be both logical subjects and logical predicates too. 
In the second, the distinction is between naming and 
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asserting, or between names and propositions. The grammatical 
distinction most in mind is the subject /predicate one. But 
Russell does not take this to be directly applicable to the 
objects of discourse, since he finds that certain things 
can correspond either to the grammatical subject or to the 
grammatical predicate. The Principles leaves Russell with a 
problem unsolved, the identity of what corresponds with, 
and hence gives meaning to, such expressions as ' Caesar's 
death '. This is the problem of ' On denoting '. 
In The Principles, the objects of discourse are called 
' terms '. Any object of thought, let alone discourse, is 
a term ( p.43.). 
' A term is, in fact, possessed of all the prop- 
erties commonly assigned to substances or sub- 
stantives. Every term, to begin with, is a 
logical subject: it is, for example, the 
subject of the proposition that itself is 
one. Again every term is immutable and in- 
destructible.' 
Op.cit., p.44. 
' The notion of a term here set forth is 
a modification of Mr G. E. Moore's notion 
of a concept in his article ' On the 
Nature of Judgment ', Mind, N.S. No.30, 
from which notion, however, it differs in 
some important respects.' 
Op.cit., footnote to p.44. 
The chief modification seems to be the sharp distinction 
between terms which are ' things ' and terms which are 
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' concepts '. Whereas Moore had made everything a concept, 
Russell separates what are ' indicated by proper names ' 
i.e. things, from what are indicated ' by all other words ' 
i.e. concepts ( p.44.). The distinction is further elab- 
orated. 
' Socrates is a thing, because Socrates 
can never occur otherwise than as term 
in a proposition: Socrates is not capable 
of that curious two -fold use which is 
involved in human and humanity.' 
Op.cit., p45. 
Russell's use of ' term ' is ambiguous; he had earlier 
given all the objects of thought as terms, but here means 
by ' term ' ' logical subject '. Socrates is, and can 
only be, a logical subject. Other entities are capable of 
the ' curious two -fold use which is involved in human 
and humanity '; these are the concepts; they may be 
predicated of other things or they may occur as logical 
subjects. The same concept corresponds both to ' human ' 
and to ' humanity , in the former case as predicate 
and in the latter as sub-'ect. 
' Predicates are distinguished from 
other terms by a number of very 
interesting properties, chief among 
which is their connection with what 
I ,hall call denoting.' 
Loc . cit. 
Russell finds it difficult to say exactly what denoting 
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is. It has ' bean obscured hitherto by an undue admixture 
of psychology ' ( p.53.). 
' A concept denotes when, if it occurs 
in a propositìon,tthe proposition is not 
about the concept, but about a term 
connected in a certain way with the 
concept. If I say " I met a man ", 
the proposition is not about a man: 
this is a concept which does not 
walk the streets, but lives in the 
shadowy limbo of the logic- books. 
What I met was a thing, not a concept, 
an actual man with a tailor and a 
bank- account or a public -house and 
a drunken wife.' 
Op.cit., p.53. 
One cannot say that the relation of denoting is much 
clearer; when a concept denotes, it is in some sort of 
connection with a term. We are not told what this 
' connection ' is; it is not even clear in the example 
given, that the concept corresponding to ' a man ' is 
always in the process of denoting. Although we can get 
the notion of denoting ' by a kind of logical genesis 
from subject -predicate propositions, upon which it seems 
more or less dependent ' ( p.54.) Russell is to offer 
no fuller explanation of it. But, if he cannot reveal 
its structure, he can assess its importance, for it 
' lies at the bottom of all theories of substance, of 
the subject -predicate logic, and of the opposition 
between things and ideas, discursive thought and 
immediate perception.' ( p.53.) 
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Russell's analysis, having moved from the grammatical 
distinction of subject and predicate to the metaphysical 
one of thing and concept, continues in a more complicated 
way, making the nucleus of the subject part of the prop- 
osition the name and the nuclei of the predicative part 
the verb and adjective or name. He further distinguishes 
names into proper names and general ones. 
His concept of a proper name is applied inconsistently, 
for at one point ( p.44.) he says that things ' are 
the terms indicated by proper names, the latter ( i.e. 
concepts )...by all other words ' and then, much later, 
writes ' that concepts can be objects and have proper 
names ' ( p.502.). The distinction between names and 
proper names is not, according to the later remark, para- 
llel to that between concepts and things, although the 
earlier remark surely implies this. The real difference 
would seem to be that whereas an expression qua proper 
name indicates one and only one thing, a general name 
may be used of many things. 
The broadening of the type of entity which can be 
indicated by a proper name, from thing to thing and 
concept, avoids the difficulty on which Frege and Benno 
Kerry disagreed, the former denying that one could 
actually talk about concepts. Frege appeals, in his 
article ' On concept and object ' of 1892, to ordinary 
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grammar; he cautions us not to establish logical distinctions 
on grammatical ones, but to treat the latter as hints of the 
former. 
' A name of an object, a proper name, 
is quite incapable of being used as 
a grammatical predicate.' 
Translations from Frege, p.43; Geach and Black. 
On the other hand, ' the concept ( as I understand 
the word ) is predicative ' ( loc.cit.); it ' is, 
in fact, the reference of a grammatical predicate ' 
( loc.cit.). 
As Russell was later to do in The Principles, Frege 
takes the subject -predicate distinction in grammar to 
imply a corresponding metaphysical distinction between 
logical subjects and logical predicates. The former he 
calls ' objects ', the latter ' concepts '. No concept 
can be an object,lecause it is essentially predicative. 
Just as no expression for an object i.e. no proper name, 
can be used predicatively, and no predicative expression 
be used as a grammatical subject, so neither an object 
nor a concept can play the role of the other. 
By seeing the ' is of ' He is Alexander the Great ' 
as performing the same function as in arithmetic, 
Frege shows that ' Alexander the Great ' is still being 
used as a name. And although ' the morning star ' does 
64. 
contain the concept -words ' morning ' and ' star ', the 
expression is not predicative; it is actually a name; ' the 
singular definite article always indicates an object ' 
( op.cit., p.45.). It is this which makes it difficult for 
him to account for such expressions as ' the concept 
horse ', since this does contain the singular definite 
article and yet seems to refer to what cannot be a logical 
subject. So either the expression can indicatee nothing, or 
it indicates an object and not a concept, or something can 
be both a concept and an object, or, finally, the logical - 
subject class is not co- extensive with either the whole or 
part of the object class. 
Russell chooses the latter, thus allowing concepts to 
be logical subjects. Frege chooses the second alternative, 
maintaining a rigid distinction between the predicative 
concept and what corresponds to the gramnstica.l subject, 
the object of discourse. 
' Kerry does not appeal to this; 
instead, he gives the following example: 
" the concept ' horse ' is a concept 
easily attained," and thinks that the 
concept ' horse ' is an object, in 
fact one of the objects that fall 
under the concept ' concept easily 
attained '. Quite so; the three words 
" the concept ' horse '" do designate 
an object, but on that very account 
they do not designate a concept, as 
I am using the word. This is in full 
accord with the criterion I gave - 
that the singular definite article 
always indicates an object, whereas 
the indefinite article accompanies 
a concept -word.' 
Op.cit., p.45. 
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' One would expect that the reference 
of the grammatical subject would be the 
concept; but the concept as such cannot 
play this part, in view of its predicative 
nature; it must first be converted into an 
object, or, speaking more precisely, 
represented by an object.' 
Op.cit., p.46. 
One sympathises with Frege's critic. The representation 
of concepts by objects is surely an admission that one can 
talk about them. Moreover, if one thing represents another, 
the two things cannot be fundamentally different. Why not 
simply admit that one can talk about and refer to concepts, 
particularly since Frege believes that one concept can fall 
under another? Surely the concept horse is a concept? 
Russell avoids this sort of difficulty by permitting 
direct reference to concepts. ( He gives a detailed dis- 
cussion of Frege's theory in Appendix A of The Principles.) 
At the same time he preserves a set of things which cannot 
be other than logical subjects. 
Both Russell and Frege believe the subject -predicate 
grammatical distinction to have a metaphysical implication, 
namely, that there is one type of thing no one of which is 
a property, and another type of thing any one of which is 
a property, the first being the ' thing ' or object type, 
the second, the concept type. If something falls under a 
Fregean concept, it has that concept as a property ( p.51.). 
The same would seem to be true of anything falling under 
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a Russellian concept. Both systems admit of things and concepts 
falling under concepts. 
Concerning language, both distinguish between proper names 
and concept words, although each allows that a proper name 
may include a concept word, if the name uses the singular, 
definite article ( Some proper names ' are derived from 
concepts by means of the ' ( The Principles, p.502.)). 
Expressions like ' the man with the dog ' are proper 
names and have meaning. Russell would say that ' John ' 
merely indicates without having meaning. 
Frege draws an important distinction between the sense 
of a name and its reference, between its having sense and 
its having reference. This follows from his recognition of 
the facts that the same thing may be referred to by using 
different concept words and that some names may lack a 
reference. He applies the same distinction to complete 
sentences and for the same reasons; different sentences 
may have the same reference; some sentences, with sense, 
may have no reference. The sense of a sentence is what 
Frege calls a ' thought '. 
' In our example, accordingly, the 
reference of the expressions " the 
point of intersection of a and b " 
and " the point of intersection of 
b and c " would be the same, but 
not th-ir senses. The reference of 
" evening star " would be the same 
as that of " morning star ", but 
not the sense.' 
Op.cit., p.57. 
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' So far we have considered the sense 
and reference only of such expressions, 
words, or signs as we have called 
proper names. We now inquire concerning 
the sense and reference for an entire 
declarative sentence. Such a sentence 
contains a thought. Is this thought, now, 
to be regarded as its sense or its 
reference? Let us assume for the time 
being that the sentence has reference. 
If we now replace one word of the sentence 
by another having the same reference, but 
a different sense, this can have no 
bearing upon the reference of the 
sentence. Yet we can see that in such 
a case the thought changes; since, e.g. 
the thought in the sentence " The 
morning star is a body illuminated by 
the Sun " differs from that in the 
sentence " The evening star is a 
body illuminated by the Sun." Anybody 
who did not know that, the evening star 
is the morning star might hold the one 
thought to be true, the other false. 
The thought, accordingly, cannot be 
the reference of the sentence, but must 
be considered as the sense. What is the 
position now with regard to the reference? 
Have we a right even to inquire about it? 
Is it possible that a sentence as a whole 
has only a sense, but no reference? At any 
rate, one might expect that such sentences 
occur, just as there are parts of sentences 
having sense but no reference. And sentences 
which contain proper names without reference 
will be of this kind. The sentence " Odysseus 
was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep " 
obviously has a sense. But since it is 
doubtful whether the name " Odysseus ", 
occurring therein, has reference, it is 
also doubtful whether the whole sentence has one. 
Yet it is certain, nevertheless, that anyone 
who seriously took the sentence to be true 
or false would ascribe to the name " Odysseus " 
a reference, not merely a sense; for it is of 
the reference of the name that the predicate 
is affirmed or denied. Whoever does not admit 
the name has reference c._.n neither apply nor 
withhold the predicate. But in that case it 
would be superfluous to advance to the reference 
of the name; one could be satisfied with the 
sense, if one wanted to go no further than 
the thought. If it were aquestion only of the sense 
of the sentence, the thought, it would be 
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unnecessary to bother with the reference 
of a part of the sentence; only the sense, 
not the reference, of the part is relevant 
to the sense of the whole sentence. The 
thought remains the same whether " Odysseus " 
has reference or not.' 
Op.cit., pps.62-3. 
In this way Frege accounts for meaning ultimately 
through correspondence, the correspondence of predicative 
words to concepts. His distinction between sense and 
reference allows him to maintain the meaningfulness 
of an expression, even if it has no reference; its being 
meaningful amounts to the possibility of its having a 
reference which it could indicate, if the reference 
actually existed. He does not, of course, account for 
all meaning through correspondence, but only for one 
essential aspect of it. 
Russell devotes a considerable part of The Principles 
to this work of Frege's, a complete appendix in fact. He 
remarks, quite correctly, that '...Frege's position on 
this question is more subtle than mine, and involves a 
more radical analysis of judgment ' ( p.502.). In spite 
of this acknowledgment, Russell cannot agree with Frege. 
The exact nature of the disagreement is difficult to 
determine because of Russell's uncertainty about what 
he himself means. He is not at all clear about the 
relation between assertion and the proposition, or 
about the relation of either to truth. He says, for 
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instance, that ' an asserted proposition, it would seem, 
must be the same as a true proposition ° ( p.504.); what 
he means by ' assertion ' has nothing to do with psy- 
chological states or acts. 
' But assertion does not seem to be 
a constituent of an asserted proposition, 
although it is, in some sense, contained 
in an asserted proposition.' 
Op.cit., p.504. 
What he is trying to explain is the difference between the 
single occurrence of a sentence and its occurrence in some 
larger sentence, such that, in the former, but not the 
latter, we assume the assertion of the corresponding 
proposition. But he obscures this issue, which is the 
distinction between the presentation of a thought and 
the presentation of a judgment or assertion, by intro- 
ducing what he calls Frege's ' divorce ' of assertion 
from truth. He cannot see any point in separating the 
assertion of a proposition from its truth -value, as Frege 
does, since an asserted proposition is just a true one 
and vice versa. He cannot see any point in distinguishing 
judgment from meaning, since the proposition somehow 
already contains assertion, although it can also occur 
in ' an unasserted form ' in some other proposition. 
Russell rejects the Fregean distinctions between the 
content of a judgment, the making of a judgment and the 
circumstance of the judgment's being true ( or, perhaps 
false ). 
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'...: it seems quite sufficient to say 
that an asserted proposition is one whose 
meaning is true, and that to say the 
meaning is true is the same as to say 
the meaning is asserted.' 
Op.cit., p.505. 
On Russell's theory, which is not fully worked out, meaning, 
assertion and the proposition's being true,all coalesce to 
form a non -psychological complex. The distinctions so care- 
fully drawn by Frege are obliterated; but this does not 
mean that Russell's theory is much inferior to Frege's. 
Russell is keenly interested in explaining what a true 
judgment actually does, and is surely justified in not 
accepting its analysis in terms of a thought, and something, 
an ' object ', called ' the True '. Although Frege draws 
important distinctions between a thought, or the meaning of 
a sentence, the use of the sentence in making a judgment, 
and the circumstance of the thought's being true ( or 
false ), his explanation of those distinctions is either 
perfunctory or carries us only as far as Russell's. 
Admittedly, Frege's sense /reference distinction takes 
him past a difficulty which Russell is just beginning to 
experience - how to explain expressions like ' the death 
of Caesar ' - since something may be a possible, if not an 
actual, name; even if there is no such thing as Caesar's 
death, ' the death of Caesar ' may still have sense. But 
the important relation between a proposition's being true 
( or false ) and reality is as great a mystery in Frege 
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as it is in Russell. And his assimilation of propositions 
to referring expressions is just as wrong an exaggeration 
as Russell's assimilation of referring expressions to 
propositions; we shall presently see Russell describing 
expressions of the form ' the ( ) ' as really being 
complexes of propositions. 
Russell's initial treatment of such expressions is as 
follows. 
' Words all have meaning, in the simple 
sense that they are symbols which stand for 
something other than themselves. But a 
proposition, unless it happens to be 
linguistic, does not itself contain words: 
it contains the entities indicated by 
words.' 
The Principles, p.47. 
Now compare ' Caesar died ' with ' the death of 
Caesar '; the concepts are the same, but on the one hand 
you have a proposition, and on the other a logical subject. 
It looks, therefore, as if the same complex corresponds 
to both sets of words. 
' By transforming the verb, as it occurs 
in a proposition, into a verbal noun, the 
whole proposition can be turned into a 
single logical subject, no longer asserted, 
and no longer containing in itself truth 
or falsehood. But here too, there seems 
to be no possibility of maintaining that 
the logical subject which results is a 
different entity from the proposition. 
" Caesar died " and " the death of 
Caesar " will illustrate this point.' 
Op.cit., p.48. 
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Russell's only bother about admitting that one and the 
same complex corresponds to the two expressions, is that 
a proposition in some way ' contains ' assertion, which 
he correlates with the action of the verb; in some way a 
verb can turn a logical subject into a proposition or 
assertion. How this is done is incomprehensible to him, 
as he freely admits, leaving the question ' to the 
logicians '! Two paragraphs later, Russell gives further 
consideration to the nature of the complex corresponding 
to the proposition, but not this time to distinguish the 
concept qua logical subject from the concept qua propos- 
ition; the question now is, how are the constituents of 
the proposition put together to make a single complex? 
' The twofold nature of the verb, as 
actual verb and as verbal noun, may be 
expressed, if all verbs are held to be 
relations, as the difference between a 
relation in itself and a relation 
actually relating. Consider, for example, 
the proposition " A differs from B ". 
The constituents of this proposition, 
if we analyze it, appear to be only A, 
difference, B. Yet these constituents, 
thus placed side by side, do not 
reconstitute the proposition. The 
difference which occurs in the prop- 
osition actually relates A and B, 
whereas the difference after analysis 
is a notion which has no connection 
with A and B. It may be said that we 
ought, in the analysis, to mention 
the relations which difference has 
to Aand B, relations which are 
expressed by is and from when we 
say " A is different from B ". These 
relatioñs consist in the fact that 
A is referent and B relatum with 
respect to ifference. But " A, 
referent, difference, relatum, B " 
is still merely a list of terms, not 
a proposition. A proposition, in fact 
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is essentially a unity, and when analysis 
has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of 
constituents will restore the proposition. 
The verb, when used as a verb, embodies 
the unity of the proposition, and is thus 
distinguishable from the verb considered 
as a term, though I do not know how to 
give a clear account of the precise 
nature of the distinction.' 
Op.cit., pps.49&50. 
The two problems of most interest, so far as our concern 
in the Tractatus is concerned, are : - 
1. How can what corresponds to ' the death of Caesar ' 
also correspond to ' Caesar died '? 
2. How can something both be a constituent of a 
propositional complex and at the same time give 
unity to the complex? 
Russell's answer to the first question is given, of 
course, in his essay of 1905, ' On denoting '. He twice 
attempts an answer to the second question, once in 
' On the nature of truth and falsehood ' ( 1910 ) and 
again in his book The Problems of Philosophy ( 1912 ). 
These are the two most interesting of the problems ex- 
plicitly considered by him; there is a third, which he 
does not take up. 
3. What are the elements of the proposition? 
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Russell doesn't really consider this at all, except to 
amend Moore's metaphysics by distinguishing things from 
concepts. He still assumes that propositional elements 
are identical with the objects of discourse. It is this 
unquestioned assumption which is to give him such a 
headache later on. 
This continued allegiance to Moore is reflected in Russell's 
articles on Meinong which appeared in Mind in 1904. These 
were to introduce Meinong to English readers who had no 
access to the original German. Russell begins his task 
by sketching his own position. 
',..every presentation and every belief 
must have an object other than itself, 
and, except in certain cases where mental 
existents happen to be concerned, extra - 
mental; that what is commonly called 
perception has as its object an exis- 
tential proposition, into which enters as 
a constituent that whose existence is 
concerned, and not the idea of this 
existent; that truth and falsehood 
apply not (t) beliefs, but to their 
objects; and that the object of a thought, 
even when this object does not exist, 
has a Being which is in no way dependent 
upon its being an object of thought: all 
these are theses which, though generally 
rejected, can nevertheless be supported 
by arguments which deserve at least a 
refutation. Except Frege, I know of no 
writer on the theory of knowledge who 
comes as near to this position as 
Meinong.' 
Mind ( 1904 ), p.204. 
In a footnote, he tells us that he has ' been led to 
accept these theses by Mr G. E. Moore '. 
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Meinong's distinctions between assumptions, judgments 
and objects, which are roughly parallel to Frege's 
thoughts, judgments and objects and concepts, are rejected 
by Russell. He cannot see any difference between being 
given an assumption and being given a proposition; he 
does not understand ' in what sense an assumption is not 
a presentation of a proposition ' ( Op.cit., p.339.). 
' The question is this: Does an assumption 
have a different object from the corresponding 
judgment, or does it merely have a different 
attitude to the same object ( the proposition )? 
The case of belief and disbelief shows that 
it is possible to have different attitudes 
to the same object, and thus allows us to 
accept the view, which is prima facie the 
correct one, that there is no difference in 
the object.' 
Op.cit., p.339. 
His objection, of course, weights the answer in his 
own favour; if he had considered whether some poem or 
novel has the same object as some observation about, say, 
the weather, or, indeed whether there is any object at 
all, in the former cases, he would have been nearer the 
mark. Without pursuing his disagreements with Meinong 
any further, let us leave these articles with a quotation 
containing Russell's picturesque, and Moorean, description 
of truth. 
' It may be said - and this is, I 
believe, the correct view - that 
there is no problem at all in truth 
and falsehood; that some propositions 
are true and some false, just as some 
roses are red and some white...' 
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This quotation ( p.523.) amply reveals a metaphysical 
vision of a world from which anything thinkable can be 
summoned. True propositions are like red roses, false 
ones like white. So that real existent things and unreal 
non-existent things are both to be had in some form 
or another. It is from this nightmare of metaphysical 
monsters that Russell's theory of descriptions delivers 
him. Such expressions as ' the man who broke the bank 
at Monte Carlo ' do not require single existent or 
subsistent terms to correspond to them to give them 
meaning. Instead, they are broken up into propositions 
whose concept words are guaranteed corresponding objects. 
The objects of discourse which correspond to ' the man 
who broke the bank at Monte Carlo ' do not include such 
a man, but consist of the properties of being a man, 
being a bank and having broken a bank, together with the 
town itself and the relation of being in or at. ' The 
death of Caesar ' is thus assimilated to ' Caesar died '. 
This is the theory in brief. A fuller exposition follows 
below. 
The overriding question is whether or not propositions 
like ' The king of France is bald ' have logical subjects. 
Why is this so important? Because, irrespective of the 
actual truth or falsity of the proposition, its constituents, 
including its logical subject ( if it has one ), must 
exist in some form or other. If it means anything, something 
is its meaning, and the individual meanings of the words 
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are parts of that meaning. So that if a proposition has 
meaning and has a logical subject, that logical subject is 
part of the meaning. This is Russell's view. It follows 
that if some proposition both has meaning and is about, say, 
the king of France, that person, its logical subject, is 
part of the proposition's meaning. Nothing has yet been 
said which was not said in The Principles of Mathematics. 
The change comes with Russell's unwillingness to have the 
king of France as a logical subject, if there is no such 
person. He finds a non -existent king of France metaphys- 
ically objectionable; thisis where he faults Meinong and 
his theory which ' regards any grammatically correct 
denoting phrase as standing for an object ' ( ' On 
denoting ', Logic and Knowledge: edited by R. C. Marsh: 
p.45.). If there is no king of France, he is certainly 
not a logical subject, and therefore not a constituent 
of the proposition that the king of France is bald. 
One obvious remedy is to deny that there is any such 
proposition, since one of its ingredients is missing. It 
cannot be denied, however, that whether there is a king 
or not, we can understand what is meant by ' The king 
of France is bald '. There remain two other alternatives, 
which, of course, would have to be supplemented by 
explanation. One is that if there is such a person as 
the king of France, he is the logical subject; sometimes 
the proposition has, and sometimes it hasn't, a logical 
subject, depending on whether he exists or not. Now, this 
sort of account would have to be in two parts, one 
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dealing with those times at which the meaning did come 
from the inclusion of the king as a constituent of the 
proposition, and thus of its meaning; and another part 
dealing with those times at which there was no such person, 
at which he could not be part of the meaning, thus necess- 
itating some other constituent analysis. That is one of 
the alternatives to admitting that there is no such 
proposition as that the king of France is bald, assuming, 
as Russell does, that the meaning and the proposition are 
in some sense identical. The other alternative is to deny 
that the king ever is a constituent of the proposition, 
whether he exists or not. This, in my opinion, is the 
alternative Russell follows, although not the one he 
chooses, since he does not actually consider the matter. 
In fact he obscures it with epistemological questions 
about objects of awareness and also with a certain con- 
fusion about the relation between grammatical and logical 
subjects. In my opinion, Russell's analysis of the meaning 
of the sentence ' The king of France is bald ' implies 
that the things meant, the elements of the meaning, those 
objective things in terms of which the sentence has 
meaning, never include the king himself because his 
existence need never be allowed for. If the proposition 
is about anything, it is about France, being a king and 
being bald; this is certainly what Russell suggests, in 
order to avoid the difficulty of admitting that, though 
it is not about the king, since there is no king, the 
proposition still has meaning. In fact, the proposition, 
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on a Russellian analysis, is not really about anything, at 
any time, since the subject -expression ' the king of France ' 
can be done away with in favour of purely predicative ex- 
pressions, like ' is a king ', excepting, of course, the 
proper name ' France ' to which something must correspond. 
This seems to be a case of there being no king because there 
are no subjects. 
To understand the word ' the ', according to Russell, at 
least from a philosophical point of view, one has to know 
how to break it up. This breaking up process replaces 
propositions in which such phrases occur with propositions 
in which they do not occur. 
' The phrase per se has no meaning, because 
in any proposit n in which it oc urs the 
proposition, fully expressed, does not 
contain the phrase, which has been broken 
up.' 
Op.cit., p51. 
The phrase in mind is ' the author of Waverley '. This 
looks as though it functions just like the name ' Scott '. 
These two expressions are, in fact, quite different. 
' If I say " Scott was a man ", 
that is a statement of the form 
" x was a man ", and it has " Scott " 
for its subject. But if I say " the 
author of Waverley was a man ", that 
is not a statement of the form 
" x was a man ", and does not have 
" the author of Waverley " for its 
subject. Abbreviating the statement 
made at the beginning of this article, 
we may put, in place of " the author 
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of Waverley was a man ", the following: 
" One and only one entity wrote Waverley, 
and that one was a man ".' 
Loc.cit. 
In other words, expressions of the form ' the A ' can 
be replaced by expressions of the form ' one thing is A; 
no two things are As ; anything that is an A is ( ) '. 
" Scott " is the subject of the statement " Scott 
was a man "; " the author of Waverley " is not the subject 
of the statement " the author of Waverley was a man ". 
Both are grammatical subjects in their respective sentences. 
However there is some sense in which " Scott " ?s= a 
subject and " the author of Waverley " is not. If the 
difference is not a grammatical one, is it then logical? 
Does Russell mean that " Scott " is a logical subject 
whereas " the author of Waverley " is not? Or does he 
mean that the man Scott is a logical subject with respect 
to the statement " Scott was a man ", whereas the same 
man, as the author of Waverley, is not a logical subject 
with respect to the statement " the author of Waverley 
was a man " ? If he means the man Scott, why does he 
put his name in quotation- marks? Is he talking about 
expressions or about what these expressions may intro- 
duce as subjects of discourse? 
It seems that Russell is talking both about expressions 
and about logical subjects. He wishes on the one hand to 
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contrast " Scott " and " the author of Waverley ", 
and on the other to contrast Scott appearing as a logical 
subject with his not appearing as such. 
Some sentences have names as grammatical subjects; in 
this passage Russell does not raise any Gethe questions he 
raises elsewhere about proper names but treats them as un- 
controversial, as if they guaranteed the existence of co- 
rresponding objects. Some sentences have expressions like 
" the author of Waverley " as grammatical subjects, ex- 
pressions which look like names and which are in fact 
concealed descriptions, carrying no guarantee of corres- 
ponding objects. What Russell seems to want is to have 
only proper names as grammatical subjects, so that to any 
grammatical subject there will correspond a logical one, 
expressions of the form ' the ( ) ' being analysed away. 
Although the following quotation is not strong evidence 
for this interpretation, coming, as it does, some half - 
century later, it does tend to support it. 
The essential point of the theory 
was that, although " the golden mountain " 
may be grammatically the subject of a sig- 
nificant proposition, such a proposition, 
when rightly analysed, no longer has such 
a subject.' 
My Philosophical Development, p.84. 
The ambiguity of Russell's notion of ' subject ' con- 
sists in his not distinguishing the grammatical from the 
logical, and, correspondingly, not justifying his correl- 
ation of them. 
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Russell's position has changed from that of describing 
expressions of the form ' the ( ) ' as proper names. He 
had done this in The principles ( p.502.) exactly as Frege 
did in ' On concept and object '. He now thinks that such 
expressions are propositional; or rather, he thinks that 
they ought to disappear on analysis, leaving no trace of 
their substantive character. His desire to see them go is 
shown not only by his saying that a proposition ' rightly 
analysed ' has no such subject, but by his saying that 
they have per se no meaning at all; for, of course, if 
' the A ' really does mean ' one thing is an A; no two 
things are As; anything that is an A is ( ) ', then it 
does mean a good deal, and can, to some extent, stand on 
its own legs; it is only the part with the gap in it which 
is meaningless. 
On the whole, Russell is very ambiguous in his attitude 
to ' the '; that is, he talks about its disappearance as 
something which is utterly important, indeed ' imperative '. 
He never talks about its reappearance; he never suggests 
that, having shown what it really means, we can leave it 
alone; his whole manner is that ' the ' should be got 
rid of wherever possible, as pernicious and misleading. 
The same goes for any grammatical subject which is not 
a proper name; the argument runs:- If it's not a proper 
name, what's it doing as a grammatical subject? 
The fundamental reason for this is Russell's conflation 
of four things, or types, sentences, meanings, propositions 
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and objects of discourse. In accordance with Moore's old 
doctrine, the last three are identical; sometimes the 
sentence, or its pieces, are lumped in too; at other times 
they are regarded as mere signs of hints of the real thing. 
It is because the objects of discourse are the same as the 
meaning or meanings involved that the meaning of ' the 
author of Waverley ' is not the author of Waverley; it 
is because propositions are meanings that Russell will 
not admit that there may be a meaning without there being 
a proposition ( Frege's solution to this sort of difficulty ). 
Giving up either of those beliefs would permit him to 
retain the belief that ' the king of France ' is a 
referring expression, as it in fact is; its having meaning 
does not imply that we can, at any time, use it, but 
merely that we would know how to use it, if the occasion 
arose. Russell is quite right in saying that the meaning 
of ' the author of Waverley ' is not Scott; but the 
fact that we use the expression just like a name does not 
imply that Scott is its meaning. It is Russell's fault in 
identifying meaning with what is being spoken about. As 
Frege pointed out, we may use expressions with quite 
different meanings to indicate one and the same thing. 
Is the king of France at any time an element in the 
proposition that the king of France is bald'.' My own 
opinion may be thought too severe, that he never is. 
In the first place, however, Russell does not advance 
two explanations of meaning, one to cover the case 
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where the king is a constituent, and the other to cover the 
case where he is not. In the second place, if we do not need 
the king on some occasions, we do not need him on others. We 
do not need to acknowledge the king, when we talk, quite 
sensibly, with the sentence ' The king of France is bald '; 
it is like not needing someone in the next room to make 
sense of the remark that there is someone in the next room. 
The truth is that, on Russell's theory, the king of France 
is never the logical subject of discussion, so long as 
that discussion is conducted in terms of such expressions 
as ' the ( ) '. In other words, even if it is true that 
the king of France is bald, you are not talking about him 
when you say, in any circumstances whatever, ' The king 
of France is bald '. The sentence does not give you that 
person as a logical subject at all. 
It will probably be thought that mine is too strict 
an interpretation, that what Russell meant was that, if 
it were true that the king of France were bald, he would 
then be the logical subject; and if false, he would not be. 
This, I think, is to miss the whole point of the theory, 
which is to dispense completely with the need for a 
logical subject. Russell sees real logical subjects as 
things which give meaning to thoughts and propositions; 
they provide the occasion for propositions. ' The king 
of France is bald ' does not rely on such things; it 
Las no logical subject. 
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A. logical subject is something complete ignorance of 
which prevents our understanding assertions qua assertions; 
if we do not know who or what is meant, we are not in a 
position to agree or disagree with what is said; we are 
not even in a position to know whether there is anything 
to agree or disagree on. The effect of Russell's analysis 
is to remove this inability; you don't need to know who 
the king of France is, or even if there is such a person, 
to know that one can agree or disagree that something is 
a king of France, that no two things are kings of France 
and that any king of France is bald. The king of France 
is not a logical subject, so far as this complex statement 
is concerned, true or false. 
' One interesting result of the above 
theory of denoting is this: when there 
is anything with which we do not have 
immediate acquaintance, but only def- 
inition by denoting phrases, then the pro- 
positions in which this thing is intro- 
duced by means of a denoting phrase 
do not really contain this thing as 
a constituent, but contain instead 
the constituents expressed by the 
several words of the denoting phrase. Thus 
in every proposition that we can 
apprehend ( i.e. not only in those 
whose truth or falsehood we can judge 
of, but in all that we can think 
about ), all the constituents are 
really entities with which we have 
immediate acquaintance.' 
Logic and Knowledge, p.56. 
This, of course, is Russell's famous distinction between 
knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. 
Strictly speaking it is not a result of his theory of 
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definite descriptions, but an addition to it. The theory 
of definite descriptions covers certain existential con- 
ditions required, or not required, for certain sorts of 
meaning. This additional theory is intended to account for 
knowledge sufficient and necessary for making or under- 
standing judgments. It implies that nothing with which 
we are not actually acquainted can occur as an element 
in any proposition we know. Yet, in some curious way, we 
can know of certain propositions, and of their truth, 
even if we cannot ' apprehend ' them. We can talk about 
Caesar, for instance, although none of us is acquainted 
with him; he cannot occur in any proposition which we 
know, yet we know certain truths about him. What Russell 
says here, however, is not sufficiently amplified for us 
to understand the relations between the objects of 
acquaintance and the objects of thought. Quite evidently 
he wants to allow us to think about what we cannot 
actually perceive, relying on some sort of meaning 
relation between what we can perceive and what we cannot. 
That is the most we know, except that an object of 
thought can somehow be ' given ' by a unique relation 
it has either to some one property or to a set of 
properties, which thus define it. There is some sort 
of epistemological equation between knowing the objects 
of acquaintance and the objects of thought, otherwise, 
according to Russell, one would not be able know, for 
instance, that Scott was the author of Waverley. But 
this does not amount to identity, or to an ontological 
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equation. Just how properties or universals ' give ' us 
things is not considered. We are simply left with the 
thought that if we can't have Caesar himself in a prop- 
osition, we can have the things which correspond to the 
words used to define him. Presumably those who actually 
knew him, could have Caesar in their propositions; and 
those who knew Louis XVlll could have him as a propos- 
itional constituent. I do not think this means that he 
could have been a logical subject qua the king of France; 
if he was a logical subject, it was as Louis, pure and 
simple. 
These epistemological considerations of meaning do not 
help us at all in understanding how the immediate objects 
of consciousness, when Scott himself is not a constituent 
of our propositions, give us information about Scott; 
what we are immediately aware of are concepts. We cannot 
be aware of their relation to Scott, presumably, since 
we cannot be aware of him; therefore, of what use are 
the concepts to us? Knowledge of concepts may be res- 
ponsible for our understanding certain descriptions, but 
that is quite a different matter from being given a 
proposition. We may understand the expression ' the 
author of Waverley ', but that does not, according to 
Russell, make it any easier to apprehend propositions 
about Scott himself; we know of those propositions, and 
that they are true ( or false ); the actual propositions 
themselves we do not know, since their constituents are 
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not within our range of acquaintance. The sort of propos- 
ition which we know of but do not know, contains such things 
as Scott and the minds of other people. 
' Hence, although we can form 
propositional functions C(x) which 
must hold of such and such a material 
particle, or of So- and -so's mind, yet 
we are not acquainted with the prop- 
ositions which affirm these things 
that we know must be true, because 
we cannot apprehend the actual entities 
concerned. What we know is ' So- and -so 
has a mind which has such and such 
properties ', but we do not know 
' A has such and such properties ', 
where A is the mind in question. In 
such a case, we know the properties 
of a thing without having acquaintance 
with the thing itself, and without, 
consequently, knowing any single 
proposition of which the thing itself 
is a constituent.' 
Op.cit., p.56. 
How we can know of these propositions, let alone know 
their truth, when the actual propositions given us are 
conceptual in character, is not stated by Russell. This 
is one of the major problems examined in the Tractatus. 
To return to ' Caesar died ' and ' Caesar's death ' 
or ' the death of Caesar '. According to The Principles 
of Mathematics, the same concept corresponds to both. 
Although this is what Russell thought, he found it hard 
to reconcile with the evident fact that the first ex- 
pression gives us an assertion, while the second doesn't. 
His new analysis, he thinks, shows that ' the death of 
Caesar ' really is assertive in character. ' Caesar died ' 
and the expression ' the death of Caesar ' are roughly 
equivalent, as follows:- 
Caesar died = One thing. but not two, was a death 
and belonged to, Caesar. 
The death 
of Caesar = One thing, but not two, was a death 
and belonged to Caesar, and that thing... 
The constituents of the complex which corresponds to 
both expressions depend on the meaning of the expressions. 
In any event, the actual death is not the logical subject 
of either. Russell thinks that the grammatical form of 
' The author of Waverley was a man ' is misleading, since 
it suggests that something is the logical subject of the 
corresponding proposition. He does away with this difficulty 
by ' reduction ' of the expression to a level at which 
propositional functions, like ' x is human ', and denoting 
phrases, like ' something ', do all the work; at this 
level it is quite obvious that there are no names or 
referential expressions in the proposition, and therefore 
no need to explain its meaning in terms of anything but 
concepts, which, being timeless ( although he does not 
say this in the article ), do not pop into and then out 
of existence, like authors and kings. 
There is a certain amount of doubt about the relations 
between things and concepts, and, correspondingly, objects 
of acquaintance and objects of thought. It is not clear 
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that something can be an object of thought and not of 
acquaintance. This depends on whether one can ' go ' 
beyond those entities which give one's propositions 
meaning. On the one hand, Russell assumes that we do 
know about the centre of mass of the solar system, 
something we are not acquainted with, and on the other, 
he insists that we do not actually know those propositions 
of which the centre of mass is a constituent, because, 
to know those propositions we should have to actually 
be acquainted with the centre of mass. The propositions 
we actually know are those with whose meanings we are 
acquainted. The problem of explaining how we can have 
objects of thought which are not objects of acquaintance 
is just the problem of connecting concepts to things, and 
knowledge which is simply of concepts, to knowledge of 
things, a problem alreaùy noticed. 
Earlier in this chapter ( p. 73 ), three questions of 
interest were noted:- 
1. What are the elements of a proposition? 
2. How can what corresponds to ' the death of 
Caesar ' also correspond to ' Caesar died '? 
3. How can something both be a constituent of a 
propositional complex and at the same time 
give unity to the complex? 
These were questions which lay behind some of the work 
in The Principles of Mathematics. Russell's answer to the 
first is essentially Moore's; the elements of the proposition 
are the elements of the meaning of the proposition, and these 
are the timeless concepts. To these Russell adds ' things ' 
which can occur only as logical subjects and not as pre- 
dicates. His answer to the second question is also the 
answer to the question of what it is that corresponds to 
expressions like ' the king of France '; this he gives in 
' On denoting '. For his answer to the third question, we 
shall consider two pieces of work done at the end of the 
first decade of this century. That will complete our study 
of Russell as a prelude to our study of the Tractatus. 
Summary. 
1. Russell accepts Moore's equation; instead, however, of 
Concept = Meaning = Proposition 
Russell suggests 
Concept, or concept and thing = Meaning = Proposition. 
At the same time he acknowledges the importance of the 
sentence, and unconsciously begins the process of reestab- 
lishing the identity of the proposition as distinct from 
its objects. This is shown by his talking about verbs as 
parts of propositions, along with predicates ( The 
Principles, Chapter 4.). 
2. The Principles contains what amounts to a corres- 
pondence theory of language. Non -assertive 
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expressions are, fundamentally, names; either they correspond 
to concepts or to things; if they have meaning and correspond 
to things, this is because of a correspondence with concepts 
which somehow define the things. Assertive expressions are 
full propositions; they correspond to complexes of things 
and concepts. Russell does not know what to do with 
referrential expressions like ' the death of Caesar ', 
since they look both like assertive and like non -assertive 
expressions. 
3. Three questions, of importance in relating Moore and 
Russell to Wittgenstein, which occur in The Principles are:- 
1. What are the elements of a proposition? 
2. How can what corresponds to ' the death of Caesar ' 
also correspond to ' Caesar died '? 
3. How can something both be a constituent of a 
propositional complex and at the same time give 
unity to the complex? 
The first two of these questions, put together, make 
the subject matter of ' On denoting '. But the form of 
the question is, How can ' the death of Caesar ' have 
meaning, if there is no such object? Although he accepts 
Moore's equation, he cannot believe that there must 
always be a corresponding object; he therefore disagrees 
with Moore, and Meinong. Because he accepts Moore's 
equation, he disagrees with Frege; such expressions have 
meaning, and so there must somewhere be corresponding 
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objects. Russell assimilates such referential expressions to 
propositions which contain no expression naming things or 
particulars; all the names are names of concepts. 
4. This solution creates the metaphysical problem of 
explaining the relation between things and concepts, and 
the epistemological one of accounting for knowledge of 
things purely in terms of concepts. Neither of those 
problems is actually formulated, let alone answered. 
Russell suggests that there is a type of proposition 
which cannot be ' apprehended ' unless its constituents 
come within one's range of acquaintance, yet one can 
know of such propositions and of their truth or falsity. 
Such propositions would be expressed through proper names, 
not simply through concept -words. 
5. Russell distinguishes the real form of a proposition 
from its apparent one, by analysing it, or reducing it, to 
something else. It is not clear whether he takes this 
process to be one of rectification or not, so far as 
actual language is concerned. We cannot say wIeLher he 
thinks that the analysandum is intrinsically and per- 
niciously misleading, or whether he merely wishes to 
show that its analysis is possible. 
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Chapter Three. 
Russell has so far accepted Moore's identification of 
what we think about with what we mean, and of meaning with 
the judgment or proposition. Admittedly, in 1905, he is not 
happy about making meanings and objects of thought exactly 
the same; if he had any theory about this, which seems 
doubtful, it is by no means clear. What is interesting in 
his unease about the relation about the objects of thought 
and meaning, is his tendency to react to Moore's claim 
about the complete objectivity of the judgment. Our 
judgment is something we are actually aware of; its 
elements are objects of acquaintance; we must be conscious 
of them, otherwise we do not apprehend the proposition. The 
proposition is still independent of us; but if we are to 
mean that proposition, it must stand in a special relation 
to us. So there is one set of judgments which we may call 
our judgments and another set which we may simply call 
possible judgments. Even in 1905 then, Russell thought 
that if something was his judgment, he stood in some 
special relation to it. The turning point marked by this 
emphasis seems to have occurred about the time of his 
1904 articles on Meinong, or shortly afterwards. 
Between then and 1910 this emphasis is changed into the 
positive conviction that without mind there would be no 
judgments whatever. This does not mean that Moore's 
doctrine is given up entirely. Russell continues to believe 
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that the content of the judgment is fully objective and in 
no way dependent on the existence of mind, unless the 
judgment is actually about a mind, of course. His view 
becomes that the individual elements of judgment are some- 
how brought together in the judgment by the act of judging. 
Moore's supposition, that the judgment about this rose in 
fact contains the rose itself, is fully maintained, with 
the proviso, made in 1905, that the person judging is aware 
of the rose. The judgment is subjective, its content 
objective. 
There is one other modification to Moore's theory, and 
this concerns truth. By 1910, Russell has decided that the 
truth of a judgment is not like the colour of a rose. Truth 
comes from correspondence, he feels; the correspondence of 
judgment and fact is what determines the truth -value of a 
judgment; if the one corresponds with the other, you have 
truth and if not, falsehood. No great imagination is 
required to see that so long as the elements of the 
judgment are precisely the same as those of the fact, or 
possible fact, the theory will run the danger of making 
judgments into facts, and thus of failing to allow for 
falsehood. It is on this difficulty that Russell's theory 
founders. 
What is remarkable about the two analyses of truth which 
we are to consider, is the fact that Russell pays so little 
attention to sentences and language, or even thought. He 
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persists in discussing judgment at the level set by Moore in 
1899. In spite of his reaction to the extreme objectivity 
of Moore, the most that Russell can achieve in reasserting 
the idertity of judgment as something to compare or contrast 
with reality, is the inclusion of the judging mind in the 
judgment, the other elements being the things judged about 
or used in predication. 
The first of the two analyses of truth which we shall 
consider occurs in the Philosophical Essays of 1910. We 
shall see how that third question noticed in The Principles, 
How can something both be a constituent of a proposition 
and give it unity ?, forgotten by Russell in ' On denoting ', 
comes to dominate the discussion. 
' On the nature of truth and falsehood ' opens in a 
typically Moorean way, by pointing out that the question 
' What is Truth ?' can be understood in various ways, and 
that the way in which Russell wants it to taken is not 
this way or that way, but as the question, What is the 
actual concept of truth? 
' What we wish to do is to detach this 
concept from the mass of irrelevancies 
in which, when we use it, it is normally 
embedded, and to bring clearly before 
the mind the abstract opposition upon 
which our distinction of true and 
false depends. The process to be gone 
through is essentially one of analysis: 
we have various complex and more or less 
confused beliefs about the true and the 
false, and we have to reduce these to 
forms which are simple and clear 
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without causing any avoidable conflict 
between our initial complex and confused 
beliefs and our final simple and clear 
assertions.' 
Philosophical Essays, p.171. 
He continues by explaining that he is not interested in 
any criterion of truth i.e. something, but not truth itself, 
which a judgment or belief has as a guarantee of its truth, 
something like a trademark. He wants to know what actually 
constitutes the difference between truth and falsehood. 
' The first point upon which it is important 
to be clear is the relation of truth and 
falsehood to the mind. If were right in 
saying that the things that are true or 
false are always judgments, then it is 
plain that there can be no truth or 
falsehood unless there are minds to judge. 
Nevertheless it is plain, also, that the 
truth or falsehood of a given judgment 
depends in no way upon the person judging, 
but solely upon the facts about which he 
judges. If I judge that Charles 1 died in 
his bed, I judge falsely, not because of 
anything to do with me, but because in 
fact he did not die in his bed. Similarly, 
if I judge that he died on the scaf old, 
I judge truly, because of an event which 
in fact occurred 260 years ago. Thus the 
truth or falsehood of a judgment always 
has an objective ground, and it is 
natural to ask whether there are not 
objective truths and falsehoods which 
are the objects, respectively, of true 
and false judgments. As regards truths, 
this view is highly plausible. But as 
regards falsehoods, it is the very 
reverse of plausible; yet, as we shall 
see, it is hard to maintain it with 
regard to truths without being forced 
to maintain it also as regards falsehoods.' 
Op.cit., p.173. 
Russell's first two distinctions are between the 
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existence of the judgment and its truth, and between the 
judgment and the fact which makes it true or false. His 
next distinction is between perceptual or imaginative acts 
and acts of judgment. Does an act of judgment have an object, 
like a perceptual or imaginative act, or is it somehow more 
complicated? 
What are the objections to the view that ' every 
judgment has an objective, and true judgments have true 
objectives, while false judgments have false objectives '? 
There are two:- 
1. ' The first is that it is difficult to believe 
that there are such objects as " that Charles 
1 died in his bed ", or even " that Charles 1 
died on the scaffold ".' 
Op.cit., p.175. 
2. ' The second objection is more fatal, and more 
germane to the consideration of truth and 
falsehood. If we allow that all judgments 
have objectives, we shall have to allow that 
there are objectives which are false. Thus 
there will be in the world entities, not 
dependent upon the existence of judgments, 
which can be described as objective false- 
hoods. This is in itself almost incredible: 
we feel that there could be no falsehood 
if there were no minds to make mistakes. 
But it Yas the further drawback that it 
leaves the difference between truth and 
falsehood quite inexplicable.' 
Op.cit., p.176. 
The force of these objections is not very great, but 
evidently strong enough for Russell to reject the view 
which he himself had held in 1904. 
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' Thus we must turn to the theory that 
no judgment consists in a relation to a single object.' 
Op.cit., p.177. 
' The way out of the difficulty consists in 
maintaining that, whether we judge truly 
or whether we judge falsely, there is no 
one thing that we are judging. When we judge 
that Charles I died on the scaffold, we have 
before us, not one object, but several objects, 
namely, Charles 1 and dying and the scaffold. 
Similarly, when we judge that Ch arles 1 died 
in his bed, we have before us the objects 
Charles 1, dying , and his bed. These objects 
are not fictions: they are just as good as 
the objects of the true judgment.' 
Loc.cit. 
' Thus in this view judgment is a relation 
of the mind to several other terms: when 
terms have inter se a " corres- 
ponding " relation, the judgment is true; 
when not, it is false.' 
Op.cit., p.178. 
' In saying that judgment is a relation 
of the mind to several things, e.g. to 
Charles 1 and the scaffold and dying, I 
do not mean that the mind has a certain 
relation to Charles 1 and also has this 
relation to the scaffold and also has it 
to dying. I do not, however, wish to deny 
that, when we are judging, we have a 
relation to each of the constituents of 
our judgment separately, for it would 
seem that we must be in some way conscious 
of these constituents, so that during any 
judgment we must have, to each constituent 
of the judgment, that relation which we 
may call " being conscious of it ". This is 
a very important fact, but it does not give 
the essence of judgment. Nothing that 
concerns Charles 1 and dying and the 
scaffold separately and severally will 
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give the judgment " Charles 1 died on 
the scaffold ". In order to obtain this 
judgment, we must have one single unity 
of the mind and Charles 1 and dying and 
the scaffold, i.e. we must have, not 
sever;. _i_ instances of a relation between 
two terms, but one instance of a relation 
between more than two terms.' 
Loc.cit. 
After some discussion about relations with more than two 
terms, and the nature of perception, he comes to an exact 
account of the correspondence on which truth depends. 
' We may now attempt an exact account of 
the " correspondence " which constitutes 
truth. Let us take the judgment " A loves 
B ". This consists of a relation of the 
person judging to A and love and B, i.e to 
the two terms A and B and the relation 
" love ". But the judgment is not the same 
as the judgment " B loves A "; thus the 
relation must not be abstractly before 
the mind, but must be before it as 
proceeding from A to B rather than from 
B to A. The " corresponding " complex 
object which is required to make our 
judgment true consists of A related to 
B by the relation which was before us in 
our judgment. We may distinguish two 
" senses " of a relation according as 
it goes from A to B or from B to A. 
Then the relation as it enters into the 
judgment must have a " sense ", and in 
the corresponding complex it must have 
the same " sense ". Thus the judgment 
that two terms have a certain relation 
R is a relation of the mind to the two 
terms and the relation R with the 
appropriate sense: the " corresponding " 
complex consists of the two terms related 
by the relation R with the same sense. 
The judgment is true when there is such 
a complex, and false when there is not. 
The same account, mutatis mutandis, will 
apply to any other judgment. This gives 
the definition of truth and falsehood.' 
Op.cit., pps.183-4. 
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On this account, the judgment M makes, when he judges that 




4. The relation of judging. 
5. The ' sense ' of the relation of judging. 
6. The relation of loving. 
7. The sense of this last relation. 
These are not all ontologically distinct, obviously 
enough, since there could be no sense to a relation without 
the actual relation. 
One would have thought that the person making the judgment 
would not form a part of it, since it is not about him. At 
several places, however, Russell says that it is a relation 
between the person and the various terms with which the 
judgment is concerned e.g. pps.180 &183. Was he being careless? 
Did he mean the judging to have seven elements, but the 
judgment only four i.e. A, B, loving and the sense of loving? 
I do not think that this is carelessness, because what 
Russell does not want judgment to be is some complex to 
which the person judging is related; the judging complex 
does not contain some further complex, for that is the 
theory he began by discarding. 
' Thus in perception I perceive a single 
complex object, while in a judgment based 
upon the perception I have the parts of 
the complex object separately though 
simultaneously before me.' 
Op.cit., p182. 
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In judgment, therefore, M is not confronted with or related 
to his judgment, but is part of it. Perhaps one should say 
that there is no such thing as M's judgment; there is only 
his judging and what he judges; what he judges is not an 
entity, simple or complex, and does not in any way add to 
the world. 
This must create some difficulty in understanding just 
what is meant by ' correspondence '. If the judgment,that 
A loves B,is true, A does love B. The fact that A loves B 
is a ' complex object ' ( op.cit., p.183.) which ' con- 
sists of A related to B by the relation which was before 
us in our judgment ' ( loc.cit. ). It is this complex, 
correspondence with which makes the judgment true. What 
is this correspondence? Russell's use of quotation marks 
with the word ' correspondence ' seems to indicate his 
awareness of its somewhat unusual appearance, in this 
context. For on the one hand, let us assume, we have the 
fact that A loves B, and on the other, the judgment that 
A loves B; on the one tmd is a complex of four elements 
( including the sense of the relation of loving ) and 
on the other, not a complex of four elements, but one 
of seven. 
Let us call the fact ' F ' and the judgment ' J '. 
Now there is certainly a kind of correspondence: to the 
occurrence of A, B and loving in F, there corresponds the 
occurrence of these same things in J, loving having the 
same sense in both. At the same time, nothing corresponds 
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to the complex F, unless it be J, for A, B and loving are 
not bound into any such complex; they only occur as parts 
of J. J cannot correspond to F, at least in structure, for 
it has at least two more elements than F. Either the 
intended correspondence is not between two complexes, or 
it is; if the intended correspondence is between two 
complexes, it must fail, since F and J do not correspond; 
if it is not between two complexes, it ought to be, because 
it is the occuizence of the fact, which is a complex, that 
is meant to explain the truth of J. 
Let us imagine that some other person, N, judges that 
A loves B. Presumably Russell would not want to admit that 
M's judgment was true simply because there was a corres- 
pondence between the occurrence of A, B and loving in 
one complex, M's judgment, with their occurrence in some 
other complex, N's judgment, even if the sense of loving 
were the same. The correspondence must be between F and J; 
but this seems to be impossible. If the correspondence is 
simply one of occurrence, it fails to distinguish fact 
from judgment, since one judgment, with the objective 
ingredients of another, would make it true. 
It may be felt that I have left out of account the 
' sense ' of the relation, which is the critical factor 
in allowing something to be a judgment without giving it 
the power to substantiate other judgments. That loving 
has a sense does not mean that same two things are in a 
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love relationship, although if some two things arein such 
a relationship, the relation must have a sense. It is im- 
portant that sense, though a necessary condition, is not 
a sufficient one for the existence of an actual relation- 
ship, for, other wise, the judgment that F would actually 
include F. What actually is ' sense ' then? 
' We may distinguish two " senses " of 
a relation according as it goes from A 
to B or from B to A.' 
Op.cit., pps.l83-4. 
But how can the relation of loving go from A to B, in J, 
if it does not actually relate them? It occurs discretely 
and therefore does not go either from A to B or from B to A. 
That the relation has sense with respect to A and B must 
surely mean that A loves B or that B loves A; which sense 
it has depends on the facts. If neither loves the other, the 
relation is without sense. If the three things are presented 
separately, as they are in J, loving has no sense to it. 
That loving has a sense with respect to A and B is, therefore, 
a sufficient condition for its binding A and B in a love 
relationship. 
It would seem quite clear that Russell wants two sets 
of inconsistent conditions to be satisfied; one is that 
there be some sort of inner complex to J, with elements 
A, B and loving, the other, that there is no such complex. 
This conflict appears greatest, naturally, when he is 
explaining the role of the objective relation. 
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Let us take the judgment " A loves B ". 
This consists of a relation of the person 
judging to A and love and B, i.e. to the 
two terms A and B and the relation " love ". 
But the judgment is not the same as the 
judgment " B loves A "; thus the relation 
must not be abstractly before the mind, 
but must be before it as proceeding from 
A to B rather than from B to A.' 
Op.cit., p.183. 
There can be no complex inner to J, because Russell has 
ruled out the possibility that judgment is a relation of 
the mind to one single object; that is the theory he once 
held, and one accepted by both Moore and Meinong. This 
immediately creates the problem of giving a content to 
the judgment, since its elements all occur discretely, a 
problem already noticed by Russell in The Principles of 
Mathematics, p.49. 
' Consider, for example, the proposition 
" A differs from B ". The constituents of 
this proposition, if we analyze it, appear 
to be only A, difference, B. Yet these 
constituents, thus placed side by side, 
do not reconstitute the proposition.' 
The Principles, p.49. 
It is therefore not enough to place the constituents 
' side by side '. The relation of loving ' must not be 
abstractly before the mind, but must be before it as 
proceeding from A. to B rather than from B to A.' What 
on earth does this mean? Surely, if the relation does 
not occur abstractly, it must occur concretely. That 
would make F an element of J; no judgment would then be 
false. When he says that the relation is before the mind, 
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does he mean that it is only before the mind, somehow 
implying that in reality, or the world of perception, 
there is nothing actually in front of him? The relation 
is ' before it ( the mind ) as proceeding from A to 
B '; is this meant to suggest that it does not in fact 
' proceed ' from A to B? I suggest that Russell did not 
know what he meant exactly, because he could not reconcile 
the non- abstract occurrence of loving with not having some 
inner complex of the old Moorean sort. If the relation 
occurs abstractly, there is nothing to correspond to F; 
if it does not occur abstractly, it must occur concretely, 
and so J must include F; therefore no judgment is false, 
since F is what verifies J. 
To describe the relation ' as proceeding ' from A 
to B, is not really helpful. What we want to know is 
whether it does proceed from A to B or not. If it does, 
J includes F; if it doesn't, nothing corresponds to F. 
Given any complex, let us distinguish between the 
relation which gives unity to it, and the terms which 
are bound by the relation. Let us allow that one of the 
terms may itself be a complex; but the terms of the second 
complex are not to- bethought of as terms of the first. In 
theory, Russell does not want any term of the complex J 
to be itself a complex which might be called ' the 
judgment '; he therefore makes loving occur as a term of 
the complex J. Atthe same time he wants to give loving 
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an improved status so that it is not simply one term among 
others, but an ' active ' ingredient which somehow is not 
active enough to create a proper fact, only active enough 
to create a sort of pseudo fact. 
The main reason for the lack of correspondence is, 
ultimately, that the elements of the fact, counting the 
relation as an element, are also elements of the judgment. 
It is thus impossible to group them together as a complex 
to which the fact may correspond, without actually creating 
the fact itself. So, either J includes F, in which ,ase 
correspondence is ruled out, or nothing in J, and certainly 
not J itself, corresponds to F, and there is once again 
no question of correspondence. As long as the elements of 
the fact are also elements of the judgment, correspondence 
is going to be difficult or impossible. 
This correspondence theory is not simply a theory of 
truth. It is also a theory of meaning. Indeed it is the 
theory of meaning originated by Moore, brought to bear 
on the problem of truth. As a theory of meaning it tries 
to explain how something is a judgment, and, as a theory 
of truth, how the judgment is true. According to the 
theory of meaning, judgment = meaning and meaning = objects 
of discourse. According to the theory of truth, J is 
true if J corresponds to F. If you put these two together, 
assuming that the elements of J are, in part at least, 
the elements of F, you reach the position occupied by 
Russell in the Philosophical Essays. 
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Other criticisms of his position may be made, the most 
important, perhaps, being that the relation of judging is 
surely worth much more explanation than is given. How does 
it differ from supposing, denying and so on? What is its 
relation to language? There is no real need to bring our 
scrutiny to bear on these points; Russell's attitude to 
them is one of confident indifference. 
' The same account, mutatis mutandis, will 
apply to any other judgment.' 
Op.cit., p.184. 
The following is a summary of the main criticisms of his 
theory:- 
1. Russell makes the judgment that A loves B include the 
person who makes the judgment. He ought surely to 
distinguish the judgment from its being judged. ' Let 
us take the judgment " A loves B ". This consists of 
a relation of the person judging to A and love and 
B.' ( Op.cit., p.183.) The judgment itself can 
hardly include the person who makes it. 
2. Given the fact that A loves B, one is given a complex 
consisting of A, loving and B. If someone judges that 
A loves B, this judgment is true, because of a corres- 
pondence between the fact and the judgment. However, 
the fact cannot correspond to the judgment, since it 
has fewer elements; and it cannot correspond to some 
complex in the judgment, since the judgment does not 
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contain a complex. There is no correspondence therefore, 
between the fact and the judgment. If the correspondence 
is simply that of the occurrence of A, B and loving in 
one complex, and then in another, a judgment would be 
verified by any other judgment having the same objects. 
3. In the judgment, loving occurs ' as proceeding from 
A to B '. It does not occur abstractly. Either it 
proceeds or it does not; either it occurs abstractly 
or it occurs concretely. If it occurs concretely, 
the fact which verifies the judgment is contained 
within it, and no judgment is false. If loving 
proceeds from A to B, once again, the fact is 
contained within the judgment. 
4. In the judgment, loving has a sense; the sense of 
the relation is determined by its going from A to B, 
or from B to A. Therefore, unless the judgment 
contains A's loving B i.e. the fact that A loves B, 
loving does not have the sense of going from A to B. 
If it can only have a sense in going from one to the 
other, the fact is contained in the judgment, and, 
once again, no judgment is false. 
5. Not nearly enough is said about judging to distinguish 
it from supposing, imagining etc, or to link it with 
language. 
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Conclusion:- This theory either does not provide a judgment 
which corresponds to fact, or makes fact a part of judgment. 
Russell provides a further treatment of the same problem 
in 1912 in that wonderful introduction to philosophy, 
The Problems of ihilosophy. Perhaps it is thought unfair 
to criticise the work in two volumes both of which were 
intended for non- philosophers. I do not think that this is 
so, for these criticisms would not have been met, I believe, 
by a fuller explanation from Russell. 
This second treatment of the problem of truth is very 
similar to the one already examined by us. Indeed, if 
there is any difference at all, it is marginal. Nevertheless, 
I think it does indicate Russell's awareness that all was 
not well with what he had said in the Philosophical Essays, 
for he introduces a new term, that of ' order ', which is 
closely linked to ' sense ', a term we are already familiar 
with. Furthermore, he does mention sentences here, and the 
order of their words. His approach is therefore more 
sophisticated. 
After the customary preliminaries about what question he 
is really interested in, Russell lists the three main 
points which any theory of truth must acknowledge and 
explain. These are:- 
1. That there are falsehoods as well as truths. 
2. That a world ' of mere matter ' would contain 
' facts ', but neither truths nor falsehoods. 
3. That although truths and falsehoods presuppose the 
existence of mind, the actual truth -value depends 
on things ' outside ' belief itself. 
The Problems of Philosophy, pps.188 -9. 
Having suggested that the third point implies some sort 
of correspondence theory of truth, he briefly considers the 
coherence theory, which he rejects. His next topic is the 
familiar one of whether or not a ' belief consists in a 
relation to a single object '. That belief is of this sort 
goes against the first point made, since all beliefs would 
then be true. 
' Hence it will be better to seek for a 
theory of belief which does not make it 
consist in a relation of the mind to a 
single object.' 
Op.cit., p.194. 
He briefly explains how some relations may have more than 
two terms and then comes to a description of what takes 
place when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. 
' The relation involved in judging or 
believing must, if falsehood is to be 
duly allowed for, be taken to be a 
relation between several terms and 
not between two. When Othello believes 
that Desdemona loves Cassio, he must not 
have before his mind a single object, 
" Desdemona's love for Cassio ", or 
" that Desdemona loves Cassio ", for that 
would require that there should be ob- 
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jective falsehoods, which subsist 
independently of any minds; and this, 
though not logically refutable, is a 
theory to be avoided if possible. Thus 
it is easier to account for falsehood if 
we take judgment to be a relation in which 
the mind and the various objects concerned all 
occur severally; that is to say, Desdemona 
and loving and Cassio must all be terms in 
the relation which subsists when Othello 
believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. This 
relation, therefore, is a relation of four 
terms. since Othello also is one of the 
four terms of the relation....Thus the 
actual occurrence, at the moment when 
Othello is entertaining his belief, is 
that the relation called " believing " 
is knitting together into one complex 
whole the four terms Othello, Desdemona, 
loving and Cassio.' 
Op.cit., pps.195-7. 
So far there is no difference with what was said in the 
Philosophical Essays. What follows is slightly different. 
' We are now in a position to understand 
what it is that distinguishes a true 
judgment from a false one. For this 
purpose we will adopt certain definitions. 
In every act of judgment there is a mind 
which judges, and there are terms concerning 
which it judges. We will call the mind the 
subject in the judgment, and the remaining 
terms the objects. Thus, when Othello judges 
that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello is the 
subject, while the objects are Desdemona 
and loving and Cassio. The subject and the 
objects together are called the constituents 
of the judgment. It will be observed that 
the relation of judging has what is called 
a " sense " or " direction ". We may say, 
metaphorically, that it ,nuts its objects in 
a certain order, which we may indicate by 
means of the order of the words in the 
sentence. ( In an inflected language, the 
same thing will be indicated by inflections, 
e.g. by the difference between nominative 
and accusative.) Othello's judgment that 
Cassio loves Desdemona differs from his 
113. 
judgment that Desdemona loves Cassio, 
in spite of the fact that it consists 
of the same constituents, because the 
relation of judging places the constituents 
in a different order in the taro cases. 
Similarly, if Cassio judges that Desdemona 
loves Othello, the constituents of the judgment 
are still the same, but their order is different. 
This property of having a " sense " or 
" direction " is one which the relation of 
judging shares with all other relations. The 
It sense " of relations is the ultimate source 
of order and series and a host of mathematical 
concepts; but we need not concern ourselves 
further with this aspect.' 
Op.cit., pps.197-9. 
The difference between this account and the one in the 
Essays is that whereas the latter account made the sense 
of loving critical, the former, i.e. the one in The Problems, 
mentions only the sense of judging and does not mention the 
sense of loving at all. Instead of talking about the sense 
of loving, Russell talks about the ' order ' of objects, 
both in the judgment and in the fact which corresponds with 
the judgment. 
We are told that sense is the source of order. It is not 
clear whether a relation in the abstract has sense or not. 
It seems evident that objects, as terms of some relation, 
are not ordered in the abstract. A set of objects is only 
ordered when its members are the terms of some relation. 
The relation puts the terms in some order and this ability 
constitutes its having sense. The same set of objects can 
be put in a different order by the same relation; does the 
relation have the same sense, even if the order changes? 
Does the relation have as many senses as there are ways 
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of ordering a given set of objects? This is what Russell 
meant in the Essays; given two possible terms and the 
relation of loving, there would be two possible senses, 
one being A's loving B, and the other, B's loving A. 
Accordingly, the senses of judging would be the various 
ways in which a given set of objects could be disposed 
in judging complexes. Unfortunately, it would seem to be 
impossible to determine exactly what Russell meant, 
particularly since he only talks about ' sense ' and 
not ' senses '. 
The order of a set of objects depends on their being 
related in one complex. A set of objects may be ordered 
in various ways; or they may be ordered in the same way 
by different relations; and different sets of objects may 
be ordered in the same way, e.g. words and objects of 
discourse. Once again, as with the concept of sense, 
what exactly Russell means is not at all clear. Nothing 
he says is a direct answer to the question, What is the 
order of objects in the judgment Othello makes that 
Desdemona loves Cassio? He merely says that their order 
is not the same in Othello's judgment that Cassio loves 
Desdemona. He cannot say that in one case Desdemona loves 
Cassio and in the other Cassio loves Desdemona, because 
in the judgment neither loves the other. He cannot say 
that on the one hand Desdemona is judged to love Cassio 
while on the other Cassio is judged to love Desdemona; 
because the order of Desdemona and Cassio is abstracted 
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from the particular relation of judging. 
The concept of order is not a specifically technical 
one; we are familiar with putting things back in the 
same order as we found them, with alphabetical order, 
order of merit and so on. The order of objects is some 
uniform arrangement of objects within a homogeneous 
system such that each object has a ' position ' and, 
in general, no two objects occupy the same position. 
The positioning of an object requires some kind of 
asymmetry which operates on each object and some other 
object. 
The order of a set of books will depend on one being 
to the left of all the others, with this book coming next, 
and so on. The order of wLght of, say, four people, is 
Jones being heavier than the rest, Smith heavier than 
at least two others, then Williamson, with Graham the 
lightest; so each person occupies a position in order of 
heaviness. 
It is possible to have more than one object in one 
position, but in general there must be a variety of 
positions. It is possible to do without a ' first ' 
position, and for some two objects not to be directly 
related by the operative relation, e.g. the order of 
those seated round a dining- table. It is possible to 
have only two objects ordered in some way, e.g. in 
order of weight. What is not possible, however, is 
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that objects be ordered without being related in some 
particular respect by an asymmetrical relation. A's 
being the brother of B and C does not give A, B and C 
any order whatever, since being the brother of someone 
is not an asymmetrical relation. Similarly, A's loving 
B, even if B does not love A, does not order A and B; 
there is nothing asymmetrical about loving. Loving A 
more than B does give an order, in respect of the relation 
of being loved more than. Love on its own does not, however. 
Nor does judging, so far as I can see. It is surely nonsense 
to say that if Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio, 
first comes Othello, then Desdemona, followed by loving, 
with Cassio at the end. In what respect does Desdemona 
' follow ' Othello? In time? What is it at whose end 
Cassio comes? It simply does not make sense. Before giving 
a final assessment of ' order ', let Russell state his 
correspondence theory in greater detail. 
' We spoke of the relation called 
" judging " or " believing " as 
knitting together into one complex 
whole the subject and the objects. In 
this respect, judging is exactly like 
every other relation. Whenever a relation 
holds between two or more terms, it unites 
the terms into a complex whole. If Othello 
loves Desdemona, there is such a complex 
whole as " Othello's love for Desdemona ". 
The terms united by the relation may be 
themselves complex, or may be simple, but 
the whole which results from their,6eing united 
must be complex. Wherever there is a relation 
which relates certain terms, there is a complex 
object formed of the union of those terms; and 
conversely, wherever there is acomplex object, 
there is a relation which relates its constituents. 
When an act of believing occurs, there is a 
complex, in which " believing " is the uniting 
relation, and subject and objects are arranged 
in a certain order by the " sense " of the 
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relation of believing. Among the objects, as 
we saw in considering " Othello believes that 
Desdemona loves Cassio ", one must be a relation - 
in this instance, the relation " loving ". But 
this relation, as it occurs in the act of believ- 
ing, is not the relation which creates the unity 
of the complex whole consisting of the subject 
and the objects. The relation " loving ", as 
it occurs in the act of believing, is one of 
the objects - it is a brick in the structure, 
not the cement. The cement is the relation 
" believing ". When the belief is true, there 
is another complex unity, in which the relation 
which was one of the objects of the belief 
relates the other objects. Thus, e.g., if 
Othello believes truly that Desdemona loves 
Cassio, then there is a complex unity, 
" Desdemona'a love for Cassio ", which is 
composed exclusively of the objects of the 
belief, in the same order as they had in the 
belief, with the relation which was one of 
the objects occurring now as the cement that 
binds together the other objects of the belief. 
On the other hand, when a belief is false, 
there is no such complex unity composed only 
of the objects of the belief. If Othello believes 
falsely that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there 
is no such complex unity as " Desdemona's love 
for Cassio ". 
Thus a belief is true when it corresponds to 
a certain associated complex, and false when it 
does not. Assuming, for the sake odeff finiteness, 
that the objects of the belief are two terms and 
a relation, the terms being put in a certain order 
by the " sense " of the believing, then if the 
two terms in that order are united by the relation 
into a complex, the belief is true; if not, it is 
false. This constitutes the definition of truth 
and falsehood that we were in search of. Judging or 
believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind 
is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, 
taken in the order which they have in the belief, 
form a complex unity, then the belief is true; if 
not, it is false.' 
Op.cit., pps.199-201. 
' We may restate our theory as follows: If we 
take such a belief as " Othello believes that 
Desdemona loves Cassio ", we will call Desdemona 
and Cassio the object- terms, and loving the 
object -relation. If there is a complex unity 
" Desdemona's love for Cassio ", consisting of 
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the object -terms related by the object -relation 
in the same order as they have in the belief, 
then this complex unity is called the fact 
corresponding to the belief. Thus a belief 
is true when there is a corresponding fact, 
and is false when there is no corresponding 
fact.' 
Op.cit., p202. 
It is obvious how similar this account is to the one 
considered earlier. The only difference seems to be the 
introduction (a) of the sense of judging, which takes 
the place of the sense of loving, and (b) of the 
order of objects, whose role appears to remedy the fault 
created by relying on the sense of loving. This theory 
allows judging a sense, in the judgment, but not the 
object- relation of loving, presumably because, if loving 
has a sense, somebody actually loves someone. Judging has 
a sense, because it connects the constituents of the 
judgment into a complex. 
If Desdemona in fact loves Cassio, there is a complex 
unity consisting of these two people related in a certain 
order by the relation of loving. It is this fact whose 
correspondence with Othello's belief that Desdemona loves 
Cassio, makes that belief true. 
The first thing which Russell means by correspondence 
is simply that it is a fact which makes the judgment true; 
so that if some fact F corresponds to some judgment J, J 
says that F. This may be the principal part of his meaning. 
At the same time, he holds that there is what might be 
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called a ' structural ' correspondence between F and J 
which is a similarity in the way their constituents are 
ordered or put together. There are therefore two kinds of 
correspondence here, one which relates to the inner 
similarity of two complexes whose constituents have the 
same order, and the other which, relying on this inner 
similarity and on the identity of the constituents, is 
the correspondence of this judgment with this or that fact. 
The inner similarity is a formal one, in the sense that 
different relations can produce the same order; order is 
formal, in being abstract. Order would seem to be inde- 
pendent of any given set of objects, since the order of 
words in a sentence can indicate the order of a given set 
of objects ( op.cit., p.198.) 
The judgment, or belief, ' Othello believes that 
Desdemona loves Cassio ', seems to have the following 




4. The relation of judging. 
5. The sense of this relation. 
6. The relation of loving. 
7. The order of Othello, Desdemona, Cassio and loving, 
according to the sense of judging. 
But that is not all, because we have not included the 
order of elements to be found also in the fact which makes 
the judgment true. This order cannot be item 7, which 
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includes elements having no place in the fact. 
' Judging or believing is a certain complex 
unity of which a mind is a constituent; if 
the remaining constituents, taken in the 
order which they have in the belief, form 
a complex unity, then the belief is true; 
if not, it is false.' 
Op.cit., p.201. 
' The remaining constituents ' are Desdemona, Cassio 
and loving. However, there is a further order to be 
reckoned with; the fact consists ' of the object -terms 
related by the object -relation in the same order as they 
have in the belief ' ( op.cit., p.202.). ' They ' pre- 
sumably refers to the object- terms, not the object -relation. 
Indeed, how could a relation order both its terms and 
itself? If we are to interpret Russell strictly, we must 
include eighth and ninth elements, in the judgment. 
8. The order of Desdemona, Cassio and loving. 
9. The order of Desdemona and Cassio. 
The theory with which we are presented is not just that 
a judgment is true if what it states is a fact. That would 
be a very weak correspondence theory. Russell's is much 
stronger than this. The sort of correspondence he suggests 
is between the fact, as a complex, and the judgment as a 
complex; the two things correspond internally. He tried to 
effect this ' strong ' correspondence by the sense of 
the object -relation; this is the theory in the Essays, and 
it is not a successful one. He now suppresses the sense of 
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loving, in favour of order; this does not mean that loving 
has no sense, since it is presumably just this which is 
responsible for the order of Desdemona and Cassio in the 
fact that Desdemona loves Cassio. The internal similarity 
between fact and judgment is now one of order, and what 
one might call the ' material ' content of the judgment 
is completed by its containing the actual objects of 
discourse. Is this new version any better than the old? 
In general, I would say that this theory is not any 
more successful than its predecessor. That is because it 
does not solve the original problems, which were (a) to 
explain why some particular judgment is true or false as 
the case may be, and (b) to explain how this thing is 
a judgment in the first place, and, in particular, the 
judgment that p, or whatever. The answer to (a) depends 
on the answer to (b), and I do not think that Russell 
has yet given the right answer to (b). 
The main fault in his account is that he has not really 
shown what corresponds with the fact. This is because he 
does not want the judgment to include some further complex, 
cannot make the entire judgment correspond with the fact 
and yet must have some complex to correspond with the fact. 
To be ' given ' a complex by a judgment, on his type of 
theory, requires some parallel judgment -complex; it is 
neither the judgment, which has elements not occurring 
in the fact, nor some complex in the judgment, for Russell 
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makes ' the various objects concerned all occur severally ' 
( op.cit., p.196.). He tries by the device of ' order ' 
both to have a complex in the judgment, and not to have 
one. But, in the first place, if Desdemona, loving and 
Cassio are ordered, they must be bound in some relation- 
ships which concern their relative positions, thus creating 
at least one complex within the judgment. Secondly, the 
order in the fact is only of Desdemona and Cassio; hence 
the order of loving with respect to these two is irrelevant 
to the fact and need not form part of the judgment. Thirdly, 
since objects can be ordered in a judgment without being so 
ordered in some complex which is not a judgment, their 
mere order cannot fully account for the make -up of the 
fact which would make the judgment true. Fourthly, even 
if we allow that A judges that p expresses an asymmetrical 
relation between A and some other thing, it surely does 
not assign positions to the things judged about, as a matter 
of course; and surely A is not ordered in relation to B 
simply by loving B. 
The cause of the trouble is still Mare's equation which 
makes the elements of the proposition, the elements of the 
meaning and the elements of the fact all the same set of 
things. If you do this, it will be impossible to disting- 
uish facts from propositions from meanings. The difficulty 
of this position first manifests itself as Russell's 
inability to reconstitute the elements of the fact into 
something which is not that fact. Once he has broken down 
the fact and taken the elements, he either puts the elements 
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together to make the fact a part of the judgment, as he 
did in the Essays, or he puts them together to make 
something which is ' bigger ' than the fact and does 
not, therefore, correspond with it. 
The following is a summary of the main criticisms of 
the amended version of the correspondence theory of the 
Philosophical Essays:- 
1. The theory claims that there is a correspondence 
between judgment and fact, but does not substantiate 
this claim. The judgment is always more complex 
than the fact, and so cannot correspond with it; 
nor does it contain some complex which corresponds 
with the fact. There is therefore no correspondence 
between judgment and fact. 
2. The resort to order is fruitless, because the act of 
judging does not assign positions like ' heavier 
than ' or ' first ' as a matter of course to its 
objects, and so does not necessarily give them any 
order. Furthermore, either the ordering includes the 
object -relation and so is not the order of the fact, 
or excludes it and says nothing about what actual 
relation, outside the judgment, the objects are in. 
Conclusion:- The theory does not show correspondence 
between judgment and fact. 
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What Russell has offered us, although he does not put it 
in this way, is a correspondence theory of truth and meaning. 
Every judgment has a meaning; that is because every judgment 
is about objective things which give it meaning. These 
objective things, in fact, are meanings. When we talk about 
Scott, we mean Scott; when we talk about Scott's being an 
author, we are talking not only about Scott but about 
the property of being an author and the relation between 
Scott and that property. 
These individual things give point to our individual 
words, if these words are names. If you put these words 
together, using denoting expressions like ' something ' 
or ' everything ' ( Logic and Knowledge, p.42.) you 
will express propositions. If you choose, you may avoid 
expressions like ' something ' by just using proper 
names and words for universals or relations. 
The propositions which we express through sentences 
correspond to beliefs and judgments, There are two sorts 
of correspondence between judgment and fact, a strong and 
a weak. The strong correspondence holds through the internal 
similarity of judgment to fact; this internal similarity 
has a purely formal aspect, called ' order ' and of a 
relational character; the material content of the judgment 
is completed by the numerical identity of the elements of 
the judgment and those of the fact. The weak correspondence 
consists in the fact that facts make judgments true, 
irrespective of how they make them true. 
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What Russell's theory says, but cannot substantiate, is 
that judgment and fact are made from the same elements, 
metaphysically speaking; that both are fundamentally 
relational in character; that both a judgment and the 
corresponding fact share an abstract relational property 
called ' order '. 
His theory does not say, but surely implies, that whereas 
the meaningfulness of a judgment requires its having a 
certain structure and elements to which the ' order ' 
and elements of some fact could correspond, actual corres- 
pondence is only required for the truth, not the meaning- 
fulness, of the judgment. 
What stands in the way of Russell's giving an intelligible 
account of judgment, whether true or not, is his wanting to 
have two corresponding complexes, each with the same elements. 
Wittgenstein's Picture Theory solves this difficulty by 
making the elements of the complexes merely similar, rather 
than identical. 
We shall see that Wittgenstein's Picture Theory, while 
holding the basic assumptions of Russell's theory of 
judgment, goes further in establishing, or reestablishing, 
the identity of the proposition, an identity obliterated 
in the first instance by Moore in 1899. 
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Summary. 
1. Russell gives up the Moorean assumptions that the 
existence of judgment is independent of mind and that the 
truth -value of a judgment is related to it as the colour of 
a rose is to it. He suggests that judgment is based on 
correspondence, and although his theory is a correspondence 
theory of meaning and truth, he calls it a correspondence 
theory of truth. 
2. In the seventh of the Philosophical Essays he describes 
judgment as a multiple relation whose terms are the judging 
mind and the objects of thought. These are bound together 
by the relation of judging. That this is a judgment depends 
on the possibility of its corresponding with the fact which 
would make it true. The fact is a complex, made up of the 
objects of thought, one of which is a relation which binds 
the other objects together. The ' sense ' of this relation 
has to be the same in both complexes, the judgment and the 
fact which verifies it. The principal difficulty with this 
theory is that either there is no correspondence, except 
in the weakest sense, between the judgment and the fact, 
because the fact has fewer elements than the judgment; or 
there is no correspondence because the judgment contains 
the fact. 
3. In the twelfth chapter of The Problems of Philosophy 
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he presents a slightly different version of the theory 
in the Essays. The principal difference is that the 
object -relation, the one operative in the fact which 
makes the judgment true, does not, as it occurs in the 
judgment, have an actual sense; it occurs purely as a 
term or constituent in the judgment and is not in any 
sense active. The correspondence between the judgment 
and the fact, assuming that the elements of the fact 
are included in the judgment, is the abstract relational 
one of ' order '. But, once again, the judgment is too 
complex to correspond with the fact; and it contains no 
complex which could correspond with the fact, since all 
the objects occur severally, rather than in some 
complex '. 
' inner 
4. The principal reason for the failure of Russell's 
theory, even within the context which he sets himself, 
of one complex corresponding with another, is his 
making the elements of the judgment exactly the same as 
the elements of the fact, at least in part. His attempt 
to reestablish the identity of the proposition or judgment, 
following Moore's denial of the distinction between judgment 
and the objects of thought, is vitiated by his acceptance 
of Moore's equating the objects of thought with meanings 
with the elements of judgment. 
5. We shall see, it is hoped, that Wittgenstein's 
Picture Theory provides one way out of Russell's difficulty, 
while retaining the Russellian assumptions that judgment 
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corresponds with fact, both for meaning and for truth; that 
the elements of fact are in some sense the same, metaphys- 
ically, as the elements of judgment; that fact and judgment 
are fundamentally relational; that a judgment and its 
corresponding fact share an abstract relational form, which 
Russell calls ' order ' and which is somehow given with 
actual relations, but is not tied to any particular one. 
129. 
Chapter Four. 
It is no doubt true that Wittgenstein owed something to 
Heinrich Hertz, as James Griffin says in his book on the 
Tractatus; however Griffin's coupling Hertz and Frege as 
the two most important sources for understanding that work 
is not only an exaggeration but something of an injustice 
to Russell. 
' The two predecessors most useful to keep 
in mind in reading the Tractatus are a 
mathematician and a physicist, Frege and 
Heinrich Hertz.' 
Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism, p.5: J. Griffin. 
A truer index of the relative value of these men in 
helping us to understand Wittgenstein, is given by the 
relative frequency with which they are mentioned: Hertz 
is mentioned twice, Frege about eighteen times and Russell 
about twenty -eight times; in the Tractatus, that is. 
One cannot, of course, say just how far Wittgenstein 
was indebted to Russell, even if he acknowledges a debt, 
as he does in the preface to the Tractatus. That is a 
biographical question which it is not our business to 
settle. The most that will be done in that direction is 
to show the similarities and differences between their 
treatments of the problems of truth and meaning. And let 
us not be misled by the tone of Wittgenstein's voice 
when he is speaking about Russell; although it is, as 
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a rule, critical, that does not imply a disagreement about 
fundamental assumptions. There is disagreement on some 
fairly important questions, e.g. on what the basic elements 
of reality, and therefore the proposition, can be; on 
whether a judgment includes the mind or not; on whether 
a relation can be named; about how restrictions operate 
on the possible values of variables, but, in spite of 
this, there is, in my opinion, a very deep agreement about 
the structure of the proposition and its relation to 
reality. 
It is perhaps best to begin with the Notebooks 1914 -16 
rather than with the Tractatus itself, which does not 
offer us quite the same candid viewpoint, presenting, as 
it does, a finished theory, whose sketchbook the Notebooks 
is. We will also make use of the notes which appear as 
appendices in Blackwell's edition of the Notebooks. Of 
these two sets of notes, according to Anscombe, Rhees 
and von Wright, the editors of the Notebooks, one was 
' composed in 1913 and given to Russell, and the other 
dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway in 1914 ' ( Notebooks, 
p.v.). Following a suggestion made to them by Griffin, 
the editors believe that the version of the 1913 notes 
published by them, was made by Wittgenstein himself 
( op.cit., p93.). A third appendix, to which some reference 
will be made, contains scraps of letters from Wittgenstein 
to Russell. 
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Let us look first at some criticisms Wittgenstein makes 
of Russell, in the 1913 notes. The ones of particular 
interest to us concern ' atomic ' propositions, or 
negated atomic propositions. Here are five:- 
1. Wittgenstein criticises Russell's assertion that 
propositions correspond to complexes. 
' Frege said " propositions are names "; 
Russell said " propositions correspond to 
complexes ". Both are false; and especially 
false is the statement " propositions are 
names of complexes ". Facts cannot be named. 
The false assumption that propositions are 
names leads us to believe there must be 
" logical objects ": for the meaning of 
logical propositions would have to be such 
things. 
What corresponds in reality to a proposition 
depends upon whether it is true or false. But 
we must be able to understand a proposition 
without knowing if it is true or false. What 
we know when we understand a proposition is 
this: we know what is the case if it is true 
and what is the case if it is false. But 
we do not necessarily know whether it is 
actually true or false.' 
Op.cit., pps.93-4. 
Russell had said that the terms in a relation may be 
complex ( The Problems, p.199.) and yet occur as terms; 
such things could even be named, e.g. Othello, presumably. 
But, so far as we have seen in our study of him, he is 
certainly not open to the charge of confusing propositions 
with names; on the contrary, he is acutely aware of the 
fact that something must correspond to a name, whereas 
nothing need correspond to a proposition. That is one of 
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the main points of ' On denoting '. Admittedly, Russell's 
theory of judgment is a correspondence theory. It does not 
demand, however, that some complex must correspond to each 
judgment or proposition, in order for that proposition or 
judgment to exist; actual correspondence is only required 
to make the judgment true, not to give it sense or meaning. 
The raison d'etre of Russell's theory is the abolition of 
the corresponding complex except to explain the actual 
truth- value. 
2. Wittgenstein criticises Russell's confusion of the 
assertion of a proposition with the proposition itself. 
' The assertion -sign is logically quite 
without significance. It only shows, in 
Frege and in Whitehead and Russell, that 
these authors hold thepropositions so 
indicated to be true. "I- ", therefore, 
belongs as little to the proposition as 
( say ) the number of the proposition. 
A proposition cannot possibly assert of 
itself that it is true. Assertion is 
merely psychological. There are only 
unasserted propositions. Judgment, 
command and question all stand on the 
same level; but all have in common the 
propositional form, and that alone 
interests us. That interests logic are 
only the unasserted propositions.' 
Op.cit., p.96. 
We recall Russell's discussion in The Principles of 
Mathematics on the relation between assertion and the 
proposition; at that time he thought that assertion was 
somehow given with true propositions. His later theory 
implies a necessary connection, not between true prop- 
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ositions and asserted ones ( The Principles, p.504.), but 
between the judgment, that A loves B, and somebody's judging 
that A loves B. The later theory does not distinguish the 
judgment from its being judged, the content of the judgment 
from its existence as something done by someone, because 
of the complete identification of the objects of discourse 
with at least some of the elements of the judgment. To 
distinguish the judgment from its being judged would commit 
Russell to a complex indistinguishable from the fact which 
would make the judgment true, since the elements of both 
would be identical. 
Wittgenstein's criticism is perfectly fair: the assertion 
of a proposition, the making of a judgment, are quite dis- 
tinct from the proposition or judgment- content. At the 
same time he recognises the difficulty of explaining how 
the proposition is related to the person who asserts it. 
' The proposition " A judges ( that ) p " 
consists of the proper name A, the proposition 
p with its two poles, and A's being related to 
both these poles in a certain way. This is 
obviously not a relation in the ordinary sense.' 
Loc.cit. 
Therefore, although he disagrees with Russell's making 
a proposition in some sense part of its being asserted, he 
agrees that if A judges that B loves C, this is not simply 
a relation between A. and the proposition that B loves C. 
3. He criticises Russell's theory of judgment, because 
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it seems to him, it permits nonsensical judgments. 
' Every right theory of judgment must 
make it impossible for me to judge that 
" this table penholders the book " 
( Russell's theory does not satisfy 
this requirement .P 
Loc.cit. 
It is not clear to me why Wittgenstein makes this 
criticism either in this particular context, in which he 
is discussing the general relational character of judgment, 
or in any place at all. According to Russell's theory, the 
elements of the judgment are, apart from the subject and 
the judging relation, things which may go together to 
form a fact. There could be no correspondence if this 
were not so. Nonsensical judgments are therefore impossible, 
since nothing could correspond to them. 
4. A proposition is not entirely relational; nor are 
the things it expresses, even if these are factual. So 
Russell's theory, Wittgenstein thinks, is wrong by being 
too simple- minded. 
' One reason for supposing that not all 
propositions which have more than one 
argument are relational propositions is 
that, if they were, the relations of 
judgment and inference would have to 
hold between an arbitrary number of things. 
The idea that propositions are names for 
complexes has suggested that whatever is not 
a proper name is a sign for a relation. 
Russell, for instance, imagines every fact 
as a spatial complex, and since spatial 
complexes consist of things and relations 
only, therefore he holds all do.' 
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Loc.cit. 
' It is wrong to conceive every proposition 
as expressing a relation. A natural attempt 
at such a solution consists in regarding 
" not -p " as the opposite of " p ", where, 
then, " opposite " would be the indefinable 
relation.' 
Op.cit., p.97. 
Wittgenstein's objections here are not clear. One of 
them, from the second quotation, seems to be that if 
you express the proposition that not -p, you are not 
simply expressing a relation between the proposition 
that p and its contradictory. The function of ' not ' 
is not to name a relation. 
This is stated in a general way in the second sentence 
of the first quotation, which, with the following state- 
ment about Russell's view of facts as spatial complexes, 
is, I think, a comment on the over -naivety both of Russell's 
metaphysics and of his theory of judgment. 
The first sentence of the first quotation seems to be 
saying that one reason for not wanting propositions to 
be relational is that if someone judges, or infers, that 
proposition, it is the proposition and not some set of 
things, which is judged or inferred. What is not obvious 
is whether 4ittgenstein accepts this reason or not. 
At any rate, he is quite right to criticise Russell's 
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extravagant application of a relational analysis to everything. 
5. Russell's theory demanded that the relation which 
occurs in the fact as a relation, should occur in the 
judgment as a term, along with those things which, in the 
fact, are its terms; so that sometimes terms, on their 
own, are ordered, and sometimes they are ordered with 
the relation. Wittgenstein's comment is that 
' There is no thing which is the form of 
a proposition, and no name which is the 
name of a form. Accordingly we can also 
not say that a relation which in certain 
cases holds between things holds sometimes 
between forms and things. This goes against 
Russell's theory of judgment.' 
Op.cit., p.99. 
An atomic proposition consists of names and a form; a 
name is quite unlike a form. The form of an atomic prop- 
osition is that in the proposition which corresponds to, 
but does not name, some specific relation which holds or 
does not hold between the things named. The form of the 
proposition is what turns a mere set of names into a 
proposition. 
' Indefinables are of two sorts: names 
and forms. Propositions cannot consist 
of names alone, they cannot be classes 
of names.' 
Op.cit., p.98. 
' A imposition must be understood when all 
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its indefinables are understood. The 
indefinables in " aRb " are introduced 
as follows: (1) " a " is indefinable, 
(2) " b " is indefinable, (3) whatever 
" x " and " y " may mean, " xRy " 
says something indefinable about their 
meaning.' 
Loc . ci t. 
' The form of a proposition may be 
symbolized in the following way: Let 
us consider symbols of the form " xRy ", 
to which correspond primarily pairs of 
objects of which onehas the name " x ", 
the other the name " y ". The x's and y's 
stand in various relations to each other, 
and among other relations the relation R 
holds between some but not between others. 
I now determine the sense of " xRy " by 
laying down the rule: when the facts 
behave in regard to " xhy " so that 
the meaning of " x " stands in the 
relation R to the meaning of " y ", then 
I say that these facts are " of like sense " 
( gleichsinnig ) with the proposition 
" xRy "; otherwise, " of opposite sense " 
( entgegengesetzt ). I correlate the facts 
to the symbol " xRy " by thus dividing 
them into those of like sense and those of 
opposite sense. To this correlation 
corresponds the correlation of name and 
meaning. Both are psychological. Thus I 
understand the form " xRy " when I know 
that it discriminates the behaviour of x 
and y according as these stand in the 
relation R or not. In this way I extract from 
all possible relations the relation R, as by 
a name, I extract its meaning from among all 
possible things.' 
Op.cit., pps.98-9. 
Although this is criticism of Russell's theory, it 
reminds us very much of it, particularly when Wittgenstein 
talks about the ' sense of " xRy "'. :hat Russell meant 
by ' sense ' was the ways in which objects could be 
related by some particular relation. What Wittgenstein 
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means is different; the sense of " xRy " is its capacity 
to institute a division between those things which are 
related by relation R, and those things which are not. 
There is no suggestion that a relation may have different 
' senses ' 
Also, Wittgenstein's ' form of a proposition ' reminds 
us of Russell's attempt to find in his judgment- complex 
something which would represent the relation in the 
corre ending fact; Russell tried to explain this aspect 
of the correspondence in terms of ' sense ' or ' order ' 
and the actual occurrence of the object- relation in the 
judgment. So there is a strong similarity between the 
relational character of the ' form of a proposition ' 
and Russell's order +object -relation; and they have very 
similar roles in explaining judgment. The form of a 
proposition, like Russell's order, not only turns a 
set of elements into a proposition, but somehow corres- 
ponds with the way things are related. 
These are most of the criticisms which Wittgenstein 
makes in the 1913 notes on Russell's theory of judgment 
as we have studied it; he has other things to say, but 
mainly on the logico- mathematical Russell. Some of his 
points are fair, but not all of them. The first and the 
third criticisms given above almost suggest that Witt- 
genstein was talking about Russell's theory in The 
Principles of Mathematics; the first criticism would 
apply there, and the third might well; the second, of 
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course, certainly would. 
The topic of form is one dealt with quite confidently in 
these notes. It gradually acquires a more problematic air 
which it carries right into the Tractatus. Its importance 
comes from Wittgenstein's acute concern about the ' identity ' 
which runs between the proposition and what it says, the 
identity which Russell's theory sought, unsuccessfully, to 
explain. It is this problem of identity which absorbs 
Wittgenstein in the early part of the Notebooks, as the 
following extended series of quotations will show : - 
' The obscurity obviously resides in the 
question: what does the logical iderlity 
of sign and thing signified really consist 
in? And this question is ( once more ) a 
main aspect of thevhole philosophical 
problem.' 
Notebooks, p.3e. 
' The logical identity between sign and 
thing signified consists in its not being 
permissible to recognize more or less in 
the sign than in what it signifies. 
If the sign and thing signified were not 
identical in respect of their total logical 
content then there would have to be something 
still more fundamental than logic.' 
Loc.cit., & p.4e. 
' That a sentence is a logical portrayal 




' The question how a correlation of relations 
is possible is identical with the problem of 
truth. 
For the latter is identical wit question 
how the correlation of situations is possible 
( one that signifies and one that is signified ). 
It is only possible by means of the correlation 
of the components; the correlation between names 
and things named gives an example. ( And it is 
clear that a correlation of relations too takes 
place somehow.) 
A proposition can express its sense only by 
being the logical portrayal of it.' 
Op.cit., p.6e. 
' The general concept of the proposition carries 
with it a quite general concept of the coordination 
of proposition and situation: The solution to all 
my questions must be extremely simple. 
In the proposition a world is as it were put 
together experimentally. ( As when in the law - 
court in Paris a motor -car accident is represented 
by means of dolls, etc.) 
This must yield the nature of truth straight 
away ( if I were not blind ). 
Let us think of hieroglyphic writing in which 
each word is a representation of what it stands 
for. Let us think also of the fact that actual 
pictures of situations can be right and wrong. 
": If the right -hand figure in this 
/1:t-flit 
picture represents the man A, and the left -hand 
one stands for the man B, then the whole might 
assert, e.g.: " A is fencing with B ". The 
proposition in picture -writing can be true and false. 
It has a sense independent of its truth or falsehood. 
It must be possible tq demonstrate everything 
essential by considering this case. 
It can be said that, while we are not certain 
of being able to turn all situations into pictures 
on paper, still we are certain that we can portray 
all logical properties of situations in a two - 
dimensional script. 
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It can be said that in our picture the right- 
hand figure is a representation of something and 
also the left -hand one, but even if this were not 
the case, their relative position could be a 
representation of something. ( Namely a relation.)' 
Op.cit., p.7e. 
' A picture can present relations that do not 
exist! How is that possible? 
Now once more it looks as if all relations 
must be logical in order for their existence 
to be guaranteed by that cf the sign. 
What connects a and c in " aRb.bSc " is not 
the sign "." but the occurrence of the same 
letter " b " in the two simple sentences. 
We can say straight away: Instead of: this 
proposition has such and such a sense: this 
proposition represents such and such a situation. 
It portrays it logically. 
Only in this way can the proposition be true 
or false: It can only agree or disagree with 
reality by being a picture of a situation.' 
Op.cit., p.8e. 
' The general concept of two complexes of 
which the one can be the logical picture of 
the other, and so in one sense is so. 
If there were such a thing as an immediate 
correlation of relations, the question would be: 
How are the things that stand in these relations 
correlated with one another in this case? Is 
there such a thing as a direct correlation of 
relations without consideration of their 
direction? Are we misled into assuming 
" relations between relations " merely through 
the apparent analogy between the expressions: 
" relations between things " 
and " relations between relations " ?' 
Op.cit., pps.9e&10e. 
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These writings come after the notes examined above, from 
September to October of 1914. Wittgenstein is obviously 
searching for the correspondence which Russell claimed 
to exist between true judgments and the facts which verify 
them. One big difference between them, however, is Witt- 
genstein's clear conception of the proposition as something 
which may appear on a piece of paper. He leaves out all 
reference to the mind. But simultaneously, he developes 
a strongly Russellian idea of a spatial or quasi- spatial 
subject- matter to which the propositional complex corres- 
ponds; one recalls his censoring Russell's modelling all 
relationships on spatial ones. One further similarity, but 
with a difference, is his seeing as problematic the relation 
between the relation in the propositional complex and its 
counterpart in what it ' portrays '; here, the difference 
is that the relation in the proposition, though a purely 
spatial one, portrays two men fencing, which is not purely 
spatial; this is a very big difference from Russell. 
Let us call the relation in the proposition,the ' pro- 
positional ' relation, and the relation in the fact, the 
' object ' relation, following Russell. Wittgenstein 
assumes that the propositional and object relations may 
not be the same; he further assumes that there may be no 
object relation, in the sense that no two things are 
actually bound by it. Ne can portray two men fencing, 
even if (1) the fencing does not occur on the paper 
itself and (2) no two men are actually fencing. This 
prompts him to introduce the expression ' logical picture '. 
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The fact that a picture is ' logical ' somehow allows 
it to get over these two difficulties. 
'...we can portray all logical properties 
of situations in a two -dimensional script.' 
' A picture can present relations that do 
not exist. How is that possible? 
Now once more it looks as if all relations 
must be logical in order for their existence 
to be guaranteed by that of the sign.' 
It looks as though the contrast with ' logical ' is 
' actual ' or ' material ' or both: a picture can 
present what is not actual, so what it presents is 
logical: a picture can present in two dimensions what 
cannot exist in two dimensions, so that, even if there 
is some material difference between the relations, there 
is no logical difference. The logical would therefore 
appear to be timeless, i.e. unaffected by existence, and 
abstract, i.e. capable of transgressing material differences. 
The correspondence between the picture -proposition and 
reality is effected, then, by some relational characteristic 
of the picture which, in being timeless and abstract, is 
in some way ' logical '. 
A little later, Wittgenstein writes that, 
' The theory of logical portrayal by means of 
language says - quite generally: In order for 
it to be possible that a proposition should be 
true or false - agree with reality or not - 
for this to be possible something in the propos- 
ition must be identical with reality.' 
Op.cit., p.15e. 
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' The proposition must enable us to see the 
logical structure of the situation that 
makes it true or false. ( As a picture must 
spew the spatial relation in which the things 
represented in it must stand if the picture 
is correct ( true ).) 
The form of a picture might be called that 
in which the picture MUST agree with reality 
( in order to be capable of portraying it at 
all ).' 
Loc.cit. 
As an ordinary picture shows us the spatial relation- 
ships of things, so will a picture -proposition show us 
the logical relationships of things. For this to happen, 
there must be in the proposition something which is 
iantical with reality, something which is presupposed 
by this thing's being a picture; Wittgenstein calls this 
' form '. He is not clear about what it is, because he 
asks, 
' This is the difficulty: How can there be such 
a thing as the form of p if there is no situation 
of this form? And in that case, what does this 
form really consist in ?' 
Op.cit., p.21e. 
' But when I say: the connexion of the prop- 
ositional components must be possible for the 
represented things - does this not contain the 
whole problem? How c-n a non -existent connexion 
between objects be possible ?' 
Op.cit., p.26e. 
He assumes that there is some identity between the 
picture -proposition and reality; the question is, how 
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can there be an identity, if nothing in fact corresponds 
with the picture? Your paper is blank; you fill it with 
a picture. But you do not thereby fill real space outside 
your picture; there are false pictures and mere pictures. 
For a picture to make sense, let alone to be true, there 
must be some correlation between its space and some other 
space; how is this possible, if the other space being 
empty means that there is no '-other space '? He 
immediately begins to give an answer. 
' Then in order for a proposition to present 
a situation it is only necessary for its 
component parts to represent those of the 
situation and for the former to stand in a 
connexion which is possible for the latter.' 
Op.cit., p.27e. 
So long as you know what things may go into a space 
outside your picture and may make up a ' situation ' 
there, that is enough; let the things in your picture 
represent those outside, and put the things in the 
picture ito some relationship. In this way, the elements 
of the proposition -picture will act on behalf of the 
objects of discourse. 
' The possibility of the proposition is, 
of course, founded on the principle of signs 
as GOING PROXY for objects.' 
Op.cit., p.37e. 
Wittgenstein does not go much further in the Notebooks 
in determining the exact nature of the pictorial relation. 
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There are remarks here and there, of course, and implicat- 
ions which follow from his discussion of complexity, the 
need for simplicity, the use of a grid- system of coordinates 
which can be used in description and so on. The Notebooks 
will have helped us enough if they have shown how, after 
his criticisms of Russell's theory of judgment, he himself 
became more interested not only in the problem of identity 
between fact and proposition, or reality and the propos- 
ition, but in the sort of relational treatment adopted 
by Russell. 
Wittgenstein's Picture Theory amounts, so far, to this : - 
A picture -proposition is a complex whose elements go 
proxy for objects. The propositional elements are connected, 
and the proposition has sense because it presents a possible 
connexion of objects in logical space. The truth of the 
proposition depends on what is actually the case. The 
element common to both the picture -proposition and what 
it represents is an abstract relational property, called 
' form ' which complexes of different types can share. 
Now compare it with Russell's theory of judgment:- 
A judgment is a complex whose elements are the objects 
of discourse. The judgment- elements are connected, and 
it is a judgment because of the possibility of corres- 
ponding with a fact whose elements are the objects of 
discourse. The truth of the judgment depends on what is 
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actually the case. The element common to both the judgment 
and its corresponding fact, other than the objects of dis- 
course, is an abstract relational property called ' order ' 
which complexes of different types can share. 
Is there not a high degree of correspondence? Does 
Wittgenstein's device of making the propositional elements 
' go proxy ' for the objects of discourse not solve 
Russell's problem, the problem of having different com- 
plexes from the same elements? Instead of making the 
elements identical, Wittgenstein does the next best thing; 
he makes one set stand in for the other. If Russell had 
made the elements of the judgment things which stood for 
the objects of discourse, the only important difference 
between his theory and Wittgenstein's would have been 
his inclusion of mind in judgment and Wittgenstein's 
exclusion of it. 
Although the Picture Theory has by now been formed in 
its essentials, it still has some way to go in the 
Tractatus, where other differences from Russell emerge. 
It remains to discuss its more advanced statement there; 
but the connection between Russell and the Picture Theory 
has already been established, I hope, and that constitutes 
the main historical part of this thesis. 
Summary. 
1. The close relation between Wittgenstein and Russell 
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in the theory of the proposition is shown both in the 
notes of 1913 and the Notebooks 1914 -16. In the former, 
Wittgenstein has a good deal of criticism of Russell, 
e.g. on Russell's ' correspondence ', his extravagant 
relational analysis of almost everything, his inclusion 
of assertion in the proposition, his not contrasting names 
sufficiently with that which symbolises relationally in 
the proposition,etc. The ' sense ' of ' xRy ' in the 
notes reminds us of the ' sense ' of Russell's relations. 
2. The Notebooks show Wittgenstein trying to work out 
in detail the relation between the proposition and reality. 
He adopts a very similar theory to Russell's, i.e. a 
correspondence theory which operates at the level of 
propositions about definite objects. Like Russell, he 
suggests that on the one hand there is a propositional 
complex, and, on the other, a factual complex, if, that is, 
the proposition is true. Instead of making the elements of 
these complexes identical, he makes one set go proxy for 
the other; the one identical aspect of both fact and 
picture -proposition is an abstract relational character- 
istic, like Russell's ' order ', which Wittgenstein 
calls ' form '. Both Russell and Wittgenstein explain 
the meaningfulness of the propositional complex by the 
possibility of correspondence, and truth by actual 
correspondence. 
3. Wittgenstein's Picture Theory, although not yet 
fully developed, by reasserting the identity of the 
149. 
proposition, has completed Russell's righting of the balance 
upset by Moore, who made propositions indistinguishable from 
facts or pseudo- facts. In particular, Russell's problem of 
having two different complexes constituted from the same 
elements, is solved, by making the elements only the same 
in kind, rather than numerically identical. 
Chapter Five. 
Moore had said that the ultimate constituents of reality 
have nothing to do with the mind, although the mind can be 
related to them, and presumably, indeed, is itself con- 
stituted out of them. These things, the concepts, break 
down into simple concepts, if they are not already simple. 
They are incapable of change; they neither exist nor do 
they not exist; they inhabit a realm of their own. It is 
these which are our objects of thought, these which we 
mean. 
In the Tractatus we find something similar, the objects, 
i.e. the ultimate immutable simples which neither exist 
nor do not exist and from which all complexes are made. 
One of the differences between Moore's concepts and 
Wittgenstein's objects is that whereas the concepts can 
go together to make complexes which are not real facts 
but pseudo -facts, the objects cannot. Another difference 
is that whereas anything is a concept, except possibly 
the relations between concepts, not everything is an 
object, but only those things which are not complexes, 
and neither properties nor relations ( See Copi's 
excellent article ' Objects, Properties, and Relations 
in the Tractatus ', Mind, 1958.). This differentiates 
the objects not only from Moore's concepts but also from 
what Russell began by calling ' things ' and ' concepts ' 
and later ' particulars ' and ' universals '. 
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' 2027: Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent 
are one and the same. 
20271: Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; 
their configuration is what is changing and unstable. 
20272: The configuration of objects produces states 
of affairs.' 
( All quotations beginning with a number are from the 
Tractatus; no references will, therefore, be given.) 
We are told that change is identical with change in the 
configuration of objects, and that the configuration of 
objects is in some sense responsible for ' states of 
affairs '. In that case, as configuration varies, so will 
states of affairs. So that any given state of affairs may 
just disappear. When that happens, the set of objects 
which went together to make that state of affairs is no 
longer connected in a certain way. 
' 203: In a state of affairs objects fit into one 
another like the links of a chain. 
2031: In a state of affairs objects stand in a 
determinate relation to one another. 
2062: From the existence or non -existence of 
one state of affairs it is impossible to infer 
the existence or non -existence of another.' 
,then a state of affairs disappears, we cannot 
presume that its elements actually occur elsewhere in 
some other state of affairs. Indeed, one possibility is 
that there are no states of affairs whatever ( 427 ). 
There would then be no world; the world is the totality 
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of existing states of affairs ( 204 ). 
The possibilities of occurring in states of affairs are 
presupposed by any given object; they are, as it were, 
written into the object. These possibilities form its 
nature, so that for any given set of objects, the poss- 
ibilities of their combining are given too. 
' 2012: In logic nothing is accidental: 
if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, 
the possibility of the state of affairs must 
be written into the thing itself. 
20123: If I know an object I also know 
all its possible occurrences in states of 
affairs. 
(Every one cf these possibilities must be 
part of the nature of the object.) 
A new possibility cannot be discovered 
later. 
20124: If all objects, are given, then 
at the same time all possible states of 
affairs are also given.' 
An object may therefore be a complex thing, in the sense 
that it contains the possibility of occurring in many 
different states of affairs: what is important is that 
though it be complex in nature, it is not a complex; a 
complex has different parts, but a complex thing need 
merely have different aspects. 
These possibilities would seem to be the internal prop- 
erties of the object, which never change. It may have 
external properties too, and these can change; any 
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description of an object is given by its external prop- 
erties, its internal ones being indescribable. 
' 201231: If I am to know an object, 
though I need not know its external prop - 
erties, I must know all its internal 
properties. 
4023: ....Just as a description of an 
object describes it by giving its 
external properties, so a proposition 
describes reality by its internal 
properties.' 
These internal properties which constitute the essential 
but indescribable nature of an object are called its ' form ' 
( 20141 ). Wittgenstein expresses the ineffability of the 
object -in- itself by saying that it is ' colourless ' 
( 20232 ); it only takes on a ' colour ' when something 
happens to it, i.e. when it enters into a state of affairs. 
Even then, however, although its form is expressed, the 
expression, i.e. its ' colour ', is not itself part of 
the form. ( There is reason to believe that objects cannot 
be coloured in any case; see 63751: this evidence is not 
conclusive; see 20251.) The manifestation of form constit- 
utes the material or external properties of the object; 
it gets these by combining with other objects. 
' 20231: The substance of the world 
can only determine a form, and not any 
material properties. For it is only by 
means of propositions that material 
properties are represented - only be 
the configuration of objects that they 
are produced.' 
The material properties of an object therefore correspond 
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with its internal properties, or with some of them, for, 
whatever its outer nature, this is already prefigured in 
some way, by its inner. 
The actual combination of one object with others is a 
state of affairs. No state of affairs includes any other 
as a part, because, if it did, the existence of one would 
depend on that of the other, and so, one could infer the 
existence of this state of affairs from the existence of 
that. 
' 2062: From the existence or non -existence 
of one state of affairs it is impossible to 
infer the existence or non- existence of 
another.' 
This means that a state of affairs is , in a sense, 
atomic; there is no simpler thing of its type. We are told 
that the world divides into facts ( 12 ); we are told that 
the totality of existing states of affairs is the world 
( 204 ), and it is tempting to think, therefore, that 
states of affairs are what have been called ' atomic 
facts '. Of course the division of W into Fs and the 
summation of Ss into W does not imply that Fs are Ss. 
Nevertheless, it does seem that states of affairs are 
atomic facts. At the same time we must take into account 
two aspects of the concept ' state of affairs ' in 
order to clarify the sense in which a state of affairs 
is a fact. I do not intend to do this in great detail, 
in view of the prolific discussion already made on the 
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topic by Stenius, Anscombe and Black, to mention only some. 
The two aspects are as follows:- 
1. A state of affairs is something which Wittgenstein 
contrasts with a Tatsache, ' Tatsache ' being translated 
as ' fact '. 
' 2: What is the case - a fact - is the 
existence of states of affairs.' 
here you have a contrast between a fact and the existence 
of states of affairs. Similarly, 
' 2034: The structure of a fact consists of 
the structures of states of affairs. 
206: The existence and non -existence of 
states of affairs is reality. 
( We also call the existence of states of 
affairs a positive fact, and their non- 
existence a negative fact.)' 
Furthermore, in a letter to Russell, he explicitly 
distinguishes a Tatsache from a Sachverhalt. 
' " What is the difference between Tatsache 
and Sachverhalt ?" Sachverhalt is, what 
corresponds to an Elementarsatz if it is 
true. Tatsache is what corresponds to the 
logical product of elementary props when 
this product is true.' 
Notebooks 1914 -16, p.129. 
Russell blurs over this distinction in his introduction 
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to the Tractatus. 
' Facts which are not compounded of other facts 
are what Mr Wittgenstein calls Sachverhalte, 
whereas a fact which may consist of two or 
more facts is called a Tatsache: thus, for 
example, ' Socrates is wise ' -is a Sachverhalt, 
as well as a Tatsache, whereas ' Socrates is 
wise and Flatoos hi.s pupil ' is a Tatsache 
but not a Sachverhalt.' 
Tractatus, p.xi. 
The contrast here is between the singular fact and the 
plural states of affairs, which seems to imply that states 
of affairs are not facts, even atomic ones. 
There can surely be no doubt that an existent state of 
affairs is a sort of fact, even if it is not a Tatsache; 
for, after all, it is the state of affairs which verifies 
the elementary proposition. It is therefore quite approp- 
riate to call an existent state of affairs an ' atomic 
fact '; the commentators mentioned above all agree on this. 
2. The second sort of contrast which Wittgenstein makes 
with the use of the concept ' state of affairs ' is 
between the actual and the possible, and it is here that 
these commentators disagree, particularly Black and Stenius. 
Stenius feels ( see Chaper 3, Wittgenstein's Tractatus.) 
that a state of affairs is neutral with respect to existence 
( op.cit., p.30.); an existent state of affairs, Stenius 
would agree, obviously is not neutral in this way; in itself 
it is a mere possibility. Black disagrees ( see Section 2, 
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A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus.) 
' On the view I am advocating, all three 
words, Sachverhalt, Sachlage, and Tatsache 
are usually to be taken as standing for 
simple or complex states of affairs ( not 
possibilities ).' 
Op.cit., p.45. 
This disagreement does not prevent them from agreeing 
that there are atomic facts, even if one describes them 
as existent states of affairs, and the other merely as 
states of affairs. 
An atomic fact, then, is a set of objects combined in 
some way, no other combination of objects being included 
in it. Atomic facts can go together to make what might be 
' molecular ' facts. These two types of combination, objects 
kto facts, and facts into more complex facts, produce the 
states of the world, that in terms of which our propositions 
are verified. 
What is the relation between our propositions and the 
world? Before answering this, we must have some idea of 
what a proposition is. Wittgenstein is not very precise 
in his use of the word ' Satz '. At one point he takes 
a proposition to be part of science, at another, part of 
language. 
' 4001: The totality of propositions is 
language. 
411: The totality of true propositions is 
the whole of natural science ( or the 
whole corpus of the natural sciences ).' 
In general what he means by a proposition is something 
which is true or false and which, at the same time, is 
linguistic, i.e. is made from expressions. It is therefore 
somewhere between a sentence and a statement; perhaps the 
nearest thing to it is the sort of thing which results 
from someone's 'making a statement ' in writing for, 
say, the police. This is both made from expressions and 
has a truth -value. This is what he means in general, 
although he does not always mean this. He talks about 
' a printed proposition ' ( 3143 ) and at one point 
( 3341 ) he seems to make the proposition the thing 
common to all statement -making sentences with the same 
meaning. Although he is at great pains to explain the 
exact relation between our propositions and reality, he 
does tend very much to fuse the statement made on some 
particular occasion by the use of a sentence with the 
meaning of the sentence, to fuse what is meant by someone 
with what the sentence means. 
This thing, the proposition, has both meaning and a 
truth -value. The meaning of a proposition is what Witt- 
genstein calls its ' sense '. This is given by its 
truth conditions and has nothing to do with what may 
or may not be the case; the sense of a proposition does 
not change with its truth -value. 
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' 4024: To understand a proposition means 
to know what is the case if it is true. 
( One can understand it, therefore, 
without knowing whether it is true.) 
4063: in order to be able to say, 
" ' p ' is true ( or false )', I must 
have determined in what circumstances I 
call ' p ' true, andin so doing I 
determine the sense of the proposition.' 
It is the capacity for being true or false which gives 
the proposition sense; but there is a type of proposition 
which is senseless, because sense ultimately comes from 
the way in which the truth of a proposition ( or its 
falsehood ) is actually correlated with the state of the 
world. 
' 42: The sense of a proposition is its 
agreement and disagreement with possibilities 
of existence and non -existence of states of 
affairs.' 
Some propositions are true without regard to the state 
of the world, and some false; they are without sense, but 
not without truth -value, because they contain other prop- 
ositions whose senses cancel one another out; these are the 
contradictions and tautologies. These are fringe propositions, 
not proper ones, since they do not have the capacity to be 
true or false. 
Real propositions derive their sense from being images 
or pictures of reality. 
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' 406: A proposition can be true or false 
only in virtue of being a picture of 
reality. 
401: A proposition is a picture of reality. 
A proposition is a model of reality as we 
imagine it.' 
These propositions which are ' pictures show us 
how reality might be. It is impossible for senseless 
propositions to do this e.g. tautologies and contradictions; 
they are not pictures. 
' 4462: Tautologies and contradictions are not 
pictures of reality. They do not represent any 
possible situations. For the former admit all 
possible situations, and the latter none.' 
A proposition is a picture because it represents. 
' 40312: My fundamental idea is that the 
" logical constants " are not representatives; 
that there can be no representatives of the 
logic of facts.' 
Logical constants are not representatives because they do 
not name or stand for objects, and if this is their status 
the inference might be drawn that propositions containing 
them cannot picture as propositions without them can. Wit- 
tgenstein does not draw the inference; he often just talks 
about ' the proposition ', and in denying that logical 
truths and falsehoods arepictures he conspicuously implies 
that all other propositions are. Moreover he says in 547 
' In fact elementary propostions themselves 
contain all logical operations. For ' fa ' 
says the same thing as ' (x).fx.x =a '. 
Wherever there is compositeness, argument 
and function arepresent, and where these are 
present, we already have all the logical 
constants . ' 
Despite this, it would seem that there is a case for saying 
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that there are two forms of ' representation ' for prop- 
ositions, a strong and a weak. All propositions_ _ 
with sense are pictures of a kind; but the important kind 
of picturing is restricted to propositions which do not 
contain logical constants, i.e. the sort which Russell, 
in Principia Mathematica calls ' elementary ' ( op.cit., 
p.44.). A proposition may contain logical constants and 
still have a representational capacity, because its truth 
is correlated with some possible state, or states, of the 
world. It can ' show ' the state of reality, not through 
the relation of similarity, which is how the strong form 
of picturing works, but through such conventions as, for 
example, that ( p.q ) is true only in the event that p 
is true and q is true; it is simply a convention that the 
dot means what it does, not something dependent on the 
similarity of the dot to some feature of reality. 
So the genuine picture -propositions do not contain elements 
like the dot and vel signs. What are their elements? The 
way the answer is given depends on the point of view of 
the questioner, because 'Wittgenstein distinguishes between 
the linguistic and the metaphysical aspect of the picture. 
Both parts of the answer must be given, and so the choice 
is simply about which to give first. 
To begin with, Wittgenstein distinguishes between the 
proposition and the propositional sign. 
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' 312: I call the sign with which we express 
a thought a propositional sign.- And a prop- 
osition is a propositional sign in its pro- 
jective relation to the world. 
311: We use the perceptible sign of a 
proposition ( spoken or written, etc.) 
as a projection of a possible situation. 
31431: The essence of a propositional 
sign is very clearly seen if we imagine 
one composed of spatial objects ( such 
as tables, chairs, and books ) instead 
of written signs. 
Then the spatial arrangement of these 
things will express the sense of the 
proposition. 
32: In a proposition a thought can be 
expressed in such a way that elements of 
the propositional sign correspond to the 
objects of the thought. 
3201: I call such elements ' simple 
signs ', and such a proposition ' com- 
pletely analysed I. 
3202: The simple signs employed in 
propositions are called names. 
3203: A name means an object. The object 
is its meaning. 
314: What constitutes a propositional 
sign is that in it its elements ( the 
words ) stand in a determinate relation 
to one another. 
A propositional sign is a fact.' 
The proposition is to be distinguished from its sign, 
which is something observable, something which can exist 
in a non -linguistic sense. The sign is a fact. It is a 
set of things put together in some definite way. It is 
not, at the moment, clear whether the analysis of the 
sign into elements must yield just those elements which 
are propositionally significant; i.e. does the analysis 
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of the proposition into the smallest units of meaning give 
the -same set as the analysis of the fact? He mentions the 
- arrangement of tables, chairs and books as a parallel to 
the sort of arrangement within the propositional sign. A 
book, however, has itself many parts, and it therefore looks 
as if there is no sort of guarantee that a non -linguistic 
analysis of the sign qua fact will produce just those things 
which are the meaning -elements of the proposition. 
From the linguistic point of view, the elements are 
' names ' whose meanings are objects. Strictly speaking, 
since we are still at the level of sign, the meaning element 
is not a name but a sign used as a name. The real name of 
some object is what all the signs for it have in common 
( 33411 ). It is still not clear what the elements of 
the propositional sign qua fact are, even if qua sign its 
elements are names. Nor is it clear why 'Wittgenstein 
should say that the meaning -elements are names. 
The answer to this last question comes partly from 
Russell. He had made those of his words which were not 
purely logical either proper names or general names. His 
reason was that the only way of explaining their function 
was through their correspondence to actual things, proper 
names to particulars or universals, general names to 
universals alone. Wittgenstein is thinking in the same 
way. The ultimate meaning -elements of picture -propositions 
must be correlated with actual things, as the names of 
those things. This leaves undecided the way or ways in 
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which names are put together. Obviously, if the sole 
elements of the proposition are names, and of the 
propositional sign, signs for objects, there has to be 
some means for avoiding having just a mere set of names 
or signs, instead of a propositional complex. 
To be told that linguistic analysis stops at names 
does not help us at all in grasping the metaphysical 
aspect of the propositional simples. What we require to 
know is how the characteristics of the elements of the 
sign qua fact are related to the characteristics of the 
sign qua proposition. 
We are told that a name represents an object ( 322 ). 
This does not simply mean that a name is correlated with 
an object. 40311 says that the name plays the part of 
its meaning in a combination representing the ' meaning ' 
in relation to other things. 31432 states that putting 
one name in a certain relation to another says that their 
meanings are so related. The function of the name, then, 
is not simply to refer to some particular thing, but to 
act like thing at least to the extent of filling a like 
relational role. 
Unfortunately, 7dittgenstein does not say a great deal 
explicitly about the matching of linguistic and meta- 
physical simplicity. Certain important facts about this 
matching, which is crucial to the theory, will have to 
be inferred rather than seen directly in quotations. 
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We will leave the linguistic side for the moment and simply 
consider what Wittgenstein says about pictures. 
We Picture facts to ourselves ( 21 ). That is to say, we 
put certain things together to make models. The model is a 
relational system which represents, in a quasi -spatial 
manner, the way in which certain other things are arranged 
( 211, 212, 215 ). To establish this pictorial relationship, 
aside from putting the elements of the model into some sort 
of system, all that need be done is to correlate the one 
set of elements with the other ( 21514 ). These elements 
are not themselves relations, but the terms of relations. 
Yet we do not need to mention relations or directly show 
them in our correlation; all that we need correlate are 
the objects with the elements of the model. This must 
mean that somehow, in correlating the two sets of elements 
we have at the same time correlated relations too. 
For a relational system to represent some other system, 
there must be something identical in both. This common 
element is called ' form '. It would be no exaggeration 
to say that the central notion of the Tractatus is this 
one, and an exceedingly difficult notion it is. 
The form which a picture and reality have in common, in 
virtue of which the picture is a picture, is pictorial 
form. If a coloured picture shows you a coloured object, 
at least part of that picture's pictorial form is colour. 
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If a spatial arrangement is shown by a spatial model or 
picture, the pictorial form of the latter is space ( 217, 
2171 ). Whatever pictorial form a picture has, e.g. spatial, 
colour, musical, there is another sort of form presupposed, 
and that is logical form ( 2182 ), so that the form of a 
spatial picture is not simply space; it is also logic. Some 
pictures are just logical pictures, for their pictorial 
form, unlike that of other pictures, is just logic and 
nothing else. ( 2181 ). 
I propose, for the sake of convenience, to call one sort 
of form ' material ', to distinguish it from the logical. 
This term is already used by Wittgenstein, e.g. at 20231. 
Space and colour are material forms, rather than logical 
ones; but both presuppose logic. 
Wittgenstein seems to say that logical form is not only 
presupposed by all other types, but is capable in some way 
of supplanting them pictorially. 
' 219: Logical pictures can depict the 
world.' 
This seems to mean that one does not need spatial pictures, 
logical ones being good enough, even if one wants to show 
the spatial arrangement of reality. This is what I take it 
to mean, and I identify these logical pictures, which can 
do anything spatial or coloured pictures can do, with 
thoughts. 
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' 3: A logical picture of facts is a 
thought.' 
üe shall consider later how, or if, a picture in logic, 
rather than space ( say ), can give information about 
spatial, rather than just logical relationships of objects. 
Let us, for the moment, return to states of affairs. 
A state of affairs is a combination of objects. The 
state of affairs has parts. These are the objects. If 
a state of affairs is to be represented propositionally, 
the proposition must have the same number of parts as 
the state of affairs. 
' 404: In a proposition there must be 
exactly as many distinguishable parts 
as in the situation that it represents. 
The two must possess the same logical 
( mathematical ) multiplicity. ( Com- 
pare Hertz's Mechanics on dynamical 
models.)' 
Not only, of course, does the proposition have the 
same number of parts as its corresponding atomic fact 
( if there is one ); it must have the same form too. 
But this form need not be materially identical, since 
Wittgenstein allows a musical score, the idea in the 
composer's mind and a gramophone record, to have the 
same logical character. 
' 4014: A gramophone record, the musical idea, 
the written notes, and the scund- waves, all 
stand to one another in the same internal 
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relation of depicting that 
language and the world. 
They are all constructed 
a common logical plan.' 
hobs between 
according to 
All that is required is identity of logical form. These 
two requirements seem to imply that the only thing capable 
of picturing an atomic fact is some other atomic fact. For 
surely the logical character of a propositional element 
forbids its being anything other than an object. If a 
propositional element could, for instance, break up, its 
logical role would be decidedly different from that of 
an object. Strictly speaking, it follows simply from 
identity of form that only an atomic fact can picture 
an atomic fact, since number is a feature of form in 
any case. 
Again, we are told that the meaning of a sign is 
irrelevant to its formal character which can be deter- 
mined purely syntactically. 
' 3327: A sign does not determine a logical 
form unless it is taken together with its 
logico- syntactical employment. 
333: In logical syntax the meaning of a 
sign should never play a role. It must be 
possible to establish logical syntax 
without mentioning the meaning of a sign: 
only the description of expressions may 
be presupposed.' 
This surely means that the logical form of an expression 
can be settled purely by examining the expression and its 
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relation to other expressions. The logical form of those 
expressions will appear as the syntax of language. Assuming 
'that the syntax of language is that of its subject matter, 
although we need not know what that subject matter is, we 
can then say that to a linguistic complex there cannot 
correspond some simple, i.e. if the language is to picture 
atomic facts, it must be of the atomic form. Not knowing 
the subject matter of discourse, we cannot say that this 
element, whose logical form is that of a complex, has the 
syntactic role of a simple; its syntactic role must be 
other than that of a simple if its logical form is that 
of a complex. The syntactic form is simply the logical 
form given a linguistic significance. 
The relation between the elements of the propositional 
sign qua fact and its elements qua linguistic units is 
simply this, that anything which is an element of either 
is both an object and a name. The proposition- picture, 
in the shape of a propositional sign, is made up ling- 
uistically of names, and factually of objects, the same 
set of elements being given by each type of analysis. 
This means that ultimately there is only one sort of 
simplicity and one sort of analysis for language, the 
sort which brings you to that point at which there is 
an exact correspondence between language and fact which 
is self-evident. At this most fundamental level, everything 
is explicit. 
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We have not, in fact, considered any claim to the effect 
that some analysis of language would produce a set of 
atomic facts as the most fundamental type of proposition. 
All that has been done is to consider one aspect of the 
sort of proposition required to picture a state of affairs. 
!ittgenstein calls this sort of proposition an ' ele- 
mentary ' proposition. 
' 421: The simplest kind of proposition, 
an elementary proposition, asserts the 
existence of a state of affairs. 
422: An elementary proposition consists 
of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, 
of names.' 
As a sentence, the proposition is a combination of 
names, as a fact it is a combination of objects and as 
a picture it is a combination of elements each of which 
plays the part of the thing which it represents. The form 
of the proposition is the syntactic form of the sentence, 
the logical form of the fact and the pictorial form of 
the picture. It is this form which we /ould find in the 
fact, if there were a fact, making the proposition true. 
It is not the form, however, which actually binds the 
propositional elements together. Form is mere possibility. 
Form merely permits elements to act as they do, or forbids 
them from acting in certain ways. It does not occur in 
the world at all, whereas there must be something besides 
the objects to explain their combination. This other sort 
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of thing is the relation. A relation is not represented in 
the same way as an object; it is not named. What corresponds 
'in the proposition -picture to a relation is a thing of the 
same logical type, i.e. a relation, just as what corresponds 
to an object is an object. Why are relations not named? 
Precisely because objects are not relations; in the first 
place, what binds a set of objects into a complex cannot 
be another object, and so cannot correspond to the syn- 
tactic category of a name; and, in the second place, what 
corresponds to a name is timeless and subsistent, unlike 
relations, which disappear with the break -up of complexes. 
Wittgenstein does not explicitly give either of these 
reasons, because he is not explicit in his discussion of 
relations. The first of these reasons seems to be given 
at 31432. 
' 31432: Instead of, " The complex sign 
aRb ' says that a stands to b in the 
reIaTion R ", we ought to put,-" That 
' a ' stands to ' b ' in a certain re- 
lation says that aRblr.' 
The second reason, I would suggest, follows from his 
making objects terms of relations, his idea being that 
the only ultimate persistence is of objects. 
At any rate, relations are not essentially substantive, 
according to Wittgenstein, and he marks this distinction 
by not considering the relation as an element either of 
the fact or of the proposition. Nevertheless, given a 
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state of affairs, oneis given a relation, the one in which 
the objects occur. lorm is the possibility of things being 
related. 
' 203: In a state of affairs objects fit 
into one another like the links of a chain. 
2031: In a state of affairs object," stand in 
a determinate relation to one another. 
2032: The determinate way in which objects 
are connected in a state of affairs is the 
structure of the state of affairs. 
2033: Its form is the possibility of its 
structure.' 
We are told that some ' determinate relation ' occurs 
in the state of affairs; are we told that this is its 
' structure '? This is a very difficult question, which 
is expressed better, perhaps, in another form:- Is the 
structure of a state of affairs the relation itself, 
or the objects actually being related in that way? `: Te 
may add to the difficulty by simultaneously considering 
215 and 2151. 
' 215: The fact that the elements of 
a picture are related to one another in a 
determinate way represents that things are 
related to one another in the same way. 
Let us call this connexion of its 
elements the structure of the picture, 
and let us call the possibility of this 
structure the pictorial form of the 
picture. 
2151: Pictorial form is the possibility 
that things are related to one another in 
the same way as the elements of the picture.' 
Here we are told that the connexion of elements con- 
stitutes the structure of the picture, and that what is 
represented is a similar connexion of things. The things 
represented may be related to one another just as the 
pictorial elements are. It looks as though the structure 
of the one could be the structure of the other. It looks 
as though structure is just some relation, like that of 
loving, say, or being to the left of. 
I think that McGu mess is right in claiming that 
structure is not shared, and is not just some relation 
( ' Pictures and form in Wittgenstein's Tractatus ', 
Archivio di Filosofia, 1956.). This means that ' to 
assert the existence o/ the structure is nothing other 
than to assert the fact, and it will also seem that 
to say that a fact has a certain structure is to say nothing 
beyond what one has already said in asserting the fact ' 
( op.cit., p214.). 
There are two sorts of evidence for this interpretation. 
The first, and weakest, is that `;Wittgenstein explicitly 
says that what is identical in the picture and in reality 
is form ( 217, 218.) which he distinguishes from structure, 
as we saw above. If he intended structure to be shared, why 
did he explicitly say that what the two have in common is 
form? 
The other sort of evidence, to which 
following a suggestion made by Ramsey, 
1_'icGuiness appeals, 
concerns the log- 
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ical relations between propositions being shown by their 
structure. 
' 513: When the truth of one proposition 
follows from the truth of others, we can 
see this from the structure of the 
propositions. 
41211: Thus one proposition ' fa ' 
shows that the object a occurs in its 
sense, two propositions ' fa ' and 
' ga ' show that the same object is 





propositions contradict one 
then their structure shows it; 
is true if one of them follows 
other. And so on.' 
41211 certainly seems to link structure explicitly with 
particular names, even if 513 does not. However Griffin, 
mentioned above, rejects this as evidence for tying 
structure to the identity of the things structured. His 
argument ( Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism, pps.73 -4.) 
is that the logical relations between propositions can 
quite adequately be represented by propositional var- 
iables, e.g. ' xRy ' and ' - xRy '. Once the variables 
are given values the result is a pair of contradictory 
propositions. No names need be used. Structure, therefore, 
can be identified with a certain type of propositional 
form. Griffin then goes rn try a parallel account of the 
structure of states of affairs. States of affairs may 
share their structure, on his account, which he illus- 
trates with the following diagrams: - 
1::::377Ar 6t. V 
1. G 2. c 3. V 4. 
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Given six spatial objects, a to f, these can be arranged 
in different ways. Only the first and second of these 
diagrams shows some two arrangements of these object with 
the same structure. All of them have the same form however. 
Griffin goes on to explain that only form must be common 
to picture and pictured, structure being variable, i.e. 
sometimes in agreement, sometimes not. 
To return to his argument with NicGukness now. Griffin 
would presumably say that the fact that John loves Jean 
has the same structure as the fact that Bill loves Joan, 
since, in each case, one member of each pair is related 
in the same way to the other member. He would seem to be 
committed to acknowledging that the two propositions, 
' John loves Jean ' and ' Bill loves Joan ', have the 
same structure. Similarly, he would say that ' John 
does not love Jean ' and ' Bill does not love Joan ' 
have the same structure. Now there is nothing in the 
proposition ' Bill does not love Joan ' which contra- 
dicts ' John loves Jean ', but this last proposition is 
contradicted by ' John does not love Jean '; so if we 
can tell contradiction by structure, the structure of 
hn does not love Jean ' cannot be the same as that 
of ' Bill does not love Joan '. 
We can put it another way. If the structure of the 
first two propositions is ' x loves y ' and of the 
second two ' x does not love y ', assuming that these 
are contradictory structures, anything filling one 
177. 
would contradict anything filling the other, and so 
' Bill does not love Joan ' would contradict ' John 
loves Jean '. 
Of course, if he wants to say that while not needing 
the actual names, one must include relative identities, 
so that the structure of ' John loves Jean ' is ' x 
loves y ' and of ' Bill loves Joan ' ' s loves t ', 
he is admitting that they do not have the same structure. 
It therefore seems best to hold that structure cannot 
be shared, though it can possibly be shared in the weak 
sense that it can be repeated. This view is also stated 
by Black ( A companion, p.66.) who does not seem to really 
discuss it anywhere. It is also ilaslow's view as given 
in A Study of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p.85. 
As McGuinness says, the structure of a fact is simply 
the fact itself. It is the actual way the objects are 
put together. Is this structure in aay sense logcal? Is it 
the logical structure of the fact? My answer to the very 
puzzling question, What does Wittgenstein mean by 
' logical ' when he is talking about the make -up of 
complexes ?, will be given later. I will say then whether 
or not, in my opinion, structure is logical. 
We now assume that a picture -proposition is an atomic 
fact and that the fact which makes it true cannot have 
the same structure. What the two do have in common is 
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pictorial form, which in the case of a thought or prop- 
osition, is logical form. Logical form is the possibility 
that things go together in a certain way. The logical 
form of an object is the set of ways in which it can 
combine with other objects. The logical form of a state 
of affairs is simply the possibility of this sort of 
combination. 
It is obvious that Wittgenstein wishes to account for 
the ability language has to ' reduce ' all relations 
to its own level. It is one thing to explain people 
being knocked over by motor -cars, using models which 
are recognisably like people and motor -cars, and seemingly 
quite another to do so just by language. Wittgenstein 
thinks that this seeming difference is in fact not a 
real one, and to explain his point, he introduces the 
concept of ' logical form '. Language does not give 
us pictures in the ordinary sense; that is why it seems 
as though the use of a model is quite unlike the use of 
a sentence. But language does, according to his theory, 
contain pictures all the same; these are ' logical ' 
pictures. This whole theory, therefore, depends on what he 
means by a ' logical ' picture, and this, in turn, 
depends on what he means by logical form. 
We can knock one sort of candidate out straight away. 
You might think that if the structure of the fact that 
John loves Jean is just that John is related to Jean by 
his loving her, then the form of that fact would be the 
relation of love. This cannot be the logical form, however, 
even if it is through there being such a thing as love that 
he loves her. The reason is that nothing on the page loves 
anything else on the page, yet there is something on the 
page which says that John loves Jean. Since the logical 
form is shared by whatever says that John loves Jean, the 
relation of loving is quite definitely not that logical 
form. 
The same sort of argument can be used to show that 
logical form has no observable correlate; this does not 
mean that logical forms cannot be expressed perceptually, 
but that nothing follows about the observable properties 
of some thing or complex from its being of this logical 
form or that. There need be no observable similarities 
between a language and its subject- matter. 
This suggests that logical form is the sort of thing 
which might correspond to an expression like '( R (x,y))' 
( McGuiness understands it in this way; see p.222.). A 
form might then, if it be logical, take the shape of the 
abstract property of being an n -term relationship. John's 
loving Jean would have the form of being a two -term 
relationship. 
This seems particularly barren in view of Wittgenstein's 
emphasis on the form of the object which is not represented 
at all in this conception of form. Black makes the forms 
of the relevant objects ' uniquely determine the logical 
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forms of the atomic facts in which they can combine ' 
( A Companion, p.68.) and makes thelogical form of the 
fact determine the forms of its constituents ( op.cit., 
p.128.). This gives a richer content to logical form 
than mere multiplicity. What this means is that it is 
not enough simply to get a certain number of objects 
as the elements of the propositional sign. The elements 
must have certain formal properties if they are to enter 
some combination together. Besides being of a certain 
number, the elements of the complex must have a formal 
disposition which fits them for their places in the 
logical form of the fact and these formal properties 
will be known from the form of the fact. 
One naturally wonders whether or not the properties of 
symmetry /asymmetry, transitivity /intransitivity and re- 
flexivity /irreflexivity are also given with the logical 
form. According to Black's theory this would be unnecessary, 
since no set of objects can unite in more than one way, 
no atomic facts imply any other atomic facts and each 
atomic fact must have more than one element. I infer that 
he would say that giving this sort of description of an 
atomic form is unnecessary from his other opinions. Be- 
lieving that no set of objects can unite in more than one 
way at any time commits one to forbidding symmetrical 
arrangements; believing that atomic facts cannot imply 
one another commits one to intransitivity; believing that 
an atomic fact is at least a relation between two things 
rules out reflexivity. 
181. 
I am not myself convinced that no set of atomic elements 
can only combine in one possible way. It seems that one 
must admit that spatial facts cannot be atomic ones, because 
one spatial arrangement excludes others and no elementary 
propositions are inconsistent ( 63751 ). This is dis- 
turbing, because spatial arrangements seem to be, par 
excellence, candidates for the role of atomic facts. 
Black's arguments against any set of objects uniting in 
more than one way are as follows:- 
1. 21514 says that the picturing relation consists only 
of the correlation of the elements of the picture with objects. 
If objects could combine in more than one way, ' the sense 
of an elementary proposition would not always be a unique 
function of the references of its component names ' ( op. 
cit., p.82.) Also 3318 says that a proposition is a 
function of its expressions, and 34 implies that sense 
is a unique function of the references of the names. 
The question is whether one set of objects can be 
arranged in different ways, which are not exclusive, in one 
space. This seems totally inconsistent with the space- image, 
since no two positions can be simultaneously occupied by 
one thing. Therefore, if the same set of objects can be 
arranged differently, the various arrangements must occur 
in different types of space. But then there would need to 
be a different propositional sign for each type of space, 
otherwise we should not know which arrangement was being 
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asserted. We therefore have different atomic facts, with 
the same elements, and different propositional signs. How 
are we to know that the same set of objects is being 
spoken about? 
If we give up the inconsistency clause which forces us 
to allow different simultaneous arrangements, things are 
somewhat easier. To this first argument of Black's y'e 
can say that when ;!Wittgenstein says that all that is 
necessary to establish a picture relation is the correl- 
ation of one set of elements with another, he does not mean 
that the arrangement of elements plays no part; he means 
that there is no need to settle the correlation of re- 
lations, since whatever the relation operating in one, it 
also operates in the other. You can choose which objects 
to talk about, but you cannot choose to indicate one 
relation by another. 
As to the other sort of argument, that sense is a 
unique function of the meanings of the constituent ex- 
pressions of the proposition, may we not say that even 
if the sense of ' p or q ' is a function of that of 
' p ' and ' q ', this does not prevent there being 
various combinations of ' p and ' q ' . 
2. Black says that if there were two distinct prop- 
ositions composed of the same names, there would be a 
logical operation converting one into the other ( op. 
cit., p.83.). Since Wittgenstein only admits truth- 
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functional operations, this, not being a truth -functional 
one, would not be a possible operation. 
I myself can see no reason for accepting the initial 
premise, that if two propositions have the same names, one 
can be turned into the other by a logical operation. The 
' conversion ', if one wants to call it that, is not a 
logical manoeuvre; it may simply be a spatial one. The 
names are rearranged. Black appeals to 554 which says 
that, in general, a proposition occurs in another only 
as the base of a truth -operation. Since there is no 
question of one proposition occurring in another, there 
is no point in invoking 554. 
3. His last argument is that we should be able to 
represent either of the two ( say ) arrangements of the 
one set of objects with the same proposition, and so the 
proposition would not be automatically linked with the 
fact it pictures via identity of form. 
However, it does not follow that one proposition can 
give us all the arrangements of some set of objects just 
because it can give us one such arrangement. The rearrange- 
ment of objects would require a rearrangement of propos- 
itional elements too. 
The one thing which stands in the way of this sort of 
interpretation is that if objects can be rearranged in 
exclusive ways, in space, for instance, the logical in- 
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dependence of elementary propositions is infringed. There 
is good reason for allowing this infringement, although 
this would conflict with an important assumption of the 
Tractatus, and that is to make sense of the image or 
model of logical space. Another reason is that on Black's 
view, although an elementary proposition is not just a 
set of names, it might as well be, since, so long as the 
names, with those meanings, can go together, there is no 
point in using their actual combination. On Black's account 
relational characteristics are still vital, but they do not 
need to figure in the actual proposition. 
I therefore prefer to assume that objects and propos- 
itional elements can go together in different ways, although 
I cannot see how this is not to conflict with the stipula- 
tion that elementary propositions be quite independent 
logically. ( See Stenius's consideration of this, with 
which I agree, in Chapter 4 of his book, particularly 
pps.46 -7.) 
Whether one is to include such factors as asymmetry/ 
symmetry in the characterising of logical form is dependent 
on one's view of the logical relations of elementary prop- 
ositions. If one is going to allow logical relations, then 
one can allow transitivity and symmetry, but not reflexivity, 
into form. The discussion now becomes one about the inter- 
pretation of the Tractatus as an actual theory of language 
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or at least as a system which is best understood in this 
way or that even if it means sacrificing a fairly important 
assumption. 
The sort of account of form offered by Black is in some 
ways parallel to that given by Stenius in his reconstruction 
of the Picture Theory in terms of people, their qualities 
and relations. The similarity I am thinking of is that both 
restrict form to a combination of number the forms of the 
elements in the complexes. 
Stenius is perfectly well aware that his model is not 
in keeping with the Tractatus; he offers it, nevertheless, 
to give some sense to the notion of picturing. Imagine two 
sets of elements A and B, as follows:- 


















These two systems have the same categorial structure 
( Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p.92.) because each consists 
of five objects, one quality and one binary relation. These 
elements can now be combined to make facts. Assuming the 
correspondence indicated in the table above, a fact in one 
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field, each system having its own field or context, can 
picture a fact in the other. E.g. the fact that Eric is 
intelligent can picture the fact that Ellis is brave; the 
fact that Brian is _Alan's father can picture the fact that 
Barrat gives orders to A1ards. The forms of the facts are 
presumably ( Object +Quality ) and ( Two objects +Binary 
relation ). 
I do not think that the categorial analysis given by 
Stenius is quite enough to give us the logical form of 
an atomic fact, because the objects have formal properties 
which should somehow be represented or included in the form 
of the fact, as Black points out. 
What a logical form must do qua form of a complex, is, 
first to tell us how many objects there are in the fact, 
second, their general formal relation and third, something 
about the logical character of each object in relation to 
other things of the same type. It is this third type of 
information which the Stenius model does not give us. 
I wish to return to a contrast made earlier, in the light 
of which logical form made its first appearance, the con- 
trast between pictures which rely on observable similarities 
and those which Wittgenstein claims exist at the basis of 
language and which do not depend on observable similarities, 
i.e. the logical pictures. 
What a logical picture gives us is not unobservable; it 
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might be a piece of music. If the logical picture is true, 
it has given information about some actual complex. It has 
said, correctly, that there is such a complex. It is in 
virtue of its logical character that the picture does this, 
together with reliance on the correlation of elements. But 
the point is this, that these complexes have an observable 
as well as a logical character. They have an observable 
side as well as an abstract one. 
What this means, I suggest, is that, aside from their 
logical form, which they can share with quite different 
types of complex, they also have a material form. The 
material form of something may be used in picturing, but 
if it is the medium of similarity, the picture is not, in 
the full sense, a logical picture. E.g. if we represent 
spatial relationships spatially, the general form of 
representation is space; this is the picture's general 
material form: but the picture will have a particular 
spatial relation at work in it, e.g. being above, or 
being to the right of etc.; this particular relation 
will be the particular material form. 
Wittgenstein's remarks about space, time and colour 
being forms of objects ( 20251, 2171 ) are often said to 
be puzzling because it is not sera how these fit in with 
logical form. I think that the explanation of this is 
Wittgenstein's not fully distinguishing material from 
logical form. Space, time and colour are material forms, 
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not logical ones; logic permeates space, time and colour. 
When Wittgenstein talks about ' the ' relation in a 
state of affairs ( 2031 ) and the ' determinate way '( 215 ) 
in which the elements in the picture are related, and then 
says that the two complexes are bound ' in the same way ' 
( 2151 ), one naturally has in mind only one relation, which 
one takes to be the binding force in each complex. One is 
then told by the theory that spatial relationships can 
picture non -spatial ones ( e.g. as with a musical score ). 
This must be confusing, because it contradicts the assumption 
based the middle 2's. One is forced, therefore, to think of 
this ' relation ' which acts in both complexes as distinct 
from ordinary, or what I call ' material ' relations. 
The solution to the puzzle is to see that there are in 
the Tractatus two types of form. Each complex has a material 
and a logical form, the former not being deducible from 
the latter. There persists a further ambiguity, and that 
lies in Wittgenstein's talking about ' the logical form ' 
of a complex, meaning some particular thing, and then 
talking about colour and space as forms. This aaiguity is 
resolved by meaning the - articul!r form of an object or 
complex when one talks about ' the form ' and the 
general form, i.e. space or time or logic, when one talks 
about ' the general form '. The general form of a picture 
which is a thought is logic; the general form of a photo- 
graph is space and colour; the general form of a linguistic 
element is logic; the general form of a photographic 
element is space and colour, or, perhaps, simply colour. 
Something like the relation of loving would be a par- 
ticular form, on the other hand. If John loves Jean, the 
particular materieal form of that fact is the relation of 
loving. Its logical form would be something like two 
things being related by a relation R such that each can 
be related by R to the other. 
I suggest this analysis of the fact that John loves Jean. 
Fact John loves Jean 
Logical form xRy is possible 
and yRx is possible 
Logical structure John R Jean 
Material form x loves y 
Material 
structure John loves Jean 
This analysis, cannot, unfortunately, be applied with 
equal success to the objects, i.e. John and Jean. We 
want somehow to explain their form at these two levels. 
John's logical form seems, however, to be just his 
material form, unless it be simply his capacity to 
enter relationships. Is the most natural candidate for 
his logical form not simply his capacity for loving? It 
is this which allows his name to occur in the expression 
' ( ) loves Jean ', and this which prevents our inserting 
some such expression as ' this piece of cake ' 
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What this means is that the forms of the objects cannot 
be represented in the logical form of the fact, since the 
form of the one is material and of the other purely formal. 
The form of loving would be something like:- 
xRy is possible 
yRx is possible 
xhy. yRx is possible 
No mention is made of love or the sort of thing that can be 
a value of ' x ' or ' y '. The case is otherwise with some 
given object, since its potential can only be given in 
terms of being human etc. 
There is an alternative, to make the form of an object 
always relative to some other object, so that if one wants 
to know the form of A, say, it will be with respect to 
something B, say. A's form might then be one of the 
following:- 
1. A has no form with respect to B; 
they cannot be related in an atomic 
fact. 
2. ARB is possible; BRA is possible; 
ARB.BRA is impossible. 
The form of an object would then be accessible in a list 
giving combinations without mentioning relations. This is 
perhaps the closest that one can get to logical form so 
far as objects are concerned; it still presupposes mat- 
erial similarities and differences between objects, and is 
not purely logical. 
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Wittgenstein seems to have followed the same sort of 
course as Russell. Russell distinguished between ' order ' 
and the relation producing it. The same order could come 
from quite different relations, e.g. the judging relation 
and the relation of loving. It was order which constituted 
the formal similarity of complexes. With Wittgenstein it 
is logical form. We saw how he began in the Notebooks by 
investigating what sort of identity there could be between 
reality and our propositions, if, firstly, there are some- 
times no relations of the asserted sort, and if, secondly, 
the relation in the picture is not like that which is 
asserted actually to exist. ode had previously seen him 
talking about form as a simple relational characteristic. 
From there it changed into something abstract and formal; 
but this difference is not clearly marked in the Tractatus, 
as can be seen from his not discriminating clearly between 
logical form and space or colour as forms. And at the 
level of objects this conflict is intolerable, since it 
is impossible to distinguish between the pure logical 
form of an object and its matter; as he said, the object 
is colourless, without material properties; but this does 
not mean that it still retains its logical ones; these 
must go too. 
If objects are to have forms these must be given by the 
possibilities of material relationships with other objects. 
The logical forms of facts are of a more abstract type. 
Wittgenstein says, as Black has pointed out ( p.82, op.cit.), 
that all one need do is to correlate names with objects. 
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Then, by arranging the names into an atomic fact one has a 
proposition which automatically, through form, says that p, 
say. Even if we accept that the forms of the objects of 
discourse are known and that the logical form of the fact 
is known too, through its occurrence in the picture - 
proposition, is this enough,'After all, we kxow John and 
Jean, we know that they are related in a two -term symmetrical 
relationship; but why should we conclude that they are 
married? On this point the answer must be that, so far 
as the objects are concerned, any set of objects which can 
go together, must occur in a combination which can be 
expressed simply by names and logical form, and consequently, 
they can only go together in one sort of way, in one dimen- 
sion if you like. They cannot occur in both space and time, 
for instance, unless there are abstract logical differences 
which would make clear whether the complex was spatial and 
not temporal or vice versa. For any given set of objects 
there are not then different material forms unless there 
are different logical ones; but since the point of logical 
form is not to distinguish material ones, but to override 
them, it seems that any set of objects can only have one 
material form to work with. 
I have mentioned Black, McGu ness and Stenius in particular, 
together with Griffin, because they have given special 
consideration to the problem of form. I do not entirely 
agree with any of them; however there is a good deal of 
disagreement in any case. The question is not so much - 
What is the correct interpretation? but - What is the best 
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sense we can make of it? 
Two writers not examined are Anscombe and Favrholdt. The 
first says very little about structure, which is not listed 
in the subject -index of her book. Her illustration of 
logical space, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 
p.75, has nothing to do with the actual arrangement of 
objects or with what a picture and the pictured have in 
common. 
Favrholdt waits until the last chapter of his book, 
An Interpretation and Critique of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 
before he attempts ' any detailed explanation of Witt- 
genstein's concept " structure " or " logical form "' 
( op.cit., p.204.), and there he says, 
' The idea is briefly this. By means of 
names ( or elements of thoughts ) we 
can make numerous configurations. But 
only some of these fulfill the condition 
that the objects which are represented 
by the names can be combined in a 
similar way. And only these fulfilling 
this condition can be said to possess 
logical form. ( This is expressed in 
2182: ' Every "picture is at the same time 
a logical one..') Fer definition the 
concept ' structure ' is used only in 
connection with ' logical pictures '.' 
Op.cit., p.205. 
There is no need to emphasise just how misleading 
this is, missing, as it does, one of the most important, 
if not the most important point of the Picture Theory, 
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that structure and form are pre -linguistic and necessary 
features of reality. 
In criticising one other point in this short passage 
in Favrholdt's book, I will close my discussion of form. 
At the atomic level of language the linguistic elements 
are themselves objects, since this is the only way to 
achieve that correspondence by which to say something. 
Without this identity nothing can be said at all. The 
objects have a dual role, as objects and as names. That 
something is a name does not simply mean that you have 
decided this, and so it became a name. It is not a name 
unless it can go proxy for what it names. This means that 
the way the name behaves relative to other names is the 
same as the way the thing named behaves to the other things 
named. It is this which allows us to understand propositions 
which we may not know to be true and may not know to be 
false, and which also allows us to put old expressions 
together to make new propositions. Accordingly, 2avrholdt's 
suggestion that names may go together although the things 
named cannot, is not true; it is built into the name A that 
the things it goes with, if names, name objects which go 
with A. 
Summary. 
1. The objects of the Tractatus are immutable simples 
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which, like Moore's concepts, neither exist nor do not 
exist and yet form that from which reality is made. The 
simples go together to form states of affairs or atomic 
facts, which make up the world. The dominant image is that 
of space being filled in this way or that, or not at all. 
2. These objects form the ultimate subjects of discourse. 
We talk about them through pictures. At one level of lang- 
uage, the proposition is a picture, although it does not 
seem to be one because it is not perceptually like what 
it is asserting; the proposition is a logical picture. 
Not all propositions are pictures. Tautologies and contra- 
dictions are not in any sense representations of reality. 
All other propositions are. But those propositions which 
contain elements not standing for real things, although 
representations in a weak sense, are not the real picture - 
propositions. A real picture -proposition is one whose 
elements can go proxy for objects. A real picture -prop- 
osition is one asserting an atomic fact, and it is itself 
an atomic fact. 
3. Wittgenstein carries on the investigation into the 
supposed identical element present in both the proposition 
and its corresponding fact, an element already postulated 
by Russell. Wittgenstein's theory shows in a confused way 
a distinction already made by Russell. This is the dis- 
tinction between actual ' material ' relations and 
corresponding abstract relational characteristics which 
override material ( e.g. spatial ) ones. Russell called 
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this abstract property, common to both judgment and the fact 
which makes the judgment true, ' order '; Wittgenstein calls 
it ' logical form '. 
4. Wittgenstein should have distinguished between logical 
form and material form much more clearly than he actually 
did. Indeed, it seems that he was not really aware of the 
distinction, although he did realise that there had to be 
some very abstract relational property if there was to be 
the required identity between proposition and fact ( if 
the proposition were true ). His lack of awareness is not 
only shown by his talking about ' the ' relation common 
to both the linguistic and the non -linguistic complexes, 
when in fact each complex has its own material relation; 
and by his talking about colour and space as forms of 
objects, with no distinction made between this sort of 
form and logical form; it is also shown by his leaving 
the objects a logical form, even when they are stripped 
of all material properties. 
5. Each atomic complex has a form, in the logical sense. 
It can share this with andher atomic complex, even if one 
is spatial and the other temporal, i.e. even if the com- 
plexes have different material forms. The structure of a 
complex is just the way the elements are put together in 
it. A complex would therefore seem to have a logical form, 
a logical structure, a material form and a material structure. 
A complex has only one of each. 
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6. An object has a form. The form of an object is the 
set of possible relationships it can enter with other 
objects. Although this can be represented abstractly by 
a list which does not contain any reference to any actual 
relation, but only references to objects, it is not of 
the same abstract type as the form of a fact, and cannot 
therefore be included in the logical form of a fact. A. 
literal reading, such as Black gives, contradicts this. 
In giving a plausible interpretation to the theory, how- 
ever, it seems best not to give a literal reading. 
7. A. proposition -picture, if it is true, shares its 
form, but not its structure, with the atomic fact which 
makes it true. Any element in the picture behaves with 
respect to the other elements just as the corresponding 
element in the fact behaves with respect to the other 
elements of the fact; such behaviour can be shown by 
this sort of formula:- 
xRy is possible 
yRx is possible 
xRy.yRx is impossible 
The relative behaviour of y and x is shown, by what in 
fact is the form of the atomic complex. That one object 
names another means that they can enter atomic combinations 
of the same form and that if ' A ' and ' B ' are names 
in the same complex, the things they name are of the same 
material sort, although the material sort of the names may 
not be that of the named. In this way nonsense is impossible. 
Chapter Six. 
Let us suppose that ' p ' is a picture- proposition; it 
says that p. This is a positive proposition; it asserts 
the existence of an atomic fact ( 421 ) and such a 
fact is a positive fact ( 206 ). The non -existence of 
such a fact is a negative fact ( 206 ) and this is 
what is asserted by the proposition which is the negative 
of ' p '. The negative of ' p ' is that proposition 
which is the characteristic of ' -p ', ' - - -p ' etc. 
( 5253, 5512 ). When it is true that -p, ' -p ' agrees 
with reality ( 5512 ), but this does not make it a 
picture -proposition because logical constants do not 
represent ( 40312 ) 
' p ' and ' -p ' have opposite senses ( 52341 ). 
The truth- conditions of the one are precisely the con- 
ditions which make the other false. It would not be 
possible to have either true without the other false. 
This does not simply mean, according to 'Wittgenstein, 
that p, if and only if 
L 
p. If you can say that p, you 
must also have at your disposal the means to say that 
-p. The existence of ' p ' as a proposition implies 
the existence of some proposition which says that -p 
( 55151 ) 
How does ' -p ' say that -p? It says it because of 
the operation of negation being applied to ' p '; this 




the sense of ' p ' does not change, it produces a prop- 
osition whose sense is the opposite of that of ' p '. How 
does it do this? It does it by correlating ' -p ', or 
some sign with a similar meaning, with the absence of the 
fact that p, relying on the correlation of ' p ' with 
the presence of the fact that p ( 55151 ). This seems to 
me to be a tacit recognition by Wittgenstein of an asym- 
metry in the meaningfulness of ' p ' and ' -p '. He 
recognises quite rightly that assertion is only possible 
by contrast with denial, that if it is in one's power to 
say that p, it is also in one's power to deny that p. 
Although he insists that any expression expressing that 
-p be constructed with the help of an expression which 
says that p, he is not willing to say that the latter 
be constructed with the help of the former. In fact his 
account of the picture -proposition implies that it is 
meaningful in its own right; having given meaning to 
the picture -propositions, you may then give meaning to 
all others. 
Of course there is an asymmetry between ' p ' and 
' -p '. Only one is a sense -function of the other; what 
I mean is this; if the expression ' p ' is nonsensical 
so is the expression ' -p ', but the expression o 
may be nonsensical without the expraBion ' p ' being 
so, since the fault may lie with ' - '. So ' p ' must 
have a meaning if ' -p ' and ' - ' have, but ' p ' 
may have a meaning without ' -p ' having one. 
On the other hand, you cannot have assertion without 
having denial. Wittgenstein realises this, but is guilt/ 
of an inconsistency in both making the meaningfuless of 
-p ' presuppo§ that of ' p ', but not vice versa, 
and the meaningfulness of ' p ' require that of ' -p ' 
The first comes from the negative proposition depending 
on the positive, but not vice versa; the second from 
assertion being impossible without denial. 
I cannot myself see any necessary reason for the sort 
of correlation which Wittgenstein claims to exist between 
' positive ° facts and propositions and ' negative ' 
facts and propositions. Assuming that we can recognise 
the absence of something without being able to say that 
this thing is absent, as a child, for instance, may 
realise that its mother is not there, why should we not 
introduce an expression for this, which we then use with 
some other expression to create a more complex expression 
by which to say that the formerly absent thing is now 
here? We might mean by ' Out ' that Mother was absent, 
and by ' Not out ° that Mother was here. We may have 
a device by which to create from sentence S1 some other 
sentence, S2, such that if both are used assertively, 
contradictory statements are made; but we cannot tell 
simply from the fact that S2 is a sense -function of Si 
that S1 asserts existence or presence, rather than non- 
existence or absence. 




' Out ' must be a linguistic complex of several words or 
for claiming that I must have a referential expression 
for Mother, if I mean that she is out when I say ' Out '. 
The information given byihe expression does not require 
either of those conditions to be satisfied. Someone may 
understand exactly what I mean even if I cannot explain 
who is out. Of course they may not; they may want to 
ask me if I mean that Mother is out. This is beside the 
point, which is that they may know just what I mean even 
if I have no word for the person who is out. 
It may be claimed that if I do not have the word, someone 
else does. It is surely possible, however, that I who do 
not have a referential expression for my mother, can not 
only mean that she is out when I say ' Out ' but can 
also understand that she is out when someone else says 
' Out '. 
Supposing, now, that I did have two referential expressions, 
and that these were the only simple expressions in my vocab- 
ulary. Could I do anything with them? A child very often 
does use just one such expression, e.g. ' Daddy '. It will 
say ' Daddy ' whenever, say, it first catches sight of 
its father after he has been unobservable for ten minutes. 
The child means nothing when it says ' Daddy ' and all 
that the word may mean to the child is that it expects to 
see its father when it hears the word and cannot see him. 
Suppose that the child also says ' Mummy ' when the 
mother is first sighted etc., and reacts to ' Mummy ' 
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in the appropriate way. One might say that it is beginning 
to understand these words. It then adds to this understand- 
ing by saying the right word in response to the utterance 
' Who is this ?'. It now knows two names, though it never 
uses them referentially, since it never refers to the 
mother or father. 
It is conceivable that a point be reached at which, by 
putting one of these words in some specific relation to 
the other, the child tells us that its mother is related 
in some way to its father; and that the child be told of 
this relation by putting the words in relation. To this 
extent the Picture Theory is right; it does describe a 
possible means of telling and being told. However, it 
is not because it sees or hears the ' sentence ' as 
a likeness of what it then believes to be the case, that 
the child understands it; on the contrary, to see x as 
a likeness of y presupposes being able to say what x 
is a likeness of. Wittgenstein's answer might have been 
that, although the picture -proposition need not actually 
be seen as a ' picture ' to be understood, it must 
always be possible to understand it as a picture. But 
then the question is, How do you understand it in the 
first instance. 
One answer is that ' p 
fact that p and ' -p 
is simply a sign for the 
a sign for the fact that not -p, 
just in the way in which footsteps tell that someone is 
coming. This very simple account will not do, since 
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' -p ' would then tell both that p and that not -p. It might 
be suggested that the theory can be refined, in the following 
way:- Imagine a passage in, say, a hospital; at one end there 
are two lights which are sometimes both off or both on or 
on alternately. One light is red, the other blue. When the 
red light is on, it means that there is no one in the 
passage. When the blue light joins it, it means that there 
is someone in the passage. When no light is on, nothing can 
be learnt about whether there are people in the passage 
or not; the same with the blue light burning alone. This 
system gets over the previous objection. It makes the 
red light burning alone have a meaning, the blue light 
alone meangless, both lights burning together meaningful, 
although the meaning of the red light has changed. 
Of course, this sort of meaning is not linguistic meaning; 
but perhaps thistle â account is suggestive in analysing 
negation, so far as its effect on informative power is 
concerned. 
As Wittgenstein was later to say, simple models have 
their place. He said this in the realisation that the 
theory of language in the Tractatus is much too restrictive. 
Consider its act -analysis. Let us say that such acts as 
promising, denying, stating etc. are complete, compared with 
such acts as referrin to, or naming, or predicating. 
The only complete acts allowed in the theory are asserting, 
denying and inferring. The wealth of speech -acts given in 
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Lecture Xl of Austin's How to do things with words cannot 
possibly be accounted for in the very limited scope of 
the Tractatus theory. To take only one sort given by 
Austin, the commissive i.e. the sort of act which commits 
' the speaker to a certain course of action ' ( op.cit., 
p.156.). Examples are ' I promise ', ' I mean to ', ' I 
bet '. In promising to do something I am not making a 
statement; I am not asserting or denying or inferring. 
But even at the level of the incomplete speech -act, the 
Tractatus account is too restrictive. We may refer to things, 
use the names of things which do not exist, but which have 
existed or are going to exist. The rigid insistence on 
the existence of the thing named is incompatible with our 
actual use of names. Furthermore, we may use names of things 
which are much more complex than the objects, e.g. ships, 
towns and planets. 
Similarly, the semantic division into referential or 
logical is too narrow to admit such an expression as 
' good ' or ' promise ' or ' into '; none of these 
is either referential or logical. None can be broken 
down into sets of names or logical operators or a mix- 
ture of these. 
At the syntactic level, the categories are sentence, 
noun and conjunctive, leaving out of account the more 
es oteric logical symbols. Verbs, adjectives and prep- 
205. 
ositions are abandoned. All these grammatical categories 
have in fact equal validity, and all are equally different. 
The attempt to boil them all down into nouns and conjunct- 
ives is futile; not only must a great deal be lost, but 
it is impossible to effect such a reduction. The English 
language has a certain grammatical structure which cannot 
be encompassed by the grammar of the Tractatus. This means 
that the Tractatus is incapable of explaining how English 
actually works. The Tractatus is not simply putting f or- 
ward an alternative grammar; its analysis of picture - 
propositions in terms of forms and names is meant to 
show the grammar of a type of proposition through which 
all meaning passes. Language is somehow built up out of 
these propositions. This will simply give us conjunctions 
of propositions of those forms, and no amount of con- 
junctions of nouns, conjunctives and sentences of nouns 
and conjunctives will produce the categories of verb or 
preposition; just as, no matter how many names you put 
together, you will not get an expression like ' I 
promise '. 
What is wrong with ' John loves Jean ', according to 
the Tractatus? Nothing. The theory does not claim that 
sentences not of the atomic form are in some way mal- 
shaped. What it claims is that the actual structure of 
the proposition is not evident. Its real form is hidden. 
' It was Russell who performed the service 
of showing that the apparent logical form 
of a proposition need not be its real one.' 
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This quotation ( 40031 ) surely refers to Russell's 
work on ' the '. What is the ' real ' form of ' John 
loves Jean '? Following Russell's model, it would be that 
expression whose non -logical elements correspond to 
real things no matter what the state of the world, unless 
they name particulars. For some reason, Wittgenstein re- 
jects Russell's particulars and goes back to Moore's 
concepts; so this means that ' John ' and ' Jean ' 
are not really names, but complex propositions. But ' John ' 
is the name of this person; it does not matter that he 
changes, that he is complex. When we use the word ' John ' 
we mean this person and no other; we refer to him as 
' John '; ' John ' is a name. 
Must we ' get rid ' of ' loves '? 1!ilust we express 
a relation by a relation? We can express relations, even 
name them, without simply relying on relations; since it 
is logically possible for us to do this, there is nothing 
logically wrong in it. There is nothing which prevents 
us from saying that John loves Jean by using a word for 
that sort of relationship; this is how we describe such 
relationships, not simply by putting the names of the 
objects in some relation, but by introducing verbs and 
other types of word which, although particulars or things, 
can be correlated with relations. 
It might be psychologically advantageous not to name 
relations, not to have expressions corresponding to them, 
but it is logically permissible. 
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If Wittgenstein's claim is that there is an atomic level 
at which language operates, at which grammar and logic 
are one, a level at which everything is open to view, let 
him tell us how to get there. Let him show us atomic facts 
and atomic propositions; let him take a sentence from some 
natural language and replace it gradually by sentences 
whose apparent grammar is their real one. It is not enough 
to point to a ' discrepancy ' between ordinary language 
and atomic language, giving an abstract description of 
the latter. We want to know what is ' misleading ' about 
ordinary language, not in terms of some theory which has 
no foundation in fact, but in terms of actual breakdown 
of function. ' The king of France is bald ' misled 
Russell only because he thought that every referring 
expression had to be usable at any given time; he could 
not accept that it might be used at sometimes and not 
at others; it was not misleading in any genuine sense 
at all. Russell had a theory of meaning; because language 
did not fit it he blamed language! 
Wittgenstein's theory cannot be easily connected with 
ordinary language, because he does not offer an adequate 
means of passing from ordinary to atomic language; his 
theory is to a great extent incomprehensible, because 
we do not know, except in a very abstract way, what he 
means. We cannot relate his theory with convenience to 
our language and world. So far as we can understand it, 
it is not an explanation of meaning, i.e. it is false. 
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Fundamentally, the Picture Theory of language is a 
correspondence theory of meaning, a continuation of a 
theory which occupied Russell in, and shortly after, 
the first decade of this century. The doctrine of form 
and names seems to me essentially Russellian. The meta- 
physics, on the other hand, smacks of Moore. But the 
combination of these is Wittgenstein's own, with certain 
important additions, e.g. that the elements of the 
proposition and the fact are not the same, his general 
theory of truth -functions, his suggestion that Russell's 
theory of types is both unnecessary and nonsensical. 
The immediate problem answered by the theory is, What 
is the identity of proposition and reality, given (a) 
that there may be no observable similarity and (b) that 
propositions are sometimes false? ( In this connection, 
I must mention Favrholdt's claim that, 
' From the start, Wittgenstein exempts himself 
from giving any explanation of how an elementary 
proposition can be false and yet have a sense. 
I am not the first to notice this difficulty. 
It has been observed by both Anscombe ( vide 
An Introduction,Chap.4 ), Stenius ( vide 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p.40 ) and Maslow 
( vide A Study, pp'?5ff ) . ' 
An Interpretation, p.46. 
This is a grotesque travesty of the Picture Theory, 
and of its interpretation at least by Stenius and Maslow; 
Maslow, for instance, says on p.81 that ' the sense of 
the proposition is independent of the actual state of 
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affairs, of the existence of the fact it describes.') 
In terms of its assumptions, the theory does explain how 
there can be identity; but its assumptions about the atomic 
nature of reality and language are wrong. 
Summary. 
1. Wittgenstein, in his discussion of the relation 
between the positive and the negative propositions, makes 
the meaningfulness of the latter depend on that of the 
former, but not vice versa. In his discussion of denial 
and assertion, admitting or realising that neither is 
possible without the other makes the meaningfulness of 
the negative a condition of that of the positive and 
vice versa. His account is thus inconsistent. 
2. There is no reason for every language system 
(a) to have positive propositions correlated with 
' positive ' facts 
(b) to have complex sentences 
(c) to use names. 
3. The account given of a type of language, atomic 
language, to which all language must be reducible, is 
wrong because it is far too simple. The semantic, syntactic 
and act categories of ordinary language are not reducible 
to compounds of the categories of his atomic language. 
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4. Since we can make statements by using words for 
relations and by using names for complexes, there is 
nothing logically wrong with this. There is thus no 
need to believe in an atomic language of the sort 
described. 
5. Wittgenstein's Picture Theory does not explain 
language, and is in fact at odds with it. The theory is 
the rigo,4rous working out of theories held by Moore 
and Russell. It succeeds in solving the problem of 
the similarity of language and reality, but only at 
the expense of distorting both language and reality. 
Anscombe, G. E. M. 
Austin, J. L. 
Black, Max 
Bradley, F. H. 
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